1. Islamic State

2. Origins of Islamic State
Grew out of al Qaeda in Iraq; Founded 1999 from disparate groups opposing Bath’ist rule
Joins al Qaeda in 2003
Challenged Shi'ite led Iraqi government and US coalition forces
Anbar Awakening; AQI nearly defeated by an alliance of Sunni tribes and US forces
Resurgent in 2009

3. Expanse into Syria
2011 expands operations into Syria capitalizing on instability and protests
Attempts to absorb al Qaeda affiliate Jahbat al Nusra
2014, splits from al Qaeda and declares Islamic State.
Rapidly eclipses al Nusra and other rebel factions

5. Caliph Ibrahim Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (The Invisible Sheikh)
Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri
Phd in Islamic Studies (Baghdad)
Imprisoned in Camp Bucca Iraq during US invasion
Became leader of al Qaeda in Iraq following Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, 2010
Declared himself Caliph 4 July 2014

6. Legitimacy? Qualifications of the Caliph
Religious expertise
Decent from the Quraysh
Approved by scholars
Jihadist organizations have been reluctant to declare a caliphate, preferring the term emirate; Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan

7. Islamic State’s Rapid Expanse
1) Financial resources
2) Clear methodology for capturing territory
3) Use of the states existing security network to their own advantage
4) Methods to draw recruits and control populations
5) Attempts by outside actors to use IS for their own interests

8. 1) Financial Resources Taxation Extortion Foreign investment
Kidnapping
Antiquities trade
Oil

9. (2) Methodology Abu Bakr Naji 2004, The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Phase Through Which the Umma Will Pass
Managing Chaos
persistent violent action directed towards the instigation of instability so as to create a zone of conflict which the state will ultimately prove incapable of controlling. As state power withers, jihadists can take advantage of instability filling the vacuum of power by either gaining popular support or at the least the submission of the populace through the provision of a secure environment.
Polarization
dragging the masses into the battle such that polarization is created between all of the people. Thus, one group of them will go to the side of the people of truth, another group will go to the side of the people of falsehood, and a third group will remain neutral, awaiting the outcome of the battle in order to join the victor.

10. (3) Redeploying State Security Network
Haji Bakr

11. Infiltration of Syria: Established intelligence offices under the guise of Dawa centers
List of powerful families.
Name of powerful individuals in these families.
Find out their sources of income.
Size of regime forces.
Find out the names of their leaders, who controls the brigades and their political orientation.
Find out their illegal activities (according to sharia), which could be used against them if necessary.

12. 4) Recruiting

13. The Caliphate
“O Muslims everywhere, glad tidings to you and expect good. Raise your head high, for today by Allah’s grace you have a state, a Khilafah, which will return your dignity, might, rights, and leadership.”

14. Permissive Violence Serves 3 specific ends
Recruitment. Violence is permitted and encouraged. Along with inhumane methods of killing, sexual slavery is also condoned (IS Fatwa 64)
Terrify enemies. This was proven effective during 2014 when the Iraqi army fled Mosul leaving behind cashes of weapon and equipment.
Maintain obedience. As a totalitarian entity dissent must be quelled. Fear of the state must be persuasive.

15. Eschatology
“The spark has been lit here in Iraq, and its heat will continue to intensify, by Allah’s permission, until it burns the crusader armies in Dabiq.” Abu Musab al Zarqawi
“The last hour would not come until the Romans would land at al Amaq or in Dabiq.”Book 41 of Sahih Muslim

16. Dabiq

17. 5) Foreign Powers
Russia, Iran
Russia, pro regime, but not committed to a united Syria or to Assad
Avoided targeting IS before weakening other anti Assad rebels
US, supports ‘moderate’ rebels, was committed to removal of Assad
US aid has been obtained by Salafi groups including al Qaeda affiliates
Iran, pro Assad, committed to a united Syria and al Assad govt
IRGC trained Shi’ite militias have in some cases abused the Sunni population making post-conflict reconciliation difficult
Saudi, anti Assad, supports Salafi rebels
Some Saudi aid has at times been received by ISIS
Turkey, anti Assad, primary concern preventing Rojava autonomy
Egypt supports al Assad
Qatar, who knows what those people are up to

18. Caliphate 2015

19. March 2017

21. DAESH vs Al Qaeda