1. Stanford University and NBER
Performance-induced CEO turnover
Dirk Jenter
Stanford University and NBER

2. 目 Contents 录 ABSTRACT INTRODUCTION PRIOR LITERATURE RESEARCH DESIGN
CONCLUSION 录
Contents

3. My First Template
Abstract
We revisit the empirical relation between CEO turnover and firm performance. We
find that boards aggressively fire CEOs for poor performance, and that the turnover performance sensitivity increases substantially with board quality.
In the first five years of tenure, CEOs who perform in the bottom quintile are 42 percentage points more likely to depart than CEOs in the top quintile. This spread increases to more than 70 percentage points for firms with high quality boards. The turnover-performance spreads remain high for seasoned CEOs in tenure years six to ten, but diminish considerably for the most seas one CEOs. of incentives for most CEOs. Our results, based on a new empirical approach, are significantly stronger than inprior research, and show that the threat of performance-induced dismissal is an importantsource
We also find tentative evidence that board quality is associated with higher stock returns following performance declines, suggesting that strong boards are more effective at dealing with negative performance shocks.

4. Two questions have received the most attention.
My First Template
INTRODUCTION
Selecting and replacing the CEO is one of the key responsibilities of corporate boards,
Two questions have received the most attention.
First, to what extent do turnover decisions depend on firm performance?
And second, do certain types of boards make systematically better turnover decisions – from shareholders’ point of view – than other boards?
We modify the methodology with which the turnover-performance relationship is analyzed, and then use the new approach to study CEO turnover in U.S. firms.

5. My First Template
PRIOR LITERATURE
The prior literature has found only modest effects of firm performance on CEO turnover.
As a result, Jensen and Murphy (1990) conclude that dismissals are simply not an important source of CEO incentives.
The literature also
finds mostly small and often inconsistent effects of governance variables on the turnover performance relationship, and mixed evidence on the relation between board structure and firm performance.

6. Section 2 describes the data and sample selection.
My First Template
RESEARCH DESIGN
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the prior literature.
Section 2 describes the data and sample selection.
Section 3 explains our approach to deal with voluntary turnovers.
Cumulative turnover probabilities are examined in Section 4.
Section 5 estimates annual turnover models, examines how much prior information boards use in their turnover decisions, and reconciles our estimates with the prior literature.
Section 6 analyzes the relation between board characteristics and firm performance.
The final section summarizes and concludes.

7. My First Template
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we find that boards aggressively fire CEOs for poor performance, and that the threat of dismissal is a first-order source of incentives for most CEOs.
In contrast to the conclusions of the prior literature, measuring CEOs’ performance incentives requires more than simply measuring their stock and option holdings.
CEOs in firms with small, outsider-dominated boards with above-average director ownership are highly likely to be dismissed for bad performance, while CEOs in firms with weak boards have a good chance of retaining their job in the same situation.

8. The Effectiveness of Credit Rating Agency Monitoring: Evidence from Asset Securitizations
THANK YOU！
资料下载： PPT课件下载：
范文下载： 试卷下载：
Word教程： Excel教程：
优秀PPT下载： PPT教程：
节日PPT模板： PPT素材下载：
PPT背景图片： PPT图表下载：
PPT模板下载： 行业PPT模板：
教案下载： PPT论坛：