EEC 688/788 Secure and Dependable Computing

EEC 688/788 Secure and Dependable Computing
Lecture 2 Wenbing Zhao Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science Cleveland State University

EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing
Outline Basic terminology Dependability concepts Attributes Fault, error, and failure Approaches to achieving dependability Security concepts Vulnerabilities, threats, attacks, and controls Security in Computing, 4th Edition By Charles P. Pfleeger, Shari Lawrence Pfleeger 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Terminology A system is an entity that interacts with other entities, i.e., other systems, including hardware, software, humans, and the physical world with its natural phenomena These other systems are the environment of the given system The system boundary is the common frontier between the system and its environment A system may consists of one or more components, such as nodes or processes System System Boundary Environment 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Terminology State: determines the status of the system A system may be recovered to where it was before a failure if its state was captured and survives the failure Service delivered by a system: work done that benefits its users User/Client: another system that interacts with the former Function of a system: what the system is intended to do (Functional) Specification: description of the system function Correct service: when the delivered service implements the system function Use a calculator as an example. Service: calculation service. User: whoever wants to perform a calculation using the service. Function: calculation. Spec: add, minus, multiply, division, etc.. Correct service: add: 1+1=2, etc. 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Dependability and its Attributes
Dependability refers to the ability of a distributed system to provide correct services to its users despite various threats to the system such as undetected software defects, hardware failures, and malicious attacks A dependable system has the following attributes Availability: a measure of the readiness of the system Reliability: a measure of the system’s capability of providing correct services continuously for a period of time Integrity: the capability of the system to protect its state from being compromised due to various threats Maintainability: the capability of the system to evolve after it is deployed Safety: when the system fails, it does not cause catastrophic consequences 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Quantitative Dependability Measures
Availability - a measure of the readiness of the system It is the probability of being operational at a given instant of time A availability means that the system is not operational at most one hour in a million hours A system with high availability may in fact fail. However, failure frequency and recovery time should be small enough to achieve the desired availability Soft real-time systems such as telephone switching and airline reservation require high availability 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Quantitative Dependability Measures
Reliability - a measure of continuous delivery of correct service. It is the probability of surviving (potentially despite failures) over an interval of time May also be evaluated as time to failure For example, the reliability requirement might be stated as a availability for a 10-hour mission. In other words, the probability of failure during the mission may be at most 10-6 Hard real-time systems such as flight control and process control demand high reliability, in which a failure could mean loss of life 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Fault, Error, and Failure
The adjudged or hypothesized cause of an error is called a fault An error is a manifestation of a fault in a system, in which the logical state of an element differs from its intended value A service failure occurs if the error propagates to the service interface and causes the service delivered by the system to deviate from correct service The failure of a component causes a permanent or transient fault in the system that contains the component Service failure of a system causes a permanent or transient external fault for the other system(s) that receive service from the given system Circular definition? A fault is really a failure in a smaller scope 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Fault Faults can arise during all stages in a computer system's evolution - specification, design, development, manufacturing, assembly, and installation - and throughout its operational life Most faults that occur before full system deployment are discovered through testing and eliminated Faults that are not removed can reduce a system's dependability when it is in the field A fault can be classified by its duration, nature of output, and correlation to other faults (and many other criteria) 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Fault Types - Based on Duration
Permanent faults are caused by irreversible device/software failures within a component due to damage, fatigue, or improper manufacturing, or bad design and implementation Permanent software faults are also called Bohrbugs Easier to detect Transient/intermittent faults are triggered by environmental disturbances or incorrect design Transient software faults are also referred to as Heisenbugs Study shows that Heisenbugs are the majority software faults Harder to detect Once a permanent fault has occurred, the faulty component can be restored by replacement or repair environmental disturbances such as voltage fluctuations, electro-magnetic interference, or radiation These events typically have a short duration, returning the affected circuitry to a normal operating state without causing any lasting damage Example Heisenbugs: temperary memory corruption? => lead to software aging 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Fault Types - Based on Nature of Output
Malicious fault: The fault that causes a unit to behave arbitrarily or malicious. Also referred to as Byzantine fault A sensor sending conflicting outputs to different processors Compromised software system that attempts to cause service failure Non-malicious faults: the opposite of malicious faults Faults that are not caused with malicious intention Faults that exhibit themselves consistently to all observers, e.g., fail-stop A fail-stop system simply stops executing once it fails Malicious faults are much harder to detect than non-malicious faults If a sensor does not read correctly consistently to everyone, we say there is non-malicious fault 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Fault Types - Based on Correlation
Components fault may be independent of one another or correlated A fault is said to be independent if it does not directly or indirectly cause another fault Faults are said to be correlated if they are related. Faults could be correlated due to physical or electrical coupling of components Correlated faults are more difficult to detect than independent faults What can you say about running three replicated processes on the same node? 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Approaches to Achieving Dependability
Fault Avoidance - how to prevent, by construction, the fault occurrence or introduction Fault Removal - how to minimize, by verification, the presence of faults Fault Tolerance - how to provide, by redundancy, a service complying with the specification in spite of faults Fault Forecasting - how to estimate, by evaluation, the presence, the creation, and the consequence of faults 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Computer Security and its Attributes
Computer security is synonymous to the following three attributes: Confidentiality: computer-related assets are accessed only by authorized parties. Confidentiality is sometimes called secrecy or privacy Integrity: assets can be modified only by authorized parties or only in authorized ways Availability: assets are accessible to authorized parties at appropriate times We have seen that any computer-related system has both theoretical and real weaknesses. The purpose of computer security is to devise ways to prevent the weaknesses from being exploited 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao 15

