1. E. Michael Saleski PPS and BCS Systems Manager
LCLS Personnel Protection System, Beam Containment System, (and misc. Safety Inspection Items)
E. Michael Saleski
PPS and BCS Systems Manager

2. LCLS: PPS-eye View

3. LCLS Injector Vault Layout

4. LCLS Injector WG Plumbing

5. Simplified PPS System Architecture

6. LCLS Injector Vault Under-Floor Searching

11. PPS Summary Diagnostic Panel has individual ‘A/B’ status for all items
Allows for simpler micro-switch testing
Equipment gate micro-switches are special safety switches – can only be actuated with special tabs on doors
Ultimately will use similar to PEP-style BSOICs; stuck with SLAC Classic BSOICs for now
Commissioning second or third week of January; much is invasive to PEP operations

12. BCS Definition and Project Scope
Prevents radiation from ‘escaping’ the shielding enclosure
Direct measurements of radiation or beam loss
Protection of safety-critical collimators and stoppers
Entirely ‘new’ LCLS BCS needed
New gun = new shut-off mechanisms
Support two simultaneous programs (LCLS & PEP) = new set of shut-off paths
[Reduce mutual interference of programs as much as possible = desire targeted shut-offs if plausible –later]

13. BCS System Scope
Original ‘Mode-switching’ BCS proposal has been sidelined for now
Propose an ‘Interim BCS’ where conservatively “All BCS faults shut-off all Guns.”
Mode-switching requirements are now better understood – move forward with second proposal for 2007 downtime implementation

14. LCLS Injector Shut-Off Mechanisms
Laser Safety Stopper (LSS)
Dedicated BCS LSS situated in Injector Vault, stops the production of primary beam
Dark Current may persist
Accelerator Sections move to Staggered Standby
New injector sections L0A and L0B together will move to staggered standby with the rest of the Linac
New Sub-Booster Interface needs to be developed, new high-stability Solid State Sub-booster is not compatible with old SBI Module
Stops primary beam and dark current acceleration
RF Gun moves to Staggered Standby
RF Gun equivalent to removal of triggers at CID
Staggered with respect to L0A and L0B
Also uses new SBI

15. Interim BCS System Architecture

17. Configuration ‘Alpha’
CID beam to PEP, and A-Line or SABER; LCLS Beam to LCLS Linac Injector Spectrometer (SDMP)
Power Supply for magnets BX01/BX02 will be locked off
BSY BCS will be active as appropriate for parasitic program (common line, NARC/SARC, A-Line) and possible accidental LCLS beam delivery to BSY

18. Configuration ‘Beta’
CID beam to PEP; LCLS beam injected into Linac through TD11 or to the LCLS Linac Injector Spectrometer
Dump TD11 will be disabled ‘IN’
Linac BAS II stoppers (BAS II Dump, ST950, ST960) administratively inserted
50B1 and B1/2 locked out; Common Line BSY BCS are active

19. Configuration ‘Beta-prime’
CID beam to PEP; LCLS beam injected into Linac past TD11 (or to the LCLS Injector Spectrometer)
Dump TD11 will be allowed ‘OUT’
BAS II ‘inserted’ with air valve – not a safety item
B1/2 remain locked out; Common Line and NARC/SARC BSY BCS are active

22. Safety Inspection Items (?)
PPS:
3 BSOICs, 1 stopper (RST1)
Locked Entry Module roof hatch
BCS:
4 LIONs
Spot Shielding:
21-1,-2,-4 have 24” of borax (also wider)
SDMP has down-beam (4-inch thick Pb, 24”x26”) and aisle shielding (sliding 5-inch thick Fe, 43”x31”)
TD11 has penetration shielding (1 ¾-inch thick Fe, 25”x40”) and aisle shielding (sliding 5-inch thick Fe, 43”x31”)