1. THE RISE OF THE NEW LEFT

3. CONTEXT Rise of China Autonomy for Latin America
Breakdown of ideological consensus
Securitizing U.S.-Latin American relations
Source: Domínguez, “Changes in the International System”

4. THE EVOLVING WORLD ORDER
Unipolar?
Multipolar?
Flat?
Pyramid?
Source: Smith, “Global Scenarios,” CR # 4

5. THE NEW LEFT: ORIGINS
Economic—lack of growth (through 2003), poverty and inequality, frustration with Washington Consensus
Political—weakness of representative institutions, inattention to poor, persistence of corruption
International—war in Iraq, opposition to Bush policies and growing distaste for American society

6. THE NEW LEFT: MEMBERSHIP
Hugo Chávez, Venezuela (1998, 2004, 2006)
Lula, Brazil (2002, 2006) and Dilma Rousseff (2010)
Néstor Kirchner and Cristina Fernández, Argentina (2003, 2007, 2011)
Evo Morales, Bolivia (2005, 2009)
Daniel Ortega, Nicaragua (2006, 2010)
Rafael Correa, Ecuador (2006, 2010)
Fernando Lugo, Paraguay (2008)
Mauricio Funes, El Salvador (2009)
Ollanta Humala, Peru (2011)
Near-Miss:
Andrés Manuel López Obrador, Mexico (2006)

7. CLARIFICATION #1 Differentiation: right/center/left
Contending leaders in/for Latin America:
Felipe Calderón (Mexico)
Lula and Dilma (Brazil)
Hugo Chávez (Venezuela)

8. CLARIFICATION #2 Disenchanted masses in Latin America ≠
Voters for pink tide candidates ≠
Leftist candidates for office ≠
Leftist winners of presidential elections ≠
Pro-Chávez chief executives ≠
Hugo Chávez
Notes:
Tidal swell is spontaneous, not organized
Rivalries and defections

9. THE NEW LEFT: GOALS
Domestic—winning power, rearranging electoral alignments; overturning status quo, possibly through institutional reform; changing policy direction
Hemispheric—gaining support throughout Latin America (invoking “Bolivarian dream”), reducing U.S. hegemony
Global—challenging international order, forging alliances with developing world and non-aligned nations

11. THE PROBLEM WITH HUGO
Uses language of the street (including the Arab street)—e.g., the “devil” speech
Sits atop petroleum
Puts money where his mouth is
Breaks established rules of the game
Plays off resentment of Bush, U.S. power
Challenges Washington Consensus
Goes for high stakes
Seeks rearrangement of prevailing world order

12. THE ODD COUPLE: HUGO AND JORGE
George’s “gifts” to Hugo:
discourse on democracy (e.g., Second Inaugural)
caricature of “ugly American”
unpopularity of foreign policies
inattention to Latin America
And Hugo’s reciprocation:
exaggerated rhetoric
potential threats to neighboring countries
authoritarian tendencies
Q1: What would Hugo do without George?
Q2: What about oil?

13. CHALLENGING AMERICAN MYTHS
The Cherished Assumption—freely elected leaders will support U.S. policy
The Western Hemisphere idea—the new world is distinct from old, will forge common front in international arena
Democracy rationale for “regime change”—free elections as protective shield
The hegemonic presumption—the United States can dictate political life in Latin America

14. VISIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA: GWB AND USA
Democratic—with tilt to right or center-right
Prosperous—with commitment to free-market policies and ties to United States
Unified—under U.S. leadership
Peaceful—in view of unanimity
Deferential—following U.S. lead in global arena

15. REALITY CHECK #1
Democracy = broad ideological spectrum, from “left” to “right”
Prosperity = mixed economies; rejection of Washington Consensus, FTAs, and FTAA
Ideology = diversity rather than unity
Outlooks = anti-U.S. attitudes strong among large share of population (improving with Obama)
Alliances = rejection of U.S. leadership and rules of the game

16. REALITY CHECK #2
Not everyone wants the same thing…!

17. GWB and Latin America: Comparative and Historical Perspective
_________Latin America as Priority___________
______ Low _______ _______ High _____
Operational
Mode for U.S. ____
Unilateral Ad hoc Systematic
imposition intervention
(Bush ) (Reagan )
_______ _________________ __________________
Intermittent, Consistent,
Multilateral low-level high-level
diplomacy engagement
(Clinton ) (Kennedy )
____________________________________________________________

18. Rank-Order Preferences for U.S. Policy
___Partners___ __Targets___
U.S. Policy (Mexico, (Cuba, __Rivals___ ___Bystanders__
__Configuration__ _Bush II__ __Colombia)__ __Venezuela)__ __(Brazil?)__ ___(Others)____
Low priority
+ Unilateral
Low priority
+ Multilateral
High priority
High priority
Note: As presented here, ordinal rankings mean that 1 stands for the first-place (most preferable) choice,
2 for the second-place choice, 3 for the third-place choice, and 4 for the fourth-place (least preferable) choice.

19. The End.