Confidentiality Confidentiality is the concealment of information Conceal the content of the information Conceal the very existence of information The need for keeping information secret arises from the government and the industry Enforce “need to know” principle Achieve confidentiality: access control mechanisms Cryptography: users without the cryptographic key cannot access unscrambled information Other access control mechanisms may conceal the mere existence of data, such as Steganography We also understand confidentiality well because we can relate computing examples to those of preserving confidentiality in the real world 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao 16

Integrity Integrity refers to the trustworthiness of information, usually phrased in terms of preventing improper or unauthorized change Data integrity: the content of the information Origin integrity: the source of the data, i.e., authentication Integrity mechanisms: Prevention mechanisms: Blocking any unauthorized attempts to change the data Blocking any attempts to change the data in unauthorized ways Detection mechanisms: report that the data’s integrity is no longer trustworthy Analyze system events to detect problems Analyze the data itself to see if required or expected constraints still hold Prevention example: suppose an accounting system is on a computer. Someone breaks into the system and tries to modify the accounting data. Then an unauthorized user has tried to violate the integrity of the accounting database. But if an accountant hired by the firm to maintain its books tries to embezzle money by sending it overseas and hiding the transactions, a user (the accountant) has tried to change data (the accounting data) in unauthorized ways (by moving it to a Swiss bank account). Adequate authentication and access controls will generally stop the break-in from the outside, but preventing the second type of attempt requires very different controls. 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao

Working with Confidentiality & Integrity
With confidentiality, the data is either compromised or it is not With integrity, both the correctness and the trustworthiness of the data must be considered Origin of the data How well the data was protected before it arrived at the current machine How well the data is protected on the current machine Evaluating integrity is often very difficult 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao

Availability Availability refers to the ability to use the information desired An aspect of reliability Also an aspect of system design: an unavailable system is at least as bad as no system at all Why availability is relevant to security? Someone may deliberately arrange to deny access to data or to a service by making it unavailable Denial of service attacks: attempts to block availability It is very difficulty to detect denial of service attacks Must determine if the unusual access patterns are attributable to deliberate manipulation of resources or of environment (i.e., an atypical event) 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao 19

