1. POL 315: Politics of War & Security
Dr. Kevin Lasher

2. UN Peacekeeping
Part Two

3. Peacekeeping Today (3rd Generation)
Peace keeping operations since 1948: 71
Fatalities since 1948: 3828

4. Peacekeeping Today (3rd Generation)
Current peace keeping operations: 14 (5 long-term)
Uniformed personnel: 88,268
Troops: 74,740
Police: 10,283
Mil. Observers: 3245
Civilian personnel: 12,932

5. Peacekeeping Today (3rd Generation)
Current budget: $6.7 billion
Countries contributing personnel: 122

7. Top Ten UN Troop Contributors
Ethiopia ………………………………………………
India ……………………………………………………
Pakistan ………………………………………………
Bangladesh ……………………………………….…
Rwanda …………………………………………………
Nepal ……………………………………………………
Senegal ……………………
Egypt …………………………………………………
Burkino Faso …………………………………………
Ghana ………………………… …

8. Developed Country Contributors
Australia …………….…………………..…………
Brazil …………………………………………………
Canada ………………………………………………
France ..……….………………………………….….. 886
Germany ..……………………………………………
Italy .……………………………………………………
Japan …..…………………
Spain …………………………………………………
Sweden …….………………………………………….. 285
UK ……………………………………………………….. 299
USA …..…………………………
China ……………………………………………………

10. Peace Operations in the 21st Century
Preventive deployments
Traditional peacekeeping
Wider peacekeeping
Peace enforcement

11. Peace Operations in the 21st Century
Transitional Administrations
Peace support operations

12. Preventive Deployments
“It is evidently better to prevent conflicts through early warning, quiet diplomacy, and, in some cases, preventive deployment than to have to undertake major politico- military efforts to resolve them after they have broken out.”
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, UN Secretary General, 1995

13. Preventive Deployments
Utilization of UN troops to prevent armed conflict between hostile parties
Before-the-fact deployments
Extremely rare
One example: UNPREDEP (UN Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia)
From , UN troops prevent Yugoslav civil war from spreading to newly independent Republic of Macedonia
Successful in keeping Serbian troops from interfering in Macedonia
UN mission replaced by European Union mission from

14. Preventive Deployments
Perhaps most useful in carrying out UN goal of reducing war, but almost never used
Major difficulties: anticipating conflict, violation of sovereignty, time constraints, lack of institutional capability, lack of political will

15. Traditional Peacekeeping
Application of traditional, limited peacekeeping functions to intrastate conflicts with some form of cease-fire agreement in place
Few “pure” traditional peacekeeping missions because of the complexity of most modern intrastate conflicts
Most 21st century missions are “multidimensional”

16. Wider Peacekeeping
Maintains notion of some form of consent between belligerent parties in intrastate conflict
May occur with “fragile” cease-fire which could break down
Wide variety of tasks including separation of forces, disarming belligerents, monitoring cease-fires, organizing and supervising elections, delivering humanitarian aid, protecting civilians and UN personnel, host-state capacity- building
Likely to coordinate with many governmental and non- governmental humanitarian organizations
Often include changing mandates as nature of task changes
Often characterized by insufficient resources

17. Wider Peacekeeping Typical peacekeeping operation of 21st century
Successes: Namibia (1989) El Salvador, ( ), Mozambique ( ), others
Failures: Bosnia ( ), Rwanda (1994), others

18. Peace Enforcement
Chapter VII of UN Charter grants authority to “determine when a threat to, or breach of, international peace and security has occurred” and subsequently “to order enforcement measures to be taken against a state or entities within a state.”
May consist of sanctions or military action
Waging war in order to create peace
There is no permanent UN military force to utilize in such situations
United States, NATO or other major powers take lead in creating a “temporary military force”
High risk of casualties

19. Peace Enforcement
Examples: Korean War ( ),Gulf War (1991), Somalia ( ), Afghanistan (2001-present ??)
Major power (usually United States) utilizing UN status to legitimize military action and encourage other states to participate
Few successful examples are interstate war not intrastate war

