1. Quiz 1
At the beginning of the Second Meditation, what statement is it that Descartes knows to be necessarily true (or at least necessarily true whenever he conceives it)?
What are the two main parts of a human being, according to Descartes’ former opinions?
What is the one activity of the soul that cannot be doubted? (Nutrition, locomotion, perception, thinking?)
So far, how would Descartes respond to the question, “Am I identical with my body?”—’Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘I don’t know’?
As illustrated by the wax example, how do we know the nature of external bodies—by the senses, the imagination, or the intellect?

2. Second Meditation – paragraph 1
Restating the method:
withhold assent from anything subject to doubt, as if it were false
keep going until I find something certain
or least find that nothing is certain
Hopefully, some particular certainty can serve as an ‘Archimedean point’—as a foundation for science.

3. ¶2 – Restating the doubt Suppose that everything is an illusion:
sense perceptions
memory
simple natures: body, shape, extension, etc.
Is nothing certain?

4. ¶3 – The Cogito Or is there something that cannot be doubted?
God’s existence? After all, someone has to put these thoughts into me.
No, because perhaps the thoughts just come from me.
But then at least I exist.

5. ¶3 – The Cogito But I have no senses and no body!
And how can I exist without senses and a body?
Well, I’ve convinced myself that the material world doesn’t even exist, and, if I’m convinced of anything, then I at least exist.
But an evil deceiver is deceiving me!
Well, if I’m being deceived, then I exist.
[There is no doubting that I exist: every skeptical scenario includes me in it!]
Whenever I directly examine [‘put forward’ or ‘conceive in my mind’] the proposition “I am, I exist”, I necessarily exist.

6. ¶4 – So what am I? (Intro) Now I’ve got a certainty: that I exist.
But what is the nature of this thing, the thing “I” refers to? [what is the nature of the self?]
I’ll start with my old opinions: what kind of thing did I think I was?
Then I’ll run the method of doubt on these old opinions.
And whatever survives will be certain.

7. ¶5 – So what am I? (My old opinions)
I thought I was a human, so what is a human?
A “rational animal”?
[that’s what Aristotle would say]
But this is not a promising approach; it raises too many other questions.
Instead, I’ll focus on a sort of offhand and ordinary account of what a human is.

8. ¶5 – So what am I? (My old opinions)
My old down-to-earth ‘natural’ and ‘spontaneous’ account of what it is to be a human:
Body (“the whole mechanical structure”)
a body is just “whatever has a determinable shape and a definable location and can occupy a space in such a way as to exclude any other body”
“it can be perceived... and can be moved..., not by itself, but by whatever else comes into contact with it”
Soul
responsible for nourishment, locomotion, sense-perception, thinking
And the soul, if I had to guess, is something like a wind permeating my body.
I was very confident about the nature of the body, more so than the nature of the soul.

9. ¶6 – So what am I? (Doubting my old opinions)
But now bring in the dream scenario or the evil deceiver.
Do I know for sure that I have any of the attributes found in the nature of body?
No.
Do I know for sure that I have the attributes found in the nature of soul?
Nutrition? Movement? No.
Sense-perception? No.
Thinking? Yes.

10. ¶6 – So what am I? (Doubting my old opinions)
That I think is something that cannot be doubted; I can be certain that thinking is part of my nature.
My existence is certain only when I am thinking.
I am a thing that thinks (a mind, a thinking thing, a res cogitans).

11. ¶7 – So what am I? (Help from the imagination?)
I’ll see if I can learn anything else about what I am, by using my imagination.
Am I a body, a thin soul-wind? No, I’m supposing these things to be an illusion.
OK, sure, maybe I really am a body or a thin soul-wind. But right now I can’t know this, and I’m trying to stick with what I know. [“I’m supposing that x is an illusion” = “x might be an illusion, so I’m rejecting it as if it is false”]
Knowledge of myself [knowledge with certainty] doesn’t depend on any imagined images:
Imagination is “contemplating the shape or image of a corporeal thing”
And anything corporeal might well be a dream.
It would be silly to use the imagination to gain knowledge concerning the nature of the self.
So, when I’m trying to figure out my own nature, I’ll try to ignore the imagination [or, rather, the contents of the images produced by the imagination] altogether.

12. ¶8, 9 – So what am I? (Modes of thought, unity of mind)
‘Thinking’ covers a lot of stuff:
doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, being willing, being unwilling, imagining, having sensory perceptions
Are all these different modes of thought found in the same thing? The thing “I” refers to?
Yes, they are. This is just as clear and evident as the fact that I exist even if asleep or deceived.
[Perhaps this is because I have direct awareness of all of them]
Even if nothing we imagine is real, “the power of imagination... really exists and is part of my thinking”
Even if all of our sensory perceptions are mistaken, the seeming involved is real.
Even if I’m not really seeing a light, it still seems as if I am.

13. ¶10 – Knowledge of bodies (Intro)
But I can’t stop thinking that I know external bodies better than I know myself.
[that is, “with more distinctness”]
With corporeal things, at least I have mental images of them.
But this “I”, which cannot be imagined, is still mysterious.
But how odd! You’d think just the opposite.
After all, the “I” cannot be doubted, and bodies can be doubted.
So I’ll pursue this topic, just to appease this stubborn and untamed ol’ mind of mine.
[Does the fact that we have images of bodies mean that we know their nature better than we know the nature of the mind?]

