1. V-22 Osprey Development to Deployment
TX-SX: Title of presentation
Presenters Name
4:49 PM
V-22 Osprey Development to Deployment
LtCol Gregg Skinner, USMC
Michael Belcher
PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM

2. TX-SX: Title of presentation
Presenters Name
Intro
LtCol Gregg Skinner
MV-22 Chief Engineer
PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM
Michael Belcher
V-22 RM&A Lead
PMA-275, NAVAIRSYSCOM

3. 3

4. Outline Program Overview Capabilities Acquisition Road Map
V-22 Reliability Past / Present / Future
Reliability Improvement Process
FRACAS Database
Corrective Action
Projection Models
Validation
Strategic Nacelle Initiative
Summary 4 4 4

5. Delivering Innovation

6. V-22 Osprey System Description
Mission:
Provide operating forces with a supportable, reliable advanced Vertical/Short Take-off and Landing (VSTOL) aircraft weapon system capable of satisfying Marine Corps assault vertical lift; Navy fleet logistics, special warfare, combat search and rescue; and SOCOM long-range special operations lift.
Description:
The V-22 tiltrotor aircraft combines the speed, range and fuel efficiency normally associated with turboprop aircraft with the vertical take-off/landing and hover capabilities of helicopters. It is powered by two turboshaft engines.
Platforms:
The V-22 aircraft is able to operate from air capable ships and unimproved landing sites throughout the world. It is capable of in-flight refueling.
Employment:
In addition to the Marine Corps assault vertical lift mission, the special operations aircraft (CV-22) consists of the baseline V-22 aircraft (MV-22) configuration plus a terrain following radar, additional fuel tanks, radios, flare/chaff dispensers, radar jammer and warning receiver.

7. V-22 Osprey Program Summary
Prime Contractor: Joint Bell Boeing
Customer: USMC, USAF, USN
POR Configuration: MV – Marines (360)
CV – Air Force (50)
MV – Navy (48)
Contracted/Plan: 288/459
FRP Decision: September 2005
IOC: MV – Complete (2007) CV – Complete (2009)
Fuselage: Ridley Park, PA
Final Assembly: Amarillo, TX
Source: PMA-275
Current Status
MYP I: FY08-FY12 (Executing)
MYP II: FY13-FY17 (Planning)
Fielded: 133 (115 MVs/18 CVs)
Block Status:
MV: Blk A/B – fielded
Blk C – on contract
CV: Blk 0/10 – fielded
Blk 20 – Increment 3 on contract 7

8. Effective and Survivable
MV Deployment at Sea
MV Iraq and Afghanistan Deployments
Deployed
16 OCONUS deployments since 2007
In the Fight
Raids, assaults, direct action, CASEVAC, long-range logistics support
Humanitarian Assistance / Disaster Relief
CV Deployments
Source: HQMC APW
Deployments to date:
USMC: 9 (3 x OIF, 3xOEF, 3xMEU)
AFSOC: 5
HQMC cleared for public release

9. V-22 Defines Capability Leap
Unprecedented agility and operational reach
Operation Enduring Freedom
Operation Iraqi Freedom
CH-46E
Combat Radius
75 nm / 12 pax
MV-22B
325 nm / 24 pax
Source: HQMC APW
Takeaway: Exponentially greater speed and range over legacy assets (CH-46E example) allows the V-22 to cover the entire theater of operations.
Effective and Survivable – Executing Full Array of Missions
HQMC cleared for public release

10. HQMC cleared for public release
MV-22 Safety
Source: HQMC Safety Division
The mishap rate is calculated as a ration of class A mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.
From 1 Jan 2001 to 31 Jan 2011, the MV-22B has the lowest class A mishap rate of any Marine tactical rotorcraft
MV-22:
USMC average: 2.46
CH-46E:
HQMC cleared for public release

