1. IEEE 802.21 MEDIA INDEPENDENT HANDOVER DCN: 21-10-0041-00-0sec
Title: Proactive Authentication and MIH Security
Date Submitted: February 16, 2010
Authors or Source(s):
Rafa Marín-López (University of Murcia), Subir Das (Telcordia Technologies), Fernando Bernal (University of Murcia), Lily Chen (NIST)(?), Karen Randall (Randall Consulting)
Abstract:
This document outlines the options on proactive authentication techniques and MIH protocol level security mechanisms. The objective is to discuss these options and conclude fewer approaches for further progress.

2. IEEE 802.21 presentation release statements
This document has been prepared to assist the IEEE Working Group. It is offered as a basis for discussion and is not binding on the contributing individual(s) or organization(s). The material in this document is subject to change in form and content after further study. The contributor(s) reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein.
The contributor grants a free, irrevocable license to the IEEE to incorporate material contained in this contribution, and any modifications thereof, in the creation of an IEEE Standards publication; to copyright in the IEEE’s name any IEEE Standards publication even though it may include portions of this contribution; and at the IEEE’s sole discretion to permit others to reproduce in whole or in part the resulting IEEE Standards publication. The contributor also acknowledges and accepts that this contribution may be made public by IEEE
The contributor is familiar with IEEE patent policy, as outlined in Section 6.3 of the IEEE-SA Standards Board Operations Manual < and in Understanding Patent Issues During IEEE Standards Development
IEEE presentation release statements
This document has been prepared to assist the IEEE Working Group. It is offered as a basis for discussion and is not binding on the contributing individual(s) or organization(s). The material in this document is subject to change in form and content after further study. The contributor(s) reserve(s) the right to add, amend or withdraw material contained herein.
The contributor grants a free, irrevocable license to the IEEE to incorporate material contained in this contribution, and any modifications thereof, in the creation of an IEEE Standards publication; to copyright in the IEEE’s name any IEEE Standards publication even though it may include portions of this contribution; and at the IEEE’s sole discretion to permit others to reproduce in whole or in part the resulting IEEE Standards publication. The contributor also acknowledges and accepts that this contribution may be made public by IEEE
The contributor is familiar with IEEE patent policy, as stated in Section 6 of the IEEE-SA Standards Board bylaws < and in Understanding Patent Issues During IEEE Standards Development
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3. Proposed Approaches
Approaches (I, II, III) are classified based on the mechanism used for MIH PoS access control
Each approach is divided into sub-options (a, b or c) depending on how proactive authentication and key distribution are performed with the media specific authenticator (MSA)
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4. Approaches Approach I: Approach II:
It carries out a direct service level authentication using (D) TLS. The generated Security Association provides protection for the MIH signaling, for example, in order to perform a proactive authentication.
(D) TLS for MIH service level authentication, and
for Proactive authentication
EAP over media specific L2 frames transported through MIH messages
EAP over MIH messages. (PoS is an EAP authenticator)
Approach II:
Unlike Approach I, service level authentication is performed though (D) TLS over MIH signaling. Once protected the MIH signaling options a) and b) are performed in the same way.
(D) TLS over MIH for MIH service level authentication, and
EAP over media specific L2 frames transported through MIH messages.
EAP over MIH messages. (PoS is an EAP authenticator ) 4
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5. Approaches Approach III:
Unlike approach I and II, the access control is carried out by using EAP over MIH signaling and the signaling for proactive authentication can be protected by the Security Association created. Proactive authentication options a) and b) are the same in approach I and II, but using EAP provides a new option c) for proactive authentication.
EAP over MIH for MIH service level authentication, and
for proactive authentication
EAP over media specific L2 frames transported through MIH messages.
