1. to the USAF Air War College
Biological Weapons
Presented by
Dr. Kenneth Alibek
to the USAF Air War College
November 1, 1999
HADRON, INC.

2. Weapons of Mass Destruction
Chemical
Biological
Nuclear
TACTICAL
STRATEGIC

3. Factors in BW Effectiveness
Choice of agent
Deployment method
Formulation
Manufacturing process
Meteorological and terrain conditions

4. Types of BW Threat Bacterial weapons Viral weapons Rickettsial weapons
Fungal weapons
Toxin weapons
Peptide weapons (a variant of toxin weapons)

5. Partial Listing of Known Biological Weapons Agents

6. BW Deployment Methods Vector Contamination of food and water sources
Aerosol (the most effective deployment method)

7. Soviet Biological Weapons Developed and Approved for Use
Tularemia
Glanders
VEE
Smallpox
Plague
Anthrax
Q Fever (<1990)
Marburg (>1990)
STRATEGIC
OPERATIONAL

8. Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s
NATURAL STRAINS
Ebola
Bolivian hemorrhagic fever
Argentinian hemorrhagic fever
Melioidosis
Lassa fever
Japanese encephalitis
Russian spring-summer encephalitis

9. Biological Weapons Being Developed--Late ‘80s/Early ‘90s
GENETICALLY ENGINEERED STRAINS
Antibiotic-resistant (AR) plague
AR tularemia
AR anthrax
Antibiotic- and sulfonamide-resistant glanders
Immune system-overcoming (IO) plague
IO tularemia
IO anthrax
Smallpox with VEE genes inserted

10. Types of Biological Weapons
DRY
Tularemia
Anthrax
Brucellosis
Marburg
LIQUID
Smallpox
Plague
Anthrax
VEE

11. BW Manufacturing Capacities Ministry of Defense
Sverdlovsk facility--anthrax
100+ tons stockpiled
Production capacity > 1000 tons annually
Kirov facility--plague
20 tons stockpiled
Production capacity ~ 200 tons annually
Zagorsk facility--smallpox
Production capacity ~ 100 tons annually
Strizhi (new facility)

12. BW Manufacturing Capacities Biopreparat
Berdsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders
Production capacity > 1000 tons annually
Stepnogorsk facility--anthrax, tularemia, glanders
Omutninsk facility--plague, tularemia, glanders

13. BW Manufacturing Capacities Biopreparat (cont.)
Kurgan facility--anthrax
Production capacity > 1000 tons annually
Penza facility--anthrax
Koltsovo facility--Marburg, smallpox
Exact production capacity unknown; dozens of tons annually

14. BW Manufacturing Capacities Ministry of Agriculture
Pokrov facility--smallpox, VEE
Production capacity > 200 tons annually

15. Munitions, Submunitions, Delivery Means
Aviation bombs with “biological” bomblets for strategic and medium bombers
Spray tanks installed on medium bombers
Multiwarhead ballistic missiles with bomblet warheads
Cruise missiles with special disseminating devices (under development)

16. Epidemiological Pattern of Smallpox Weapon
New foci of
secondary infection
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Zone of initial
explosion

17. Epidemiological Pattern of Tularemia Weapon
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Zone of initial
explosion

18. Epidemiological Pattern of Plague Weapon
New foci of
secondary infection
Contaminated zone
Infected zone
Zone of initial
explosion

19. Epidemiological Pattern of Anthrax Weapon
Contaminated zone
Zone of initial
explosion
Infected zone

20. Modes of Infection PRIMARY AEROSOL
Caused by aerosols that form immediately after dissemination
Affect “target objects” before sedimentation
SECONDARY AEROSOL
Caused by aerosols which have already sedimented, but have aerosolized again due to wind or activity (building ventilation, vehicular activity, street cleaning, maintenance, etc.)

21. Modes of Infection (cont.)
SECONDARY DROPLET
Caused by droplet aerosols secreted by people who were infected by primary or secondary aerosols
Seen only with agents contagious by respiratory droplet infection
SECONDARY NON-AEROSOL
Transmitted by infected animals (rodents, insect parasites) directly or via objects, food or water, OR
Transmitted by contaminated objects (without involving aerosolization)

22. Effectiveness of the USSR’s BW
Specific expenditure value (Q50) = amount of BW required to affect 50% of the population evenly distributed over one square kilometer (open area)
Smallpox, anthrax, tularemia, plague, VEE, glanders: Q50 ~ 3-5 kg/km2
Marburg, dry form (and theoretically dry Ebola): Q50 ~ 1 kg/km2

23. Current Defenses Against Biological Weapons
Physical:
Early Detection
Limited Capability
Protective Gear
Inadequate
Unrealistic

24. Current Defenses Against Biological Weapons
Medical:
Vaccines
Available for < 10% of known agents
Genetic engineering can render ineffective
Weeks / months to become effective
Supplies inadequate
Not cost effective
Pre-treatment
Depends on luck
Treatment
Marginal success

25. Medical Research Targets
Treating and preventing a broad spectrum of infections by modulating the immune system
Treating and preventing specific infections caused by biological weapons

26. Dr. Kenneth Alibek HADRON, INC. 7611 Little River Turnpike Suite 404W
Annandale, VA
(703)