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David Cooper Highway and Motor Carrier Modal Manager

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1 Vehicle Ramming Attacks Threat Landscape, Indicators, and Countermeasures
David Cooper Highway and Motor Carrier Modal Manager Office of Security Policy and Industry Engagement January 2018

2 Vehicle ramming is a form of attack in which a perpetrator deliberately aims a motor vehicle at a target with the intent to inflict fatal injuries or significant property damage by striking with concussive force.

3 (Rumiyah 3, Just Terror Tactics, 2016)
Threat Landscape Terrorist organizations overseas advocate the use of vehicle ramming attacks—using modified or unmodified motor vehicles—against crowds, buildings, and other vehicles. Recent ISIL Rumiyah and al-Qaeda Inspire publications continue to encourage vehicle ramming attacks. “Though being an essential part of modern life, very few actually comprehend the deadly and destructive capability of the motor vehicle and its capacity of reaping large numbers of casualties if used in a premeditated manner.” (Rumiyah 3, Just Terror Tactics, 2016)

4 Threat Landscape What makes vehicle ramming an attractive attack method? Vehicles are relatively easy to acquire or gain access to. Requires minimal planning and training. Minimized potential for premature detection. Potential to inflict mass fatalities if successful.

5 Threat Landscape From 2014 through 2017, terrorists carried out at least 23 known vehicle ramming attacks worldwide, resulting in 206 fatalities and 913 injuries.

6 Threat Landscape Most recent attacks:
10/2017, New York, NY: Man drove a rented pickup truck into cyclists and runners on the Hudson River Park bike path killing eight and injuring 11 (including attacker). 9/2017, Edmonton, Canada: Man stabbed police officer then drove a rented U- Haul truck into pedestrians injuring five. 8/2017: Barcelona, Spain: Man drove a rented van into pedestrians on La Rambla killing 14 and injuring 101. 8/2017: Cambrils, Spain: Five men wearing fake suicide vests a drove car into pedestrians killing one and injuring six. Attackers were killed by police. 8/2017: Charlottesville, VA: Man rammed a car into a crowd during a protest killing one and injuring 19.

7 Threat Landscape Most recent attacks (cont.):
8/9/2017: Paris, France: Man drove a car into soldiers injuring seven (including attacker). 6/2017: Paris, France: Man attempted to a drive car into worshippers at a mosque. No casualties reported. 6/2017: Paris, France: Man drove a car filled with guns and explosives into national police. Only the attacker was killed. 6/2017: London, England: Man drove a rented van into pedestrians at Finsbury park killing one and injuring 10. 6/2017: London, England: Three men drove a rented van into pedestrians on London Bridge followed by a stabbing attack killing 11 (including three attackers) and injuring 48.

8 Threat Landscape Most recent attacks (cont.):
4/2017, Stockholm, Sweden: Man drove a hijacked truck into a department store in city center killing four and injuring 15. 3/2017 London, England: Man drove a rented car into pedestrians on Westminster Bridge killing six (including attacker) and injuring 50. 1/2017, Jerusalem, Israel: Man drove truck into military personnel near a popular promenade killing five (including attacker) and injuring 17. 12/2016, Berlin, Germany: Man drove hijacked truck into pedestrians at an outdoor Christmas market killing 12 and injuring 48. 11/2016, Columbus, OH: Man drove a car into pedestrians at Ohio State University killing one (attacker) and injuring 11. 7/2016, Nice, France: Man drove a rented cargo truck into pedestrians during a parade killing 87 (including attacker) and injuring 433.

9 Commercial Vehicles Commercial vehicles – distinguished by their large size, weight and carrying capacity – present an especially attractive mechanism for vehicle ramming attacks because of the ease with which they can penetrate security barriers and the large-scale damage they can inflict on people and infrastructure.

10 Commercial Vehicles Commercial vehicles may be obtained for terrorist activity in a variety of ways, including: Insider threat – authorized commercial vehicle driver carries out or facilitates the attack; Hijacking – attacker gains control of a commercial vehicle by force; Theft – attacker steals a commercial vehicle; Rental – attacker rents a commercial vehicle; and Purchase – attacker purchases a commercial vehicle.

11 Indicators There are several indicators that may suggest terrorists are planning a commercial vehicle ramming attack. Although a single indicator may not always warrant suspicion, one or more indicators might indicate an imminent attack, based on specific facts or circumstances. It is also important to note that a commercial vehicle ramming attack can occur with little to no warning. also important to note that a commercial vehicle ramming attack can occur with little to no warning.

12 Indicators Potential vehicle ramming attack indicators:
Unusual and unexplained modifications to commercial motor vehicles, such as attempts to reinforce the front of the vehicle with metal plates. The purchase, rental, or request for temporary use of commercial motor vehicles, if accompanied by typical indicators such as nervousness during the purchase, paying in cash, or lack of familiarity with the vehicle’s operations. Attempts by a commercial vehicle driver to unnecessarily or unlawfully infiltrate areas where crowds are gathered.

13 Indicators Potential vehicle ramming attack indicators (cont.):
Commercial motor vehicles being operated erratically, at unusual times, or in unusual locations, particularly in heavy pedestrian areas. Presentation of altered or questionable driver’s license, proof of insurance, credit cards, or other required documents when purchasing or renting vehicles. Suspicious behavior on the part of a vehicle trainee, such as lack of interest in what type of work they will do, what route they will drive, or how much they will be paid.

14 Countermeasures TSA has developed a set of countermeasures in partnership with public and private sector transportation security partners with the aim of aiding in preventing, protecting, and mitigating the use of commercial vehicles in terrorist attacks within the homeland. Facility Security: Establish a robust facility security program with vehicle accountability measures. Event Security: Reinforce strong vehicle security, establish adequate vehicle stand-off distance, and employ vehicle barriers near parades and other celebratory gatherings, sporting events, entertainment venues, or shopping centers.

15 Countermeasures On the Road:
Instruct drivers to watch for suspicious vehicles at the pickup point or suspicious vehicles that may follow their vehicle on the highway. Instruct drivers to keep vehicles locked while in operation and while parked.  To the extent possible, avoid resting in vehicles parked in secluded areas and be wary of persons who may be observed outside your vehicle when exiting. Instruct driver to inform the dispatcher of their route and ensure route compliance. If the route changes, inform appropriate personnel.

16 Countermeasures Rental Truck Companies:
Report to authorities any suspicions arising from the rental of large capacity vehicles in areas and within a proximate time frame of parades and other celebratory gatherings, sporting events, entertainment venues, shopping centers, or other activities which place crowds near roads, streets or venues accessible by vehicles. Report repeat renters who may appear to be “practicing” their large vehicle skills in the time leading up to a nearby open event.

17 Countermeasures Community Partnership:
Request increased presence and visibility of law enforcement personnel near parades and other celebratory gatherings, sporting events, entertainment venues, or shopping centers. Consider offering your vehicle to planners and law enforcement as a secured and monitored barrier to streets, alleys, or parking facilities which lead directly to parades and other celebratory gatherings, sporting events, entertainment venues, or shopping centers.

18 Conclusion Would-be terrorists can be stopped by some of the least-intrusive and lowest-cost means available: meaningful security awareness. Drivers and staff who both remain alert to potential threats and report suspicious activities to appropriate authorities are the most effective means of detecting acts of terrorism by commercial vehicle. No community, large or small, rural or urban, is immune to attacks of this kind by organized or “lone wolf” terrorists.

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