1. POL 315: Politics of War & Security
Dr. Kevin Lasher

2. UN Peacekeeping
Part One

3. Helping to preserve a fragile peace that has already been established
Definition
Peacekeeping is the maintenance of international peace and and security by the deployment of military forces, especially under the authority of the United Nations, in a particular area.
Helping to preserve a fragile peace that has already been established

4. 1st Generation Peacekeeping
Peacekeeping was not included in original charter of UN
UN Charter: “ to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war”
Became one of the main instruments by which the UN could promote peace globally
Superpower Cold War limited opportunities for peacekeeping operations

5. 1st Generation Peacekeeping
UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold laid out founding principles of international peacekeeping during Suez operation of 1956

6. 1st Generation Peacekeeping
Consent of involved parties
Neutrality -- not influence the political balance between the parties
Non-use of force except in self-defense
Temporary nature of missions
Interstate Conflict

7. 1st Generation Peacekeeping
Observation consists of the deployment of a small number of unarmed, neutral personnel with the consent of the host state(s) to collect information and monitor activities (cease-fire, human rights, etc.) in the deployment area, sometimes following a cease-fire or other agreement

8. 1st Generation Peacekeeping
Traditional peacekeeping is the stationing of neutral, lightly armed troops with the permission of the host state(s) as an interposition force following a cease-fire to separate combatants and promote an environment suitable for conflict resolution

9. 1st Generation Peacekeeping
Thirteen operations between 1948 and 1978
Observation/peacekeeping at the end of interstate wars
Main operations included: India/Pakistan (Kashmir), Suez Crisis, Congo, Cyprus, Sinai, Golan Heights
Several of these (India/Pakistan, Cyprus, Golan Heights) are ongoing
Goals were primarily monitoring and enforcing of cease- fire agreements, separation of enemy states, preventing new conflict
Congo was only intrastate version
Most (not all) would be considered “successes”

10. 1st Generation Peacekeeping
No new observation/peacekeeping missions from
Lost decade

11. End of Cold War
Ending of Cold War allowed breakthrough in the number of peacekeeping operations
End of superpower conflict encouraged countries to examine new issues, like peacekeeping

12. Clinton and Peacekeeping
Clinton Administration initially enthusiastic at expanding US participation in peacekeeping operations (with UN)
Humanitarian interventions viewed as important in the post-Cold War world
This enthusiasm did not last

13. 2nd Generation Peacekeeping, 1988-2000
Many more operations which went beyond traditional peacekeeping
38 operations from
Peace-building, nation-building, peace enforcement
Focus turned to intrastate conflicts (civil wars) versus interstate conflicts
Much more complicated and dangerous missions
Ad hoc procedures and improvisation

14. 2nd Generation Successes
Namibia ( )
Separation and disarmament of opposition parties following two decades of civil war
Helping to create unified national army
Supervising withdrawal of South African forces
Resettlement of returning refugees
Supervising free national elections

15. 2nd Generation Successes
El Salvador ( )
Helped to broker cease-fire agreement following a decade of civil war
Demobilization of opposition sides and creation of a unified military force
Establishment of Truth Commission to investigate human rights violations during civil war
Creation of new national police force
Supervision of national elections in 1994

16. 2nd Generation Successes
Mozambique ( )
Monitor cease-fire agreement
Disarmament and demobilization of opposition forces after two decades of civil war
Assist in resettlement of refugees who had fled during civil war
Monitor national elections in 1994

17. Failures in 1990s
Somalia
Bosnia
Rwanda

18. Failures in 1990s: Somalia Somalia in civil war chaos since early 1991
Joint US/UN humanitarian mission begun by Bush 41 in Dec. 1992
Turns into joint US/UN mission to crack down on Somali warlords in order to aid humanitarian relief
Black Hawk Down incident kills eighteen Americans in October 1993

19. Failures in 1990s: Somalia US troops leave in May 1994
UN troops leave in March 1995
Peace-making failure
Somalia continues as one of the most extreme failed states through 2019

20. Failures in 1990s: Bosnia
Multi-ethnic republic in collapsing state of Yugoslavia
Mixture of Croats, Muslims, and Serbs
Three-way civil war begins in 1992

21. Failures in 1990s: Bosnia
UN establishes peacekeeping force (UNPROFOR) to protect Bosnian Muslims in city of Srebrenica (among other actions)
Civil war continues and Muslims are massacred in in Srebrenica while UN forces do not respond
Serb attacks also occur in other UN “safe areas”