11. Most Survivable Rotorcraft Ever Built
SUSCEPTIBILITY I N T E L G M S O P A
THREAT
SUPPRESSION
RANGE
SPEED
SIGNATURE
CONTROL
Radar
Infrared
Visual
Acoustic
Electronic
Emissions
COUNTERMEASURES
&
SIGNATURE CONTROL
Radar Warning System
Missile Launch Warning
Countermeasures
DIRCM (CV Only)
SIRFC (CV Only)
DETECTION
ACQUISITION AVOIDANCE
KILL TOLERANCE
SURVIVABILITY
ENGAGEMENT
HIT AVOIDANCE
VULNERABILITY
VULNERABILITY REDUCTION
Fire Suppression
Broom Straw
Controlled Wing Failure
Ballistic Tolerance
CBR&N
Component Redundancy
(with Separation)
Source: HQMC APW
Key takeaway: The V-22 is the most survivable rotorcraft ever built
Survivability is a function of three key elements: susceptibility, vulnerability, and crashworthiness. Susceptibility is the probability of being hit; vulnerability is the probability of surviving, if hit; and, crashworthiness is the probability the occupants will survive an emergency landing or ground impact without serious injury.
The V-22 reduces its susceptibility through the use of speed, range, altitude, situational awareness for the aircrew, the aircraft survivability suite sensors and countermeasures, as well as infra-red signature reduction. Ballistic tolerance and system redundancy combine to reduce the Osprey’s vulnerability. The V-22 capitalizes on the fatigue resistance and damage tolerant properties of composites which allow the V-22 to continue flight after sustaining impacts from projectiles. Cockpit seats are armored to withstand a 7.62mm small arms round. Fuel tanks are self-sealing and contain inert nitrogen gas to reduce the possibility of vapor ignition. The flight control system provides redundant flight control computers and hydraulic systems powered by redundant electrical subsystems. All major flight systems are physically separated to prevent loss of system functionality following loss of a single system. An emergency lubrication system provides 30 minutes of flight following loss of the primary proprotor transmission system.
V-22 crashworthiness is a function of design. Heavy components, such as the engines and transmissions, are located away from the cabin and cockpit area. The proprotors are designed to fray or
“broomstraw” rather than splinter on impact with the ground. The energy-absorbing landing gear system is designed to attenuate most of the energy for hard landings up to 24 fps. The wing is
constructed to fail outboard of the wing/fuselage attachment in a manner that absorbs kinetic energy and ensures the cabin area will not be crushed, thereby protecting the occupants. An anti-plow
bulkhead prevents the nose from digging in on impact, and the fuselage provides a reinforced shell that is designed to maintain 85% of its volume during a crash. Aircrew and embarked troops receive
additional protection from crashworthy seats that stroke vertically to absorb energy.
In any combat operation against a determined foe when assault support aircraft deliver supplies or troops to a contested area, there is the chance that hostile fire will impact the aircraft. Valuable lessons have been learned recently in the kinetic fight of Operation Enduring Freedom. Through the course of their operations, MV-22B's have taken surface to air fires on multiple occasions. No one can say with certainty how many 'misses' there have been, but we do know that the aircraft have received hits from various small arms fire on several occasions. Due to the robust ballistic tolerance of this airframe, in all instances the affected aircraft have been able to safely return to base with no injuries to embarked personnel or crewmembers. Moreover, in each instance the aircraft were repaired at the organizational (squadron) level and were returned to the flight schedule in short order.
Battle damage in OIF/OEF due to enemy fire
Every instance the aircraft returned safely to base with no injuries
HQMC cleared for public release

12. Location / Operational Inventory
V-22 Osprey
Location / Operational Inventory

13. Strategy Development- Philosophy
MS I
MS II+
MS III
MS II S
Cost
Readiness
Capability
Cost
Readiness
Win
Win
Trust
Objectives
Measures
Actions
Safety
Reliability
Logistics
Trust
Investing in Resources
#1 - People

14. Acquisition & Lifecycle Management
Source: HQMC APW
Takeaway: Exponentially greater speed and range over legacy assets (CH-46E example) allows the V-22 to cover the entire theater of operations.
HQMC cleared for public release

