1. The threat of the use of force in WMD counterproliferation:  
Comparing the cases of Syria, Iran and North Korea
Professor Christoph Bluth
Division of Peace Studies, University of Bradford

2. The second nuclear age The end of the strategic nuclear confrontation
The end of Great Power armed conflict?
The decline in inter-state conflict
A democratic peace?
News Wars, international terrorism and ungoverned spaces
The emergence of conventional global power projection capabilities
The irrelevance of nuclear arsenals?

3. The changing dynamics of nuclear proliferation
Nuclear proliferation risks during the Cold War
The changing role of nuclear weapons in international security
Nuclear proliferation as the key strategic challenge
Nuclear weapons in crisis regions
Nuclear weapons and ‘rogue states’
Non-Proliferation and Counterproliferation
The “myth of nuclear proliferation”

4. Rogue states Isolation from the international community
Authoritarian/Totalitarian Government
Human rights violation
Failure of the political elite to adhere to/internalise international norms (on the use force in particular)
Failure to respect the territorial integrity of other states and use of state sponsored terrorism
Development of nuclear, chemical, biological weapons

5. The origins of the Iranian nuclear programme
The Shah’s nuclear ambitions
Khomeinei and the rejection of the Islamic bomb
The Iran/Iraq war: The search for WMD
The Khan proliferation network
North Korean missile proliferation

6. Secrecy & Deceit A civilian or military nuclear programme in Iran?
Secret enrichment and the violation of IAEA safeguards
The illogic of domestic enrichment
The infrastructure of a weapons programme
Weaponisation: Project 111
The controversy over the US NIE
The ballistic missile programme

9. Iran’s Motives Deterrence of Iraq National pride and prestige
Ambition to be the dominant power in the region
Deterrence of the United States
A deterrent relationship with Israel?
Conflict with the international community as an instrument to achieve domestic legitimacy
Regional power struggle with Saudi Arabia
Aim: A full-fledged capability or just potential?

10. The legality of the use of force
The legal case against Iran: Violation of obligations under the NPT
Remedies under international law: Enforcement actions (demand for inspections, demand for implementation of remedies, sanctions agreed by the UNSC)
Strikes against Iran on the basis of self-defence
The Israeli assassination programme and the Stuxnet attack

11. The strategic dilemma Towards a nuclear agreement with Iraq?
If diplomacy fails: The futility of the use of force in the cause of counterproliferation
Can a nuclear Iran be deterred?
The dilemma posed by Iran’s regional ambitions and the potential impact of a nuclear deal

12. Repudiation of Iran deal by USG
US withdraws from the JCPA
No evidence that Iran is in violation
Claim: JCPA only postpones a nuclear Iran
Reason given: JCPA does not address the issue of ballistic missiles and Iran’s involvement in Syria, Iraq etc.
Sanctions to enforce change in Iran’s policy
Rift between US and Europe on JCPA
Defiant Iran continues with compliance for now

13. The strategic dilemma
If diplomacy fails: The futility of the use of force in the cause of counterproliferation
Can a nuclear Iran be deterred?
The dilemma posed by Iran’s regional ambitions and the potential impact of a nuclear deal

14. North Korea’s security dilemma
Strategic isolation
The US threat: Real or imagined ?
Socio-economic collapse: The North Korean state is not viable
Reform threatens the regime
The problem of succession
The challenge of the Republic of Korea

15. The North Korean threat
1.North Korea’s security dilemma as the source of threat
2. The use of low-level military actions
3. The nuclear and missile threat
4. Proliferation of unconventional weapons
5. The threat of collapse
6. Propaganda and subversion
7. Assessing the risks

16. The strategic dilemma on the Korean peninsula
1. The division of the Korean peninsula
2. The Korean War and its aftermath
3. North Korea: The long march to ruin
4. South Korea: From dictatorship to vibrant democracy
5. The military confrontation on the Korean peninsula
6. Containment or engagement ?
7. Korea and regional security in North East Asia

17. Dealing with the NK nuclear programme
The first nuclear crisis 1994 and the “agreed framework”
The first Bush administration: isolate and contain
The collapse of the agreed framework
The Six Party Talks and the 13 February agreement
The succession crisis and the second nuclear test: suspension of the Six Party Talks
Obama and the policy of “strategic patience”