14. ¶11 – Knowledge of bodies (Posing the wax example)
Take a piece of wax: it’s sweet, it smells like flowers, it’s solid and cold, etc.
Now put it by the fire: it’s no longer sweet, the scent goes away, it’s gooey and hot, etc.
But clearly it’s the same piece of wax.
“So what was it in the wax that I understood with such distinctness?”
[What is the nature of the wax, the nature that I somehow mentally grasped, that stays there throughout the changes?]
It can’t be any of the specific features perceived with the senses, because they’ve all changed.

15. ¶12 – Knowledge of bodies (The intellect vs. the imagination)
Maybe this is was understood in the wax: a body that once had those forms and now has these forms.
Since the outward forms have changed, let’s forget about them.
Here, then, is the underlying nature of the wax: “merely something extended, flexible, and changing”
Now, can I know “flexible” and “changing” through the imagination?
No, because I can’t picture the countless changes I know the wax is capable of.
And what about “extended”?
No, because I can’t picture the countless ways of taking up space I know the wax is capable of.
Hence I know the nature of the wax, not by the imagination, but by the intellect.
My perception of (the nature of) the wax isn’t a matter of imagination or sense perception: it’s a matter “of purely mental scrutiny”

16. ¶13 – Knowledge of bodies (Ordinary language)
So our knowledge of external bodies is a matter of the intellect.
But, ordinarily, we say that we see the wax; we don’t say that we (intellectually) judge the wax to be there.
Yes, but this is just a confusion of language:
When I look out the window and ‘see’ men walking around, what I see might really be androids.
[The perceptual image itself doesn’t have enough information to settle whether they are men or androids]
Strictly speaking, I don’t see any men; rather, I (intellectually) judge that they are men.

17. ¶14 – Knowledge of bodies (Which ‘knowledge’ is superior?)
Earlier, I looked at the wax, and thought I knew it by the senses, or at least by the power of imagination.
[Perhaps the mind was trying to use the senses and the imagination to get at the nature of the wax]
But then I found the nature of the wax (I managed to “distinguish the wax from its outward forms”), by carefully using the intellect.
[The mind is now relying on itself to get at the nature of the wax]
Which kind of knowledge is “more perfect and evident”? Which has more “distinctness”?
Obviously, the latter.
The former kind of ‘knowledge’ could be had by dumb animals.
The latter requires a human mind.

18. ¶15 – Knowledge of bodies, knowledge of self
Knowledge of the mind’s existence is “truer and more certain” than knowledge of the existence of bodies.
If I know the wax from sight, I know that I exist “much more evidently”.
Same goes for touch.
Same goes for imagination.
And what goes for the wax, goes for all external bodies.
Anything (sight, touch, ) that contributes to my perception of the nature of the wax does an even better job of establishing the nature of the self.
[Each kind of ‘contact’ reveals the role of the intellect and its judgments]
Of course, there’s plenty of other stuff in the mind that “can serve to make my knowledge of [the mind] more distinct” [judgments of the intellect?].

19. ¶16 - Conclusion The nature of bodies My mind
not perceived by the senses
not perceived by the imagination
perceived by the intellect
My mind
it can be better known (with “more evident perception”) than anything else

20. Questions to think about
When Descartes talks about perceiving a piece of wax, and understanding its nature, is he retracting his doubt concerning the external world? (Presumably not, but then what is he doing?)
Descartes, it seems, can know for certain that there are thoughts, or that thinking is going on. But how does that entitle him to conclude “I exist”? (Is he making use of some metaphysical principle about substances and attributes, and if so, what gives him the right?)
Presumably, any fact about me entails that I exist: “x eats, therefore x exists” is just as good as “x thinks, therefore x exists”. So why does Descartes make use of the fact that he is thinking? (And what is the role of the principle “anything that thinks must exist”? Doesn’t Descartes need to prove it first?)
Thoughts about crackers (or wax!) can be known about with as much certainty as thoughts about oneself. So presumably the cogito argument doesn’t require self-directed thoughts—any old thought will do. So why does Descartes like to mention self-directed thoughts? Does his argument turn on the paradoxical character of statements like “I do not exist” or “I am not speaking”?

21. Points you may have missed
In his old opinions, both body and soul are known by the senses/imagination. But now Descartes has both the nature of the mind and the nature of body (individual bodies, body in general) known by the intellect.
Why? Because the senses/imagination aren’t capable of gaining us such knowledge.
The senses/imagination do have a role to play. It’s just that the intellect is what enables us to know a thing’s nature or recognize something as the kind of thing it is.

22. Main points “I exist” survives the method of doubt.
“I am a thinking thing” also survives.
The nature of the mind cannot be known by using the imagination.
The nature of bodies cannot known by using the imagination.
Judgments of the intellect are what give us knowledge of things’ natures.
I can know my own mind better than anything else.

23. Vocabulary for the 3rd Meditation
the “objective reality” of an idea = how much reality is had by what it represents
e.g., an idea of God has more objective reality than an idea of turnips
the “formal reality” of an idea = how much reality the idea itself has
all ideas have the same formal reality, because they’re all the same kind of thing