1. Which of these things are defined functionally? What function?
Guitar
Lungs
Human
Carpet
Paracetamol

2. Think / Pair / Share Recap
Briefly explain the key points of functionalism in 5 bullet points or less.
Include:
What it means to describe the mind functionally or as having a causal role.
What inputs / outputs the mind is related to.
Why it doesn’t matter what type of stuff the mind is made out of.
Why it is sometimes known as machine-state functionalism.

3. If I damage the blade of my electric tin-opener, what will happen to it functionally? Why might this be useful to functionalists (physicalists) when explaining the link between our brain and mind?

4. Strengths over Dualism
Functionalists can answer a common criticism about some theories of mind, most often dualism, quite easily. If I damage my brain, why does my mind also change? For functionalists, the answer is simple, damaging the brain effects it’s ability to perform certain functions. Thus a brain missing certain neurons might not be able to create certain behavioural outputs in relation to particular inputs, or it might not be capable of outputting certain mental states (until another part of the brain takes over). Note: This is not solving the problem of interactionism, but denying that there is an issue. Remember most functionalists are physicalist, so to them the mind is not some mysterious non-physical thing, but just another functional role of the physical (in our case, the brain).

5. 5 Minute Recap
Explain why functionalism is stronger than three other theories we’ve discussed:
Dualism
Behaviourism
MBTIT

6. Are there any issues for functionalism you can think of?

7. Revisiting Mary’s Room
What can you remember about Mary’s Room? Why did it demonstrate a problem for physicalism? Why might it also present a problem for functionalist accounts of the mind?

8. Revisiting Mary’s Room
We said previously that Mary’s Room (Knowledge argument) presents a problem for physicalism because intuitively we want to believe that Mary would learn something new when she sees a colour for the first time, even if she knows all of the physical information concerned with seeing a colour. If this is true it would suggest some knowledge is non-physical and therefore physicalism cannot be a full explanation of the mind.

9. Mary’s Room + Functionalism
What might be some of the inputs and outputs involved in the mental state of “seeing red”?
Functional definition of seeing the colour red
Input
Output

10. Mary’s Room + Functionalism
We can now rephrase this problem for functionalism. If we assume Mary has a full functional understanding of what happens when someone sees colour (i.e. she knows all of the inputs and all of the possible outputs in any given situation) along with all of the physical information, does she still learn something new? Again we might say that she does, she learns what it is like see red (i.e. qualia) and how the functional goings on of her mind feel to her, but if this is true then it means a functional understanding of the mind is not complete. There is some information that is not contained within a functionalist explanation – that of qualia.

11. What are we saying here?
It’s important to be specific about this criticism – Jackson would not say that his argument is showing that pain does not have a functional role. It is easy to see, for example, that when we are in pain it dictates our behaviour and other mental states. He would say however, that those functions and causes are not all there is to pain. It is not just it’s functional role. There is a “how it feels to us” part of pain that cannot be analysed purely in terms of functions. If you accept this, then functionalism has a serious issue.

12. Quick Notes
Summarise Mary’s room and explain why it is a problem for a functionalist understanding of the mind.

13. A Possible Defence?
As we’ve mentioned before Jackson actually came to reject his own argument, believing that someone with enough physical information would understand what it is like to see red. We could potentially use that argument here, if we knew all there was to know about the inputs and outputs regarding the colour red, then we would know what it is like to see the colour red. We would have access to that qualia.

14. A Secondary Defence?
We could also argue (again as we’ve seen before) that whilst all the functional information might give us a third person understanding of the mind, experiencing a particular colour would give us that same information much more rapidly in first person. We would have a different type of understanding the inputs / outputs but it would ultimately be the same information. Qualia are just a functional process.

15. How might a functionalist respond to the issue of Mary’s room?
Quick Notes
How might a functionalist respond to the issue of Mary’s room?

16. Possibility of Inverted Qualia
What colours are the boxes above? How do you know everyone else is seeing the same colour you are?

17. Possibility of Inverted Qualia
Imagine someone whose colour vision is swapped so when they see the colour yellow they see what you call blue and vice versa. Since this has been their situation since birth, they have always called bananas yellow (despite seeing what you’d call blue) and the sky blue (despite seeing what you’d call yellow) their colour spectrum is inverted.