EAP over MIH messages (PoS is an EAP authenticator)
Re-use key material exported from EAP

6. Approach I: (D) TLS for MIH service level authentication.
Use (D) TLS for MIH service level authentication
PoS is a TLS server NOT an EAP Authenticator
MIH messages are protected after successful (D)TLS authentication by using the created TLS SA
Use (D)TLS for authentication, key establishment and ciphering
(D)TLS SA is used to protect subsequent MIH messages
PSK (static) or public key as (D)TLS credentials
Note: In this approach, TLS handshake is not over MIH Protocol. Therefore additional techniques would be required such as binding transport identity with MIHF-ID
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7. Approach I.a Proactive Authentication with the PoA
Use protected MIH transport to carry EAP over media specific L2 frame to candidate PoS
PoS relays the EAP messages to media specific candidate authenticator(s) (MSA(s))
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8. Approach I.a contd.. PoS MSA MN (TLS Server) (D) TLS Handshake
MIH SA established
Protected MIH messages w access control
MIH Messages w EAP over L2 frame
EAP messages over L2 frame
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9. Proactive Authentication (App. I.a)MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2
MSK’/rMSK’ AS
(1) EAP over media specific L2 frames through
protected MIH messages
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10. Approach I.b Proactive Authentication
Carry EAP over MIH to candidate PoS
PoS is an EAP authenticator
Two cases:
Same MSK’/rMSK’ received by PoS is sent to the MSA
A MSK (different from MSK’/rMSK’) is derived from a MS-PMK and distributed somehow to the MSA.
sec

11. Approach I.b contd.. PoS AS MN) MSA (TLS Server and EAP authenticator)
(D) TLS Handshake
MIH SA established
MSA
Protected MIH messages w access control
EAP over protected MIH
EAP messages/AAA messages
Key Distr. Mech.
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12. Proactive Authentication (App. I.b): Case 1MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MSK’/rMSK’
(2)
MSK’/rMSK’
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2 AS
 EAP over MIH through protected MIH messages
 The same MSK’/rMSK’ is sent to the MSA.
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13. Proactive Authentication (App. I.b): Case 2MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MSK’/rMSK’
(2)
MSK
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2 AS
 EAP over MIH through protected MIH messages
 The MSK is derived somehow from the MS-PMK. (Key hierarchy required).
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14. Approach II: (D) TLS over MIH for MIH service level authentication.
Tranport (D) TLS over MIH for MIH service level authentication
PoS is a TLS server is NOT a EAP Authenticator
TLS authentication is transported over MIH
Use (D)TLS for authentication, key establishment and ciphering
PSK (static) or public key as (D)TLS credentials.
MIH SA is established after successful (D)TLS authentication and subsequent MIH messages are protected
Keys from TLS execution are used to build the MIH SA.
Note: In this approach, TLS handshake is over MIH Protocol as opposed to Approach -I
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15. Approach II.a Proactive Authentication with the PoA
Use protected MIH transport to carry EAP over media specific L2 frame to candidate PoS
PoS relays the EAP messages to media specific candidate authenticator(s) (MSA(s))
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16. Approach II.a contd.. PoS MSA MN (TLS Server)
(D) TLS Handshake over MIH
MIH SA established
Protected MIH messages w access control
MIH Messages w EAP over L2 frame
EAP messages over L2 frame
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17. Proactive Authentication (App. II.a)MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2
MSK’/rMSK’ AS
(1) EAP over media specific L2 frames through
protected MIH messages
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18. Approach II.b Proactive Authentication
Carry EAP over MIH to candidate PoS
PoS is an EAP authenticator
Two cases:
Same MSK’/rMSK’ received by PoS is sent to the MSA
A MSK (different from MSK’/rMSK’) is derived from a MS-PMK and distributed somehow to the MSA.
sec

19. Approach II.b contd.. PoS AS MN MSA (TLS Server and EAP auth.)
(D) TLS Handshake over MIH
MIH SA established
MSA
Protected MIH messages w access control
EAP over protected MIH
EAP messages/AAA messages
Key Distr. Mech.
