1. The Impact of Cognitive Load on the Processing of Moral Principles
Hanne M Watkins & Simon Laham, The University of Melbourne
INTRODUCTION
METHOD & DESIGN
Permissibility
Intuition vs. Reasoning– System 1 vs. System 2
Different moral principles have been suggested to be processed more or less “intuitively”. Intuitive processes are often contrasted with rational, or reasoned, processes (Haidt, 2001, 2007). This duality parallels the System 1/System 2 distinction of many dual process models. According to the Greene’s (2007) Dual Process Model of morality, intuition is the basis of deontological inclinations, whereas reasoning is the basis of utilitarian inclinations (Conway & Gawronski, 2013).
Moral principles may draw differentially on System 1 and System 2. Cushman, Young and Hauser (2006) have demonstrated that awareness differs across the principles of Action, Contact and Intention.
One-hundred participants made moral permissibility judgments about 6 moral scenarios presented in a random order, on a 7-point Likert Scale. There were 2 scenarios for each principle (Cushman et al, 2006): act/omission, contact/no-contact, intention/no intention.
Participants were randomly allocated to a load or a no- load condition (Valdesolo & DeSteno, 2008).
In the load condition participants were asked to remember a 7-digit number, presented for 10 seconds.
Intention principle main effect, F(1,95) = 21.38, p < .001, ηp2 = .18; Load x Principle interaction, ns: F(1,95) = 1.26, p = .27, ηp2 = .01
[scenario]
Recall
DISCUSSION
Results revealed the expected pattern: the Action principle was impaired by cognitive load, the Contact principle was partially impaired, and the Intention principle was unimpaired. This is consistent with previous research, and supports the hypothesis that the Intention principle is processed efficiently.

2. RESULTS CONCLUSION AIMS & HYPOTHESES
Action Principle
Contact Principle
Intention Principle
Available to awareness.
System 2 implicated
Partially available to awareness.
Both systems implicated
Not available to awareness.
System 1 implicated
RESULTS
Results are inconsistent with a mapping of deontological judgment onto System 1 and utilitarian judgment onto System 2. They are also inconsistency with claims about the automaticity of processing of certain moral foundations, including harm. Instead, they suggest that some moral principles that bear on utilitarian-deontological trade-off are resource dependent, whereas others not.
Permissibility
System 1 processes are characterized by a number of properties, including efficiency, awareness, controllability and intentionality (Bargh, 1989).
“Intuition” may thus be construed too broadly.
CONCLUSION
Action principle main effect, F(1,93) = 23.71, p < .001, ηp2 = .20; Load x Principle interaction, F(1,93) = 11.67, p = .001, ηp2 = .11
These results point to the utility of formulating hypotheses about processing characteristics of moral judgment at a level more molecular than broad moral inclinations or moral foundations/domains.
AIMS & HYPOTHESES
To assess whether the efficiency of processes underlying moral principles differ, for the three principles of Action, Contact, and Intention.
If a principle if processed efficiently, it will not be impacted on by cognitive load.
Permissibility
REFERENCES
Bargh. (1989). In Unintended thought. Conway & Gawronski .(2013). JPSP, Cushman, Young, & Hauser. (2006). Psych. Science, 17. Gilbert, & Hixon. (1991). JPSP, 60. Greene. (2007). TiCS, 11. Haidt. (2001). Psych. Review, 108. Haidt. (2007). Science, 316. Valdesolo & DeSteno. (2008). JESP, 44.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Special thank you to: my supervisor, Dr Simon Laham; our lab volunteers Neeraj and Candice for help with the data collection; and Kelly Trezise for help with making this poster
Contact principle main effect, F(1,93) = 17.53, p < .001, ηp2 = .16; Load x Principle interaction, F(1,93) = 2.97, p = .09, ηp2 = .03