Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers"— Presentation transcript:

1 Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers
- Linear Cryptanalysis Differential Cryptanalysis Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers CSCI284 Spring 2008 GWU This slide set almost entirely from: H. M. Heys, "A Tutorial on Linear and Differential Cryptanalysis", Technical Report CORR , Centre for Applied Cryptographic Research, Department of Combinatorics and Optimization, University of Waterloo, Mar (Also appears in Cryptologia, vol. XXVI, no. 3, pp , 2002.)

2 Recall: Single SP block
One part of key “S” block permutations From: Hey’s paper 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

3 4 Rounds 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

4 An attack: linear cryptanalysis
First concentrate on breaking a single S-box: Model S-box in terms of probabilities of linear relationships between input and output bits E.g.: x1 x4 = y2  y4 is true with what probability? If S-box were truly random, what would be the probability of that equation being true? Difference is the bias – the higher it is, the easier an attack 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

5 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

6 Generate some of these 4/16/2019
CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

7 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

8 U1 P5 P7  P8  K15 K17  K18 = V16 V1 V16  K26 = V26  V28
4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

9 Errors There are some errors in each approximation. What happens to them as concatenated? 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

10 Combined errors 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

11 Further 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

12 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

13 Complexity of linear cryptanalysis
Need known plaintext-ciphertext pairs O(1 / 2) 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

14 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

15 Differential Cryptanalysis
Like linear cryptanalysis, concentrate on breaking a single S-box: Model S-box in terms of probabilities of output differences given input differences E.g.:x = 1011 y = 0010 is true with what probability? If S-box were truly random, what would be the probability? Difference is the bias – the higher the bias, the easier an attack 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

16 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

17 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

18 Then choose S-boxes Total probability = 27/1024 4/16/2019
CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

19 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

20 Try all target sub-keys
Try all sub-keys and see which one gives the correct input to the last round most often. That’s the most likely sub-key. 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys

21 4/16/2019 CS /Spring08/GWU/Vora/Block Ciphers: Cryptanalysis All equations, tables, figures and accompanying text from Heys


Download ppt "Cryptanalysis of Block Ciphers"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google