1. SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 1
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator
Institute of Technical Informatics
Thomas Wolfgang Pieber 1

2. Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 2
Outline
Introduction
Design
Evaluation
Results
Conclusion
Future Work
Institute of Technical Informatics 2

3. Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 3
Outline
Introduction
Design
Evaluation
Results
Conclusion
Future Work
Institute of Technical Informatics 3

4. Introduction New System Designs need to be tested thoroughly
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 4
Introduction
New System Designs need to be tested thoroughly
Currently done by manually specifying I/O combinations and random testing
Designing tests based on use cases and boundary conditions
Oportunity that the designer misses special cases
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5.
Introduction 5
Improvement
Use cases can be used to directly generate valid test scenarios
Boundary conditions are simulated through changing initial and final conditions
Simulated hardware can affect the surrounding test system  Feedback
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6.
Introduction 6
Example Scenario
A sensor (DUT) is read out and charged via NFC by a robot
The robot approaches with activated NFC field and tries to read data
Data transmission fails due to long communication range
The robot gets closer
Data transmission suceeds
The robot leaves the sensor
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7. Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 7
Outline
Introduction
Design
Evaluation
Results
Conclusion
Future Work
Institute of Technical Informatics 7

8. Design Gazebo plugin to communicate with SystemC
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 8
Design
Gazebo plugin to communicate with SystemC
SystemC process is started by this plugin
Communication between the processes via standard I/O
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
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9. Requirements The simulation settings in SystemC must be configurable
Design 9
Requirements
The simulation settings in SystemC must be configurable
Commands and responses must be readable and generic
SystemC testbed must be activated continuously
Communication to affected parts must be possible
Incoming commands must be executed in correct order
Time between the simulations must be synchronized
Simulation time and memory must be reduced as much as possible
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10.
Design 10
Communication
The Gazebo plugin restructures the internal communication and adds additional information
The SystemC testbed parses the information and passes it to the correct components and adjusts simulation parameters
The simulation sends infor- mation directly to the Gazebo simulation
The Gazebo plugin needs to restructure the information to send it to the rest simulation
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
Institute of Technical Informatics 10

11.
Design 11
Communication
Gazebo starts the SystemC simulation and sends commands and a start signal
SystemC sends status information during the simulation
When the SystemC simulation is finished a signal to proceed is sent
If the simulation should run longer, the Gazebo simulation again sends a start signal; otherwise an empty SystemC run is performed and both simulations are terminated
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
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12.
Design 12
Communication cont‘d
To be as generic as possible the communication between the simulations is performed with XML
Specific tags are necessary for configuring the SystemC environment, the communication between the simulations, and the triggering of new time steps
Possible commands can look like this:
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
Institute of Technical Informatics 12

13. Simulation Time Reduction
Design 13
Simulation Time Reduction
Normal SystemC operations are performed
If all relevant components are in an Idle-state the changing parameters are estimated and changed
The simulation is stopped and a signal that indicates that a discontinuity occurs is generated
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
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14. Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 14
Outline
Introduction
Design
Evaluation
Results
Conclusion
Future Work
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15. SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 15
Evaluation
A robot, equipped with NFC capabilities approaches the sensor
This influences the channel and allows communication and energy transfer
The sensor gets charged and transmits the sensor values to the robot
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
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16. Parameters Can the robot communicate with the sensor at all?
Evaluation 16
Parameters
Can the robot communicate with the sensor at all?
How fast can this simulation approach be?
What are bottlenecks of this simulation approach?
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
Institute of Technical Informatics 16

17. Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 17
Outline
Introduction
Design
Evaluation
Results
Conclusion
Future Work
Institute of Technical Informatics 17

18. Results The robot is able to communicate with the sensor
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 18
Results
The robot is able to communicate with the sensor
The simulation gets much slower if the sensor needs to work  Time reduction works as expected
Realtime factor: Gazebo alone: 0.8 Gazebo + SystemC idle: 0.5 Gazebo + SystemC running:
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
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19. Identified Bottlenecks
Results 19
Identified Bottlenecks
Multiple SystemC simulations are execured sequentially
Parsing XML messages is slow
SystemC generates huge maounts of data that need to be stored and processed
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
Institute of Technical Informatics 19

20. Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 20
Outline
Introduction
Design
Evaluation
Results
Conclusion
Future Work
Institute of Technical Informatics 20

21. Conclusion Valid inputs for the sensor are generated
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 21
Conclusion
Valid inputs for the sensor are generated
Errors in the communication / execution are translated to errors appearing on the robot
Erroneous states in the hardware can be found by matching the timestamp of the error message with the generated data
Simultaneous simulation of many SystemC instances is very slow
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
Institute of Technical Informatics 21

22. Outline Introduction Design Evaluation Results Conclusion Future Work
SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 22
Outline
Introduction
Design
Evaluation
Results
Conclusion
Future Work
Institute of Technical Informatics 22

23. SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 23
Future Work
Update plugin structure to communicate to a server and receive results in next time step
Implement a server that searches for valid SystemC simulations to connect to
Implement a structure to parallelize SystemC simulations
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
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24. Acknowledgement SystemC Test Case Generation with the Gazebo Simulator 24
Acknowledgement
This project has received funding from the Electronic Component Systems for European Leadership Joint Undertaking under grant agreement No This Joint Undertaking receives support from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme and Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Slovakia.
IoSense is funded by the Austrian Federal Ministry of Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT) under the program "ICT of the Future" between May 2016 and May More information
Hugo Krawczyk and his co author Shai Halevi state in “Public-key Cryptography and Password Protocols“ (Aug. 99):
[. . . ] using a low-entropy password as a key to a cryptographic function, can transform an otherwise strong function into a weak one. Namely, when using passwords as cryptographic keys, one makes the assumption that these functions remain secure even when the keys are chosen from a very small set. These assumptions are so unusual that [. . . ] no one has been able to formally dene the requirements from these cryptographic functions under which existing protocols can be proved secure.
Institute of Technical Informatics 24

25. Thank you for your attention! 25
Thank you for your attention! 25