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Game Theory Game 5 Mixed Strategies.

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Presentation on theme: "Game Theory Game 5 Mixed Strategies."— Presentation transcript:

1 Game Theory Game 5 Mixed Strategies

2 No Equilibrium 1 shirk p 1/10 work 1/2 1 no monitor q monitor

3 Class Results shirk p work no monitor q monitor 1 Shirk: p=0.23
1/10 work 1/2 1 no monitor q monitor

4 Class Results Got away with shirking 100 Got caught shirking 0 Shrey
Xue Joe

5 Class Results Lucky to have monitored -10
(but probably don’t feel too lucky) Connor Tony

6 Class Results Should have monitored Sonny

7 Best Responses What should managers have done given that 23% of employees shirk? What should workers have done given that they had a 91% chance of being monitored?

8 Class Results For managers: For employees:
Monitor: (0.77)- 10(0.23) = 67 No Mon: 100(0.77)-100(0.23) = 54 Monitoring is a best reply For employees: Work: 50(0.91)+ 50(0.09) = 50 Shirk: 0(0.91)+100(0.09) = 9 Working is a best reply

9 Summary Managers should monitor Employees should work
Is this sustainable? What would happen next time?

10 Cost Change Monitoring cost increases from 10 to 50
Monitoring decreased from 91% to 60% Shirking increased from 23% to 31% Only Edward got away with it


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