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INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

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1 INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES
CHAPTER 12 INCOME REDISTRIBUTION: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

2 The Distribution of Income Among Households
Percentage Share Year Lowest Fifth Second Fifth Middle Fifth Fourth Fifth Highest Fifth Top 5 Percent 1967 4.0 10.8 17.3 24.2 43.6 17.2 1977 4.2 10.2 16.9 24.7 44.0 16.8 1982 10.0 16.5 24.5 45.0 17.0 1987 3.8 9.6 16.1 24.3 46.2 18.2 1992 9.4 15.8 46.9 18.6 1997 3.6 8.9 15.0 23.2 49.4 21.7 2002 3.5 8.8 14.8 23.3 49.7 2004 3.4 8.7 14.7 50.1 21.8 Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplements URL: These figures do not include the value of in-kind transfers.

3 Who is Poor? Group Poverty Rate All persons 12.7% Under 18 years 17.8%
White 8.4 65 years and older 9.8 Black 22.8 Female households, no husband present Hispanic origin 20.5 28.4 Source: US Bureau of the Census, “Historical Poverty Tables.” [WWW Document] URL: Figures are for 2004.

4 Poverty Rate ( ) Source: US Bureau of the Census, “Historical Poverty Tables.” [WWW Document] URL:

5 Measuring Poverty Poverty line

6 Interpreting the Distributional Data
Census income consists only of family’s cash receipts in-kind transfers Official figures ignore taxes Income measured annually Consumption data may provide better assessment of well-being Problems defining unit of observation

7 Simple Utilitarianism
Simple Utilitarianism Utilitarian Social Welfare Function: W = F(U1, U2, ,,,, Un) “Promote Greatest Good for Greatest Number” Additive Social Welfare Function W = U1 + U2 + … + Un Assume Individuals have identical utility functions that depend only on their incomes Utility functions exhibit diminishing marginal utility of income Total amount of income is fixed Review General Concept of Social Welfare Function Utilitarianism simply means W a function of people’s utility Conventional Welfare Economics posits W = F(U1, U2, …, Un), but this so general it doesn’t tell us much Utilitarians believed in additive welfare function, although W = F( ) is called a utilitarian welfare function

8 Implications for Income Inequality
Implications for Income Inequality This is the net gain to society Paul gains this much utility Paul’s marginal utility Peter’s marginal utility e f Peter loses this much utility d c MUPeter Take ab from Peter and give to Paul Social welfare maximized MUPaul Paul’s income Peter’s income 0’ a b I* Paul’s income Peter’s income

9 Evaluating the Assumptions

10 The Maximin Criterion Social Welfare Function W = Minimum(U1, U2, …, Un) Maximin criterion - No inequality acceptable unless it works to the advantage of the least well off Original position – “behind the veil of ignorance” Critique of Rawls Only important consideration is the utility of the least well-off member. Society’s objective is to maximize the utility of the person with the least utility. This implies there should be complete equality except to the extent that departures from equality increase the welfare of the worst-off person. No inequality acceptable unless it works to the advantage of everyone. Original position – “behind the veil of ignorance” – people will adopt maximin because of the insurance it gives against disastrous outcomes Criticisms Should decision made in original position have any special claim to ethical validity Are people really that risk adverse? It can lead to some weird outcome. “A new opportunity arises to raise the welfare of the least disadvantaged by a slight amount, but almost everyone else must be made substantially worse off, except for a few individuals who would become extremely wealthy.” Because all that is relevant is the welfare of the worst-off person, the maximin criterion indicates that society should take advantage of the opportunity

11 Pareto Efficient Income Redistribution
Will redistribution always make someone worse off? Utility Function Ui = F(X1, X2, …, Xn, U1, U2, …, Ui-1, Ui+1, …, Um) Redistribution if gain in utility from charity exceeds loss from reduced consumption Government reduces cost of redistribution Income distribution as a Public Good Social safety net Social stability Assumption that utility depends on your income only implies that al redistribution must hurt at least one person so redistribution can never be a Pareto improvement. If we assume that utilities depend not only on their own income, but those of others, then redistribution can be a Pareto improvement.

12 Nonindividualistic Views
Fundamental principles specifying income distribution derived independent of tastes Incomes distributed equally as matter of principle Plato’s 4:1 ratio of highest to lowest income Commodity Egalitarianism Some argue specification of income distribution should be derived from a set of principles that are independent of people’s tastes. Nonutilitarian approach Commodity Egalitarianism – James Tobin – certain types of commodities are so important that they should be distributed equally (less unequally than ability to pay for them) – basic necessities of life, health citizenship

13 Other Considerations Processes versus Outcomes Mobility Corruption
Fairness of distribution of income judged by fairness of process that generated it Robert Nozick Society cannot redistribute income because society has no income to redistribute Mobility Corruption

14 Expenditure Incidence
Relative price effects Public goods Valuing in-kind transfers

15 In-kind Transfers H Other goods per month 420 E3 340 A F U 300 E1 260
B D 20 60 150 210 Pounds of cheese per month

16 In-kind Transfers H Other goods per month 420 A F 300 E5 168 E4 136 B
82 126 150 210 Pounds of cheese per month

17 Reasons for In-Kind Transfers
Commodity egalitarianism Reduce welfare fraud Political factors


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