Availability The security community is just beginning to understand what availability implies and how to ensure it A small, centralized control of access is fundamental to preserving confidentiality and integrity, but it is not clear that a single access control point can enforce availability Much of computer security's past success has focused on confidentiality and integrity; full implementation of availability is security's next great challenge 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao

Relationship of Security Goals
A secure system must meet all three requirements The challenge is how to find the right balance among the goals, which often conflict For example, it is easy to preserve a particular object's confidentiality in a secure system simply by preventing everyone from reading that object However, this system is not secure, because it does not meet the requirement of availability for proper access => There must be a balance between confidentiality and availability 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao

Relationship of Security Goals
4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao

Vulnerabilities, Threats, Attacks, & Controls
A vulnerability is a weakness in the security system A threat to a computing system is a set of circumstances that has the potential to cause loss or harm A human who exploits a vulnerability perpetrates an attack on the system. How do we address these problems? We use a control as a protective measure A control is an action, device, procedure, or technique that removes or reduces a vulnerability A threat is blocked by control of a vulnerability For instance, a particular system may be vulnerable to unauthorized data manipulation because the system does not verify a user's identity before allowing data access 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Controls
4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Type of Threats An interception means that some unauthorized party has gained access to an asset In an interruption, an asset of the system becomes lost, unavailable, or unusable If an unauthorized party not only accesses but tampers with an asset, the threat is a modification An unauthorized party might create a fabrication of counterfeit objects on a computing system An interception means that some unauthorized party has gained access to an asset Example: illicit copying of program or data files, or wiretapping to obtain data in a network Unlike a loss, which may be discovered fairly quickly, a silent interceptor may leave no traces by which the interception can be readily detected In an interruption, an asset of the system becomes lost, unavailable, or unusable Example: malicious destruction of a hardware device Example: erasure of a program or data file Example: (distributed) denial of service attacks If an unauthorized party not only accesses but tampers with an asset, the threat is a modification Example: someone might change the values in a database, alter a program so that it performs an additional computation Example: modify message being transmitted over the network Some cases of modification can be detected with simple measures, but other, more subtle, changes may be almost impossible to detect An unauthorized party might create a fabrication of counterfeit objects on a computing system Example: the intruder may insert spurious transactions to a network communication system or add records to an existing database Sometimes these additions can be detected as forgeries, but if skillfully done, they are virtually indistinguishable from the real thing 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Type of Threats Ask students to identify the figures w.r.t. interception, interruption, modification and fabrication 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

Threats: Methods, Opportunity, and Motive
A malicious attacker must have three things: Method: the skills, knowledge, tools, and other things with which to launch an attack Opportunity: the time and access to accomplish the attack Motive: a reason to want to perform this attack against this system 4/12/2019 EEC688/788: Secure & Dependable Computing

EEC688: Secure & Dependable Computing
Methods of Defense Harm occurs when a threat is realized against a vulnerability To protect against harm, we can neutralize the threat, close the vulnerability, or both The possibility for harm to occur is called risk 4/12/2019 EEC688: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao

EEC688: Secure & Dependable Computing
Methods of Defense We can deal with harm in several ways. We can seek to Prevent it, by blocking the attack or closing the vulnerability Deter it, by making the attack harder, but not impossible Deflect it, by making another target more attractive (or this one less so) Detect it, either as it happens or some time after the fact Recover from its effects Intrusion tolerance is also a form of recovery because it enables the system to continue operating correctly despite attacks 4/12/2019 EEC688: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao

Methods of Defense – Multiple Controls
4/12/2019 EEC688: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao

Countermeasures / Controls
Encryption Scrambling process Software controls Internal program controls, OS controls, development controls Hardware controls hardware or smart card implementations of encryption Policies and Procedures Example: change password periodically Physical Controls Example: Locks on doors, guards at entry points Software control will be elaborated in more details in the next slide 4/12/2019 EEC688: Secure & Dependable Computing Wenbing Zhao 31

EEC 688/788 Secure and Dependable Computing

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