15. Analogy/Parametric/Engineering Methods
RCM Failure Management Process
Analogy/Parametric/Engineering Methods
Actual Method

16. Reliability Past / Present / Future
In Service - Reliability Performance
Actual
Environment
Usage 16 16 16

17. Reliability Past / Present / Future
0.37 hrs
0.9 hrs
LRIP
(2000)
Block A
(Present)
Block B
Block C
(Jan 2012)
1.0
2.0
3.0
Hours
1.3 hrs
1.5 hrs
Mean Flight Hour Between Failure Growth
Threshold: 0.9 hrs 17 17 17

18. MV-22 Incremental Acquisition Mission and R&M Improvements
Block D
Block C
P3I
Block B
ECS Upgrade
Wx Radar
Troop Commander Station
Forward ALE 47
Crash Position Indicator
Enhanced Stby Flt Instruments
Improved Engine Starter Valve
Improved engine starter valve
TBD
Capabilities
Block A
Enhanced
R & M
Safe and Operational
Wing Aux Tanks
Clam shell doors
Retractable ARP
Icing Clearance
Hoist / Fast Rope
DAMA SATCOM
Dual DIGMAP
Line Clearance
Flight Control Software
IETM / NATOPS
Standdown
12/00 - 5/02 FY FY
FY 09 - ?

19. Reliability Improvement Process
Fleet Operational Data
MV and CV Aircraft
Identify Reliability Readiness Degraders
Root Cause
Component
System
Corrective Action
Material
Non-Material
Implementation
Off Aircraft Testing
Establish Aircraft Validation Plan
Implement CA into Fleet Aircraft
Monitor Fleet Operations
Validate CA Effectiveness

20. Identify Readiness Degraders
V-22 Critical Item Logistics Review (CILR) Process
TMS Team
FST Readiness Degraders
PMA-275 Reliability Degraders
Mission Dependability
Operational Supportability
Multiple Criteria used in determining Degraders
Individual criteria ranked
Establish Composite Score
Analyze degraders
Supply
Maintenance
Reliability
Develop Goals
Implementation Plan
Validate
CILR Composite Score

21. V-22 FRACAS Database V-22 CARTS database R&M Tool Kit Production
Suppliers
MV Fleet
CV Fleet
R&M Tool Kit
R&M Metric reports
Failure Mode Identification
Corrective Action Plans
AMSAA Projection

22. Root Cause & Corrective Action
Integrated Product Team (IPT)
Engineering Investigation
Supplier Findings
Repair Data
Corrective Action
Addresses Root Cause Findings
Target Corrective Actions
Safety
Impact to readiness & Cost

23. CA Implementation Strategy
Fielded Aircraft
Production Aircraft
Attrition
When old part fails, replace with new configuration part
Production
Aircraft Affectivity is Identified
Force Retrofit
Old configuration part is forced off the targeted fielded aircraft

24. Validate Corrective Action
Establish Validation Goals
Failure Mode or Component
Characteristic Life
Mean Time To Remove
Establish Test Profile
Operational Aircraft
Sets Expectations to PM
Establishes Plan Line
Staggered Introduction
Monitor aircraft progress

25. Validate Corrective Action
Completed Hydraulic Actuator Validation TPM
Target Threshold
Upper Threshold
0 Failures, T = 27,128 FH
Successful Validation Point
Nov 2009
Jan 2011
Crosses
Flight Hours
Mean Time To Remove

26. Corrective Action Validation Summary
March 2011

27. Corrective Action Validation Summary
March 2011

28. Strategic Nacelle Initiative

29. Single Assessment POA&M
POA&M repeated for each of 8 assessments

30. TX-SX: Title of presentation
Presenters Name
Summary
Educate your PMs
Test
Document your assumptions
Leave breadcrumbs
Alignment
Tell stories…they travel better than facts

31. Thank you for your time.
Questions?