20. Transitional Administration
Following cease-fire and political settlement, UN forces either assist or take charge of administrative duties such as policing, creating a temporary military force, judicial functions, creating new political institutions and bureaucratic structures, others
Responsibilities include maintaining security and order, facilitating and coordinating relief assistance, facilitating emergency rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, administering and creating structures for sustainable governance and the rule of law, and assisting in the drafting of a new constitution and conducting elections
Missions are based on traditional principles of consent, impartiality and minimum use of force

21. Transitional Administration
Examples: Kosovo (1999-present), East Timor ( )
Both involved provinces separating from larger states (Serbia and Indonesia)
UN took over almost all administrative functions in both countries temporarily and assisted in training of indigenous personnel to take over these functions
Both missions would be considered “modest successes” with a host of unresolved issues (East Timor probably more success)

22. Transitional Administration
Difficulty of Kosovo and East Timor missions highlight the unlikelihood of such missions as a practical solution to the dilemma of fragile states
Comes close to “shared sovereignty” or “trusteeships”

23. Peace Support Operations
Peace support missions are designed to undertake a range of civilian and military tasks, including the maintenance of public order, policing, mentoring of security forces, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation
The peace support model operates on the basis of flexibility, allowing the mission to adapt its posture between peacekeeping and peace enforcement depending on the compliance of the parties
Wider peacekeeping plus peace enforcement where necessary

24. Peace Support Operations
Robust military forces to protect peacekeepers, protect citizens, protect humanitarian activities
Military forces can be used against “spoilers” -- one or more actors who are refusing to participate in or abide by a cease- fire/peace agreement
Greater willingness to use military force – in order to promote the large goals of peace-making and societal reconstruction
Stresses “impartiality” over neutrality – difficult to describe military force used against “spoilers” as neutral
Temporarily using military force against “spoilers” in order to promote the larger goal of state unity

25. Peace Support Operations
Incredibly difficult (impossible) missions because of the combination of wider peacekeeping with peace enforcement responsibilities
Trying to “keep” peace and “make” peace at the same time

26. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
Much research has examined individual peace operations and made judgements about success or failure
Very difficult to draw comparative conclusions across peace operations
Much scholarly disagreement
Each mission is “unique” to a certain degree

27. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
2nd and 3rd Generation peace operations often occur in circumstances of maximum difficulty, no surprise that success rates are “mixed”

28. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
What is the standard of success?
Satisfaction of multiple parties?
Length of time before renewed conflict?
Reduction not elimination of civilian deaths?
Keeping UN troop losses to a minimum?
Making a horrible situation “less bad”?

29. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
Operational matters (nature of mandate, resources, number of troops, command and control) not very important
Of course, peace operations with clearly inadequate troops or funding have much lower chance of success
“Bare minimum” in operational matters seems to be sufficient to enable success (considering many other factors)

30. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
Contextual factors
Less success in intrastate versus interstate conflict; serious problem since almost all recent peace operations involve intrastate conflict
Intrastate conflict often involves multiple groups (more groups, more difficulty)
Intrastate conflict poses greater threats to peace operation forces (more casualties)

31. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
Contextual factors
Intensity and length of hostility between opposition parties
Most success following cease-fire plus peace agreement
Smaller territory is more conducive to success than large territory

32. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
Behavioral factors
Degree of “acceptance” among main parties
Presence of one or more “spoilers”
Third party cooperation or failure to interfere in peace operations

33. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
Political Scientist Susan Doyle stresses the “learning curve” among peace operations actors
Examples of peace operations which started poorly but ended with some measure of success

34. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
Peace keeping and peace operations do not possess a single “magic wand” to deal with their situations
Increasingly peace operations are dealing with complex intrastate wars, often with multiple combattants
Often involved in states with long history of conflict and possibly recurring civil conflict
Peace operations in states where one or more actors are not committed to ending conflict are unlikely to succeed
Peace operations in fragile states emerging from civil war in which “state capacity” is limited will face major challenges (wider peacekeeping or transitional administration)

35. Keys to Success in Peace Operations
Peace keeping and peace operations are an important tool in limiting, preventing or reversing instrastate conflict
However, future peace operations will continue to produce a mixture of successes, failures and uncertain outcomes
They will continue to receive mixed support from the international community because of the uncertainty and costs of implementation
Despite improvements in UN actions, significant problems remain in the areas of funding, training, bureaucratic coordination, and the lack of a permanent operational peacekeeping force

36. The End