1. Analytic Ontology 18-19
Lezioni 19-21

2. Lezione 19
12/11/18

3. ANNUNCI
Non ci sarano lezioni il 4 e il 5 dicembre. In sosituzione: 10 e 11 Dicembre (soliti orari)
Lezione del 26 Novembre, ore 9: Vittorio Morato (Padova) su "Contingent necessity-makers"
Programmare interventi in classe sugli argomenti delle tesine

4. Reduction of B-relations to A-properties
Just as old B theorist tried to reduce A properties to B relations (no tensism), Arthur Prior ( ) proposed to reduce B relations to A properties (serious tensism)
Goal: showing there really are no B-relational facts, or that they are less fundamental than A-facts

5. (1) P is before Q
(1a) P(Q & P & PP)  (Q &  P & PP)  F(Q & P & PP)
After hearing Marco Governatori's objection I read again what Prior says (in Past, present and future, p. 41). He says that "perhaps the negative part is not necessary". Without it we get:
(1b) P(Q & PP)  (Q & PP)  F(Q & PP)
I think the idea is (as I said in replying to Marco) that "perhaps" (1) does not rule out that P and Q also occur simultaneously. Consider: "John's eating is before John's being sleepy". This does not rule out that John eats and is sleepy at the same time.

6. However, if we assume that 'before' rules out simultaneity (as Prior seems to have doubtedly assumed), we should complete (as Marco urged) the insertion of "the negative part". So as to get:
(1c) P(Q & P & P(P & Q))  (Q &  P & P(P & Q))  F(Q & P & P(P & Q)))
I think that the impression that 'before' rules out simultaneity is due to the fact that we tend to think of events as unrepeatable (as such that the time of their occurrence essentially contributes to their identity). If so, an event e1 that is before another event e2 cannot also be simultaneous with e2.

7. My opinion
I think that we had better think of events as repeatables and thus I prefer this analysis:
(1) P is before Q
(1b) P(Q & PP)  (Q & PP)  F(Q & PP)
And I also think that Prior should also prefer this, since his P's and Q's stand for present-tensed propositions that may change truth value in time, depending on whether corresponding repeatable events occur or fail to occur

8. (2) P is simultaneous to Q [i.e., P while Q]
P(P & Q)  (P & Q)  F(P & Q)

9. A concrete example
(1) the battle of Marathon precedes the battle of Waterloo
M = [Marathon ist hosting a battle]
W = [Waterloo ist hosting a battle]
  P(W & PM)  (W & PM)  F(W & PM)
Here we are paraphrasing away "talk of events" in terms of "talk about things" (Prior, "Changes in events, ...", p. 10). Instead of a singular term for an event, we have a sentence expressing a proposition.
What if past objects seem to be involved?

10. The death of Queen Anne
Prior considers an example involving Queen Anne:
(1) the death of Queen Anne occurred 250 years ago
(1a) it was the case 250 years ago that Queen Anne is dying
Here we have a metric tense operator. Prior proposes that neutrally dated sentences can be paraphrased by means of such operators.
Prior is a presentist: according to him this is not a proposition about Queen Anne (she does no longer exist), but "about the earth, maybe, which has rolled so many times since there was a person called 'Anne', ..." (p. 13)
We shall go back to this "truthmaking" issue

11. abstracta sentences (1) 2 is a prime number
(1a) Necessarily, always, 2 ist a prime number
always A = (PAST  A) & A & (FUTURE  A)
sometime A = (PAST A) v A v (FUTURE A)

12. Neutral language Should we accept these reductions?
I think we need a neutral language that allows for tensed and tenseless predication
So that all parties can state their different ontological theses and genuinely disagree
We shall go back to this in discussing the deflationist challenge

13. A-eternism past, present and future are all (equally) real
the same event may have different A-properties at different times (tensional change)
As some events from future becomes present, others change from present to past.
More precisely, there are changes in degrees of pastness and futurity
Absolute becoming: ONLY for "A-facts" such as the being past, present or future of events. For instance, Armstrong's landing on the moon is tenselessly ("eternally") part of reality. Yet, its pastness came to exist after that its presentness ceased to exist, which in turn came to exist after its futurity ceased to exist.
Alethic change: [Armstrong lands on the moon] was true and is now false; [Armstrong landed on the moon] was false and is now true.

14. Two metaphors for A-eternalism
Moving spotlight (Broad 1923)
The river of time (Smart 1949)
(neither Broad nor Smart accept it)
Discussed and rejected by McTaggart
Defended by Quentin Smith (1993, 2002), Cameron (The moving spotlight, 2015),

15. Lezione 20
13/11

16. Lezione del 26 Novembre, ore 9: Vittorio Morato (Padova) su "Contingent necessity-makers"
sareste disposti a cominciare alle 8,30?

17. Pastism
There are only past and present, not the future, if not potentially
the Growing block theory (GB) is introduced and defended by Broad (1923). It is also typically attributed to Tooley (1997). No future at all
The Branching future theory (BF) has been proposed by McCall (1994). It admits alternative potential futures.