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20. Proactive Authentication (App. II.b): Case 1MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MSK’/rMSK’
(2)
MSK’/rMSK’
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2 AS
 EAP over MIH through protected MIH messages
 The same MSK’/rMSK’ is sent to the MSA.
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21. Proactive Authentication (App. II.b): Case 2MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MSK’/rMSK’
(2)
MSK
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2 AS
 EAP over MIH through protected MIH messages
 The MSK is derived somehow from the MS-PMK (Key hierarchy required).
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22. Approach III: EAP over MIH for MIH service level authentication.
Use EAP for MIH service level authentication
PoS is an EAP authenticator
PoS holds MSK’ (Master Session Key) or rMSK’ (Re-authentication MSK’) generated by EAP
MIH SA is established after successful EAP authentication and subsequent MIH messages are protected
MSK’ or rMSK’ is used for deriving media-independent pair-wise master key (MI-PMK)
MI-PMK is used to build the MIH SA and protect MIH messages
Note: In this approach, EAP is used instead of (D) TLS as opposed to Approach-I and Approach- II for MIH service level authentication
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23. Approach III.a Proactive Authentication with the PoA
Use protected MIH transport to carry EAP over media specific L2 frame to candidate PoS
PoS relays the EAP messages to media specific candidate authenticator(s) (MSA(s))
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24. Approach III.a contd.. PoS AS MN MSA (EAP authenticator)
EAP over MIH
EAP messages/AAA messages
MIH SA established
MSA
Protected MIH messages w access control
MIH Messages w EAP over L2 frame
EAP messages
over L2 frame
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25. Proactive Authentication (App. III.a)MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2
MSK’/rMSK’ AS
(1) EAP over media specific L2 frames through
protected MIH messages
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26. Approach III.b Proactive Authentication
Carry EAP over MIH to candidate PoS
PoS is an EAP authenticator
Two cases:
Same MSK’/rMSK’ received by PoS is sent to the MSA
A MSK (different from MSK’/rMSK’) is derived at the PoS using MI-PMK as root key and distributed somehow to the MSA.
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27. Approach III.b contd.. PoS AS MN MSA (TLS Server and EAP auth.)
EAP over MIH
EAP messages/AAA messages
MIH SA established
MSA
Protected MIH messages w access control
EAP over protected MIH
EAP messages/AAA messages
Key Distr. Mech.
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28. Proactive Authentication (App. III.b): Case 1MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MSK’/rMSK’
(2)
MSK’/rMSK’
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2 AS
 EAP over MIH through protected MIH messages
 The same MSK’/rMSK’ is sent to the MSA.
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29. Proactive Authentication (App. III.b): Case 2MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MSK’/rMSK’
(2)
MSK
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2 AS
 EAP over MIH through protected MIH messages
 The MSK is derived at the PoS (Key hierarchy required).
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30. Approach III.c Proactive Authentication
Using the key material exported by the EAP authentication over MIH for MIH service level authentication new key material is derived:
A MSK (different from MSK’/rMSK’ received by the PoS ) is derived at the PoS using MI-PMK as root key and distributed somehow to the MSA.
A Key hierarchy is needed
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31. Approach III.c contd.. PoS AS MN MSA (TLS Server and EAP auth.)
EAP over MIH
EAP messages/AAA messages
MIH SA established
MSA
Protected MIH messages w access control
Key Distr. Mech.
Key derivation
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32. Proactive Authentication (App. III.c)MN
(1)
MIH PoS
MIH User
MSK’/rMSK’
(2)
MSK
MIHF
Candidate MSA
Layer 2 AS
 EAP over MIH through MIH messages
 The MSK is derived at the PoS (Key hierarchy required).
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33. Proposed Approaches at a Glance
Service Level Authentication
Proactive Authentication
Key Hierarchy
(exported by EAP)
Carrying EAP over L2 frames
Carrying EAP over MIH
To protect MIH signaling
To be used in proactive authentication I a
(D) TLS
Yes No b II
(D) TLS over MIH
III
EAP over MIH c
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