18. Possibility of Inverted Qualia
Imagine someone whose colour vision is swapped so when they see the colour yellow they see what you call blue and vice versa. Since this has been their situation since birth, they have always called bananas yellow (despite seeing what you’d call blue) and the sky blue (despite seeing what you’d call yellow) their colour spectrum is inverted.
Is this idea conceivable?
Would they be any different functionally to you?

19. Possibility of Inverted Qualia
The problem is, if we accept that the two people in this instance are functionally equivalent, then according to functionalism they must be experiencing the same qualia. The same mental states. If we define mental states by their functional role, then two people whose mental states have the same function (i.e. same inputs / outputs) should be having the same mental state. The problem in this case is they quite clearly aren’t. Therefore, we can repeat the idea that functionalism cannot give a full explanation of qualia.

20. Response
It’s possible that the functionalist might reply here that this is an inconceivable example. We cannot ever refute or confirm the idea of inverted qualia, there is nothing in the world we can point to that would help us, we cannot make coherent sense of the difference between the two people. So the idea of inverted qualia is nonsensical. Counter Response: This seems to be a weak response, just because we can’t confirm it to be true doesn’t make it entirely incoherent.

21. Second Response
Another possible functionalist response is to deny that there is a different in qualitative experience between the two people. If we react in similar and complex ways to the same stimuli in all situations, then this is all we need to be sure we are in the same mental state. If the different qualia were to play the same functional role in relation to our other mental states (i.e. finding blue calming, red dangerous etc.) and behaviour (stopping at traffic lights when they are red) then it becomes harder to hold on to the idea that they have distinct, intrinsic natures.

22. Ned Block’s “Homunculi-Head”
Imagine a body externally like a human body, say yours, but internally quite different. The neurons from sensory organs are connected to a bank of lights in a hollow cavity in the head. A set of buttons connects to the motor-output neurons. Inside the cavity resides a group of little men. Each has a very simple task: to implement a "square" of an adequate machine table that describes you. On one wall is a bulletin board on which is posted a state card, i.e., a card that bears a symbol designating one of the states specified in the machine table. Here is what the little men do: Suppose the posted card has a 'G' on it... Suppose the light representing input I17 goes on. One of the G-men has the following as his sole task: when the card reads 'G' and the I17 light goes on, he presses output button O191 and changes the state card to 'M'... In spite of the low level of intelligence required of each little man, the system as a whole manages to simulate you because the functional organization they have been trained to realize is yours...

23. The Chinese Brain

24. The Chinese Brain
Block suggests that if we use the citizens of China (a billion or so) to represent the neurons of the brain, each with their own set of input/outputs, and functionally performing the same as the human mind (i.e. making a body they control jump on one leg when it steps on a nail) then according to functionalism we would have to say this creation is “minded”. It is having mental states. It is having qualia. Does this seem counter-intuitive?

25. The Chinese Brain
If you think it does seem counter-intuitive, then this is another argument that can be used against functionalism. This is because, the “mind” in this case is functionally equivalent to you and me, it causes the body to react in the same way to standing on a nail or being given bad news, it even may send signals through the Chinese neurons that would cause other “mental states”. But it doesn’t seem right to say it has the accompanying qualia or is conscious. And if it doesn’t truly have the accompanying mental state but can still perform functionally, it seems functionalism is not an adequate account of the mind.

26. Functionalist Response
You’re being prejudiced! Yes it may seem counter-intuitive to suggest such a system would have a mind, but that is only because we’re basing our ideas of the mind on the brain. We are assuming just because something doesn’t fit in with the type of “minds” we experience it must be wrong. Maybe the Chinese Brain, if it was complex enough, if it performed all it’s functions correctly, would be conscious. After all, we’re still not sure how our brain produces consciousness / mental states, why is it so far fetched to think other things may also produce them?

27. Tasks
Explain the three problems and why each one is a criticism of functionalism.
How might a functionalist respond to these criticisms?
Have these criticisms successfully defeated functionalism?

28. Final Summary:
Is functionalism an effective theory of mind? If so, why? If not, why not?