18. Pastism: growing block
There is tensional change at least for the passage from present to past and in degrees of pastness.
Absolute becoming: in GB new objects can come to be but cannot cease to exist.
qualitative change: perdurantism cum growing temporal slices
New supporters: Correia & Rosenkranz, "Living on the brink, or welcome back growing block!", Oxford st. in met. VIII, 2013; Forbes "The growing block past problems, Phil St
PASt
NOW
Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

19. Pastism: branching future
present: the last point of the trunk before the branching
As time goes by and a certain set of events becomes present, the trunk grows and all the alternatives at that moment are cut off.
The alternative potential events are NOT propositions. For instance, there is the proposition [the earth doubles its diameter (in the year 2100)], but there is no corresponding potential event (since physically impossible)
Is the passage from potential to actual a real coming to be? Is the cutting off of unrealized options a ceasing to be?
PASt
NOW
Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

20. Presentism (preliminary presentation)
Only the present exists
Absolute becoming
Qualitative change: endurance
Alethic change
Tensional change: there are no past and future events that change A- properties in time. There is only the acquiring presentness of events, which coincides with their coming to exist, and their losing presentness, which is their ceasing to be. Is this enough to account for time passage?

21. Eternalist problems

22. Preliminary list
Relativity theory: taken to favor B-eternalism and to go against A- eternalism and A-theory in general. Yet, there is no univocal B- relational ordering according to relativity theory
Perdurantism: eternalism (and more generally no-presentism) seems committed to perdurantism, which does not seem to be in line with common sense (however, some eternalists have argued that this is an advantage; see Loux, ch. 6)
No open future: eternalism seems to imply logical fatalism
No libertarian free will: this seems to follow from logical fatalism

23. Problems from relativity

24. We already saw the relativity of simultaneity creates a problem for any A theory
We already saw that relativity is also problematic for the B theory because only time-like separated events are univocally ordered by 'earlier than'
Time permitting, we shall discuss further details

25. weirdness of perdurantism

26. Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18
The Block theory
The B theory is often thus called
But in A-eternalism as well there is a "big block" containing all events and thus various "temporal worms"
What is there in the big block?
Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

27. Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

28. Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

29. Ma anche Socrate che beve la cicuta, e...
Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

30. Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18
How many I are there?
Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

31. Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18
Are we temporal worms?
Is each of us a temporal worm with both spatial and temporal parts?
Notte europea dei ricercatori - Bar Mercurio, Macerata, 28/9/18

32. Eternalism without perdurantism?
Mellor (1998, p. XII, and ch. 8) says yes
I think however that Merricks (1995) is right when he argues that the answer must be NO

33. No open future and logical fatalism

34. Fixed past and open future
Intuitively, the past is fixed, we cannot change it
In contrast, the future is open, and we contribute to bringing it about
Yet, eternalism seems to lead to logical fatalism, which seems incompatible with the open future

35. "prefixed" propositions
neutrally dated proposition: Garibaldi says "obbedisco" at 8:30 a.m. 26/10/1860.
In G)
G is the "internal" (undated) proposition
m is the date
Seminario dottorato filosofia Macerata - 15 Settembre 2015

36. prefixed propositions
A prefixed proposition is a true proposition of the type
@(t, P),
such that there is a time t' < t, such that
P))
is also true.
We may say P) is future-dated if t is a future time
Seminario dottorato filosofia Macerata - 15 Settembre 2015

37. Open future vs logical fatalism
We can then define the thesis of the open future as the claim that, for at least some future-dated P), where P is atomic and undated, P), nor its internal P), is prefixed.
Logical fatalism (as I define it) is the denial of the thesis of the open future

38. Eternalism => logical fatalism
Consider a dated P), with P atomic, i.e a proposition of the sort that can be made true by an appropriate event, such as the proposition that on August 21, 2020 at noon John is kissing Mary.
Given eternalism, all past and future events are real just as much as the present ones.
Hence, even if t is not the present moment, there are nevertheless all the events of time t. Among them, either there is, or there isn’t, an event p that works as truthmaker P), which leads to fatalism
Let's consider both options

39. Lezione 21
14/11/18

40. John kisses Mary at t
This event p is part of reality tout court and it is thus real from the point of view of t just as much as it is real from the point of view of any previous moment t’.
Hence, p can be considered not only a truthmaker P), but also a truthmaker @(t, P)).
t': John and Mary have never met
t: John kisses mary
t': at t John kisses Mary

41. John does not kiss Mary at t
the events of t constitute a totality which, by lacking a truthmaker P), functions as truthmaker P).
this totality is real from the point of view of t just as much as it is real from the point of view of t’, and thus is also a truthmaker for P)).
See Orilia in manuscrito 2016 for details
t': John and Mary have never met
t: many events but no John- kisses-Mary event among them
t': at t John does NOT kiss Mary

42. Eternalism and libertarian free will
Compatibilism: I am free (inasmuch as my volitions cause my actions) even though I could not have done (willed) otherwise
Libertarianism: I am free only if I could have done (willed) otherwise
There is a sense of necessity that has to do with prefixation: if a dated P) is prefixed, true at a date t'<t, then it is necessary at t'. It is impossible at t' that P fails to be true at t.
If so, eternalism is incompatible with libertarian free will
Let us see this with an example ...

43. Seminario dottorato filosofia Macerata - 15 Settembre 2015
the Garibaldi example
Given G) is true at a time m' < m:
G).
G) is prefixed
G) could not have been true at m'.
Hence, it could not have been the case that Garibaldi did not say "obbedisco" at time m.
Hence, Garibaldi could not have done (willed) otherwise, when he decided to say "obbedisco"
Seminario dottorato filosofia Macerata - 15 Settembre 2015

44. A logical advantage?
Logical fatalism seems to be clearly compatible with classical logic: no problem with the excluded middle
Must a theory, e.g. presentism or pastism, which avoids logical fatalism, sacrifice CL?
Is sacrificing CL a bad news?
We shall see this after the discussion of presentism