18. The first nuclear crisis and the ‘agreed framework’
North Korea and the NPT
The conflict over IAEA inspections
The failure of negotiations and the threat of the use of force
The meeting between former President Carter and Kim Il Sung
The agreed framework – freezing the plutonium programme
The failure to achieve a missile deal

19. The second nuclear crisis
The Bush doctrine, 9-11, and the ‘axis of evil’
The collapse of the agreed framework: threat of containment but not the use of force
The origins of the multilateral talks
The failure of the Six Party Talks
The role of China
The ROK and the North Korean nuclear programme
North Korean negotiating tactics and strategic objectives: Renewed confrontation and the nuclear test
The February 13 Agreement: Towards a Resolution of the Nuclear Issue ?

20. Understanding North Korea’s nuclear policy
The nuclear programme as an instrument to address North Korea’s security dilemma
The dynamics of confrontation and engagement
North Korea’s only card: How to cash it in without losing it.
Military threats as a diplomatic instrument

21. Assessing the failure of engagement
Unconditional engagement (separating economics from politics) has not produced tangible results
Efforts to use political and economic inducements to end the nuclear program in NK have failed
Attempts to bind NK into institutions have failed
Explanation: NK does not act on the basis of norms, but only power
NK’s self-isolation means the regime is not integrated into the international community and seeks to leverage needed economic support by coercion

22. Perception of increasing threat
Nuclear development continuing unabated Frequent tests of short-range and medium range missiles Internal turmoil: Kim’s rule of fear, the killing of Jang Son-thaek (uncle), Kim-Jong-nam (half-brother) Election of Trump: Abandon Obama’s policy of strategic patience

23. Escalation of crisis Testing of Hwasong-15 missile (ICBM ?) July 2017
Tense and escalating rhetorical threats. Trump threatens “fire and fury”
September 2017: North Korean nuclear test. Kim threatens missile attack on Guam and nuclear test over the Pacific
US initiates policy of “maximum pressure” with sanctions

24. Return to engagement
South Korean president Moon Jae-in invites North Korea delegation to Winter Olympics to initiate engagement and relaxation of tension Moon/Kim summits April 2018/May 2017 Trump/Kim Summit in Singapore 12 June 2018

25. NK conditions for denuclearization
Ensuring the United States and South Korea do not locate nuclear weapons strategic assets within the vicinity of the Korean Peninsula[
Ceasing development or operation of strategic nuclear assets during USFK–ROK combined military training
Ensuring the United States will not attack North Korea with conventional or nuclear weapons
Converting the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty on the Korean Peninsula
Establishing official diplomatic ties between North Korea and the United States.

26. Results of summit
NK commitment to denuclearization but no practical steps yet except closure of test site and cessation of missile and nuclear tests
Cancellation of US-ROK military exercises
Return of remains of US soldiers from Korean War
Trump offers security guarantees in the even of denuclearization
De facto suspension of policy of “maximum pressure” and exemption of South Korean from sanctions

27. The future of Korea
Doubts about denuclearization: Will the crisis resume?
Engagement without resolving the nuclear issue
Has the role of China in North Korea weakened as a result of US engagement and South Korean conflict mediation?
Possible outcome: Partial denuclearization, closer relations between North and South
Peace treaty: Is it achievable?

28. Syria and chemical weapons
Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal
The use of chemical weapons against rebels in the civil war
Defiance of the international community

29. Syrian chemical weapons activity

30. Syria and chemical weapons
Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal
Obama’s Red Line: Failure to obtain approval for the use of force.
Disarmament to avoid military strikes
Failure of compliance
The Trump administration and the controlled strike on Syrian facilities
Empty threats and gestures: the failure of compellence

31. WMD proliferation and the use of force
The effectiveness of deterrence of new nuclear powers
The proportionality of the use of force to constrain nuclear developments
The legality of the use of force against nascent nuclear states
Diplomacy works: The threat of the use of force is not credible or proportionate
Lessons of the Iraq War – escalation of the threat of force to a disastrous conflict