1. Part II – Cleanthes’ design argument and Philo’s opening salvo
Cleanthes gives his design argument.
Philo objects to the weakness of the argument.
Philo spells out Cleanthes’ argument in more detail.
Philo then launches into an all-out attack on the argument, “somewhat between jest and earnest”

2. Cleanthes’ argument
“Look round the world: contemplate the whole and every part of it: You will find it to be nothing but one great machine, subdivided into an infinite number of lesser machines, which again admit of subdivisions to a degree beyond what human senses and faculties can trace and explain. All these various machines, and even their most minute parts, are adjusted to each other with an accuracy which ravishes into admiration all men who have ever contemplated them. The curious adapting of means to ends, throughout all nature, resembles exactly, though it much exceeds, the productions of human contrivance; of human designs, thought, wisdom, and intelligence. Since, therefore, the effects resemble each other, we are led to infer, by all the rules of analogy, that the causes also resemble; and that the Author of Nature is somewhat similar to the mind of man, though possessed of much larger faculties, proportioned to the grandeur of the work which he has executed. By this argument a posteriori, and by this argument alone, do we prove at once the existence of a Deity, and his similarity to human mind and intelligence.”

3. Philo’s opening salvo This is a “very weak analogy”
Example: Circulation of blood / sap
Comparing the universe to, say, a house!?
All we have is “a guess, a conjecture, a presumption”
Arguments from analogy require “extreme caution” and “exactly similar” cases.

4. Philo’s attack: transferring our limited observations
part → whole?
Why go with reason as our explanation?
Partiality worry
part → other remote parts?
finished world → origins of world?
“A very small part of this great system, during a very short time is very imperfectly discovered to us: And do we thence pronounce decisively concerning the origin of the whole?”

5. Philo’s attack
“Admirable conclusion! Stone, wood, brick, iron, brass, have not, at this time, in this minute globe of earth, an order or arrangement without human art and contrivance; therefore the universe could not originally attain its order and arrangement, without something similar to human art. But is a part of nature a rule for another part very wide of the former? Is it a rule for the whole? Is a very small part a rule for the universe? Is nature in one situation, a certain rule for nature in another situation vastly different from the former?”

6. Philo’s attack: only one instance
Taking experience as our guide, we have only one universe to look at—this one!
It’s not like we have lots of experience with the origin of worlds.
So where do we get off confidently making claims about the origin of the universe?

7. A quick exchange
Cleanthes: Those same arguments would work against the Copernican system. “Have you other earths… which you have seen to move?”
Philo: “Yes!” The moon, the planets, etc.
The “cautious proceeding of the astronomers”, as they first made sure of the similarity of heavenly bodies, shows the recklessness of Cleanthes’ argument.

8. Part III – Cleanthes strikes back
Cleanthes gives two thought-experiments to show that Philo’s objections (though very clever) cannot be taken seriously.
‘Voice from the clouds’ example
‘Vegetable library’ example
Skepticism is appropriate only when applied to “abstruse, remote, and refined arguments”.
But skepticism is unreasonable when applied to common sense.
And the design argument is a common sense argument.

9. Part IV – Mysticism, anthropomorphism, and the Super-God objection
Cleanthes, who thinks God’s mind is like our mind, mixes it up with Demea, who thinks God’s mind is perfect and changeless.
Cleanthes: What’s the difference between mystics and atheists?
Demea: How can a perfect God have a mind like that of humans—a big bundle of fleeting sentiments and ideas?

10. The Super-God objection
If a well-ordered natural world requires a special designer, then God’s well-ordered mind also requires a special designer.
And once we start dreaming up new designers, where do we stop? Do we go on forever?
If you can say that God’s mind is inexplicably self-ordered, then I can say that the natural world is inexplicably self-ordered.
If you can give the empty explanation that God’s mind is ordered by its rational faculty, then I can say that the natural world is ordered by its faculty of order.

11. A quick exchange
Cleanthes: Sure, we can never get at “ultimate causes” but so what? Explanations have to stop somewhere, after all.
Philo: So why not just stop at the natural world? We can just say we don’t know why it’s so well-ordered. That’s just as good as dreaming up a special designer and saying you don’t know why it’s so well-ordered.

12. Part V – Anthropomorphism gone wild!
Philo tries to show the unsatisfying consequences of Cleanthes’ anthropomorphic conception of God—basically, it’s the “weak conclusion” objection.
There are tons of new discoveries showing us just how incredible the natural world really is.
You’d think this would make the case for God even stronger.
But, because these discoveries weaken the resemblance between machines and the natural world, Cleanthes’ argument ends up being weaker!

13. Designer, yes; God, no
Suppose that Cleanthes’ argument really does establish an Designer.
But this leaves room for many possibilities.
Who knows? This Designer might very well be:
Finite
Imperfect
Unintelligent
A team of people
Mortal
In human form
We have no reason to think the Designer is anything like God!

14. Taking experience as our guide…
So what should we say about this Designer?
In “human affairs”, great machines are built by teams.
And for a universe like this, any single Designer would need “such vast power and capacity” as to be completely unlike anything we’ve ever experienced.
All the designers we know are mortal beings, “renew[ing] their species by generation”.
And since all the reasonable beings we know are in human form, the Designer probably has human form.
Taking experience as our guide, the Designer is probably a team of mortal beings in something like human form!

15. Summarizing: ‘Weak conclusion’ objection
“In a word, Cleanthes, a man who follows your hypothesis is able perhaps to assert, or conjecture, that the universe, sometime, arose from something like design: but beyond that position he cannot ascertain one single circumstance; and is left afterwards to fix every point of his theology by the utmost license of fancy and hypothesis. This world, for aught he knows, is very faulty and imperfect, compared to a superior standard; and was only the first rude essay of some infant deity, who afterwards abandoned it, ashamed of his lame performance: it is the work only of some dependent, inferior deity; and is the object of derision to his superiors: it is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death, has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him. You justly give signs of horror, Demea, at these strange suppositions; but these, and a thousand more of the same kind, are Cleanthes's suppositions, not mine. From the moment the attributes of the Deity are supposed finite, all these have place. And I cannot, for my part, think that so wild and unsettled a system of theology is, in any respect, preferable to none at all.”

16. Part VI – World-soul theory and the age of the earth
Even more than it resembles a machine, the universe resembles an animal.
Hence we might very well conclude that God is the soul of the world, controlling the world like a mind controls a body.
This theory is better than Cleanthes’ Designer theory:
The resemblance is even closer
We’ve never encountered a mind without a body attached

17. Part VII – generation and vegetation
Even more than machines, the universe resembles vegetables and animals.
So instead of coming from reason, the universe probably comes from generation or vegetation.
Sure, we can’t explain how generation or vegetation might produce a universe.
But we can’t explain how reason might produce a universe either!

18. Objection and replies
Objection: Supposing the universe did arise from vegetation or generation, isn’t that itself really remarkable? So we need design to explain that.
1st Reply: “[L]ook around you.” Vegetation and generation produce order all the time. Sure, maybe this is also a result of design, but we can’t assume that without begging the question.

19. Objection and replies
2nd Reply: If you get to ask me the origin of this special vegetative faculty, then I get to ask you the origin of the special designer. (Remember the Super-God objection)
And moreover, in our experience, reason comes from generation all the time, and generation never comes from reason.