22. Failures in 1990s: Bosnia
US and NATO forces replace UN forces while civil war continues
US and NATO forces launch air attacks against Serbian positions in Bosnia
Eventually US and NATO help to negotiate ceasefire and bring end to conflict
Original UN mission ( ) considered a failure

23. Failures in 1990s: Rwanda
UN Peacekeeping force to implement post civil war cease-fire agreement
Relatively small UN force unable to prevent genocidal slaughter of Tutsis by extremist Hutus
April 6-July 18,1994
800,000 Tutsis (and moderate Hutus) killed, mostly by machete attacks
France and other countries send in additional troops to help evacuate their own nationals

24. Failures in 1990s: Rwanda
Leader of UN force warns of coming crisis and pleads for an additional few thousand troops
Believes that a few thousand additional troops could have prevented much of the death toll
Has to be the worst failure in a group of failed missions
Historian Paul Kennedy: “the lowest point in the UN’s history.”

25. Failures in 1990s: Rwanda
New UN mission is sent after genocide is completed
UN helps create the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to try major actors involved in the genocide in the next two decades

26. 2nd Generation Peacekeeping, 1988-2000
Mixture of successful and failed missions in 1990s
Perception that UN was not well-prepared for the complex, multidimensional peace operations of post-Cold War era
Demands of international system far outweighed the capabilities of the UN “peacekeeping system”

27. The Brahimi Report, 2000
An attempt by UN to bring coherence and clarity to peacekeeping operations after a decade of very mixed results
“To assess the shortcomings of the existing system and to make frank, specific and realistic recommendations for change.”
Especially after failures in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda
57 recommendations
Lakdhar Brahimi, UN Diplomat

28. The Brahimi Report, 2000
“Without renewed commitment on the part of the Member States, significant institutional change and increased financial support, the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical peacekeeping and peace- building tasks that the Member States assign to it in coming months and years.”
Lakdhar Brahimi, UN Diplomat

29. The Brahimi Report, 2000
“There are many tasks which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked to undertake and many places they should not go. But when the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace, they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat them.”
Lakdhar Brahimi, UN Diplomat

30. The Brahimi Report, 2000
Call for states to provide political support for UN
A more realistic and modest approach to peacekeeping efforts
Clear mandates backed up by credible force
Fewer operations but better defined and implemented
UN should have robust capability and be provided with means to implement mandate, ability to respond to parties who violate cease-fire provisions or otherwise harm civilians
Lakdhar Brahimi, UN Diplomat

31. The Brahimi Report, 2000
Improve information and intelligence for peacekeeping operations
Improve mission guidance and leadership
Create “rapid deployment” standards and mechanisms (short of permanent UN military force) to facilitate deployment within thirty days of UNSC resolution
Lakdhar Brahimi, UN Diplomat

32. The Brahimi Report, 2000
Improving UN bureaucratic mechanisms overseeing peace operations
Adapting peace operations to information age
Lakdhar Brahimi, UN Diplomat

33. The UN Bureaucracy is … Bureaucratic Brahimi Aftermath
How well have Brahimi Report recommendations been implemented?
Not surprisingly, a mixed bag of results
The UN Bureaucracy is …
Bureaucratic

34. Brahimi Aftermath
Follow-up reports and recommendations in 2005, 2008, 2011, 2015

35. High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015
“There is a collective call for urgent change in how we conceive of our peace and security instruments, how we apply them and how we work together to maximize impact. … Our action plan centers on three pillars: renewed focus on prevention and mediation; stronger regional-global partnerships; and new ways of planning and conducting United Nations peace operations to make them faster, more responsive and more accountable to the needs of countries and people in conflict.”

36. High Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, 2015
“Since its founding, the United Nations has worked to prevent, mitigate and resolve violent conflict through a range of actions, from support to human rights and inclusive development to prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and longer-term recovery and reconstruction. The limits of our engagement are reflected in United Nations peace operations, the most visible face of the Organization. Over six decades, they have shown a remarkable capacity to adjust to evolving situations and new demands, guided by well - established principles. However, missions are struggling to cope with the spread and intensity of conflicts today, and the lack of unity among Member States over their scope and application is thwarting their adaptation. Within peace operations, the shameful actions of some individuals are tarnishing the efforts of tens of thousands. We are convinced that we can and must do more to tackle such profound challenges.”

37. To Be
Continued