1. UN BWC Meeting of States Parties
Biochemical Security 2030
Project Report
UN BWC Meeting of States Parties
Dr Brett Edwards
University of Bath

2. Central Project Question
How to ensure that advances in S&T do not undermine the prohibition against biological and chemical Weapons?

3. Key Aspects of Project (1)
Three meetings
First Project Meeting, University of Bath
Workshop on Regional Innovation Biochemical Security Network, University of Bath
Biological and Chemical Security in an Age of Responsible Innovation, The Royal Society, London

4. Key Aspects of Project (2)
Down the slippery slope? A study of contemporary dual-use chemical and life-science research potentially applicable to incapacitating chemical agent weapons (October 2014) – By Dr Michael Crowley and Professor Malcolm Dando –  Paper 8
BTWC: Learning from Alternative Models of Science and Technology Review  (July 2014) – By Dr Catherine Rhodes – Paper 7
Convergence at the Intersection of Chemistry and Biology- Implications for the Regime Prohibiting Chemical and Biological Weapons   (July 2014) – By Dr Ralf Trapp – Paper 6
To What Extent Was The Review Of Science And Technology Made More Effective And Efficient At The 2013 Meeting Of BTWC States Parties? (May 2014) – By Prof. Malcolm Dando – Paper 5
Beyond the Horizon: “Wide Area” Riot Control Agents Means of Delivery and Their Relevance to the CWC, BWC and UNSCR 1540 (February 2014)- By Dr Michael Crowley and Dr Dana Perkins – Paper 4
The Growth of Amateur Biology: A Dual Use Governance Challenge? (November 2013) – By Dr Catherine Jefferson – Paper 3
The 2013 Meeting of Experts to the BWC, with a Focus on the Standing Agenda Item Review of Science and Technology Developments (November 2013) – By Prof.  Kathryn Nixdorff – Paper 2
Application of the OPCW Mechanisms for Reviewing and Addressing Science and Technology Developments: the Case of Incapacitating Chemical Agents (ICAs) (November 2013) – By Dr Michael Crowley – Paper 1

5. Key Aspects of Project (3)
Forthcoming Publications
The central role of nanotechnology in targeted delivery of biological agents: implications for biosecurity
Professor Kathryn Nixdorff
Attempts to identify and assess security challenges posed by synthetic biology in the context of the BTWC and CWC
Dr Brett Edwards and Dr James Revill
Arms control, non-proliferation and Resilience
Dr Brett Edwards and Professor David Galbreath

6. Key Findings and Questions

7. Findings Regional Innovation Biosecurity Network Feasibility Study
Meeting
University Health and Safety typically deal with security aspects and training
i.e containment, CWC reporting
Support for sharing good practice
Especially as legislative approach not seen as feasible
Wide range of professional and informal networks already exist
Support for education
Need for institutional innovation security policy to be more forward looking.
For example it was suggested that there was need for greater security consultation when new laboratories were being designed and built.
Education initiatives directed scientists would be of value to many of the stake-holders.
Universities as:
Producers and Consumers

8. Looking forward: What do we want from S&T review processes?
Advances in S&T
Outputs
Underlying systems of tech generation
Tech Governance
Changing role/structure of CBW regimes
Convergence
Arms control to Risk Management
Rise of Networks
Cross- article/ Cross-treaty nature of challenges
Security Environment
Terrorism
Changing nature of Conflict
Changing approaches to National Security
For discussion see Kelle, Dando and Nixdorff 2014 and (Kelle, Dando, and Nixdorff 2013, Daoudi, Hart, Lele and Trapp 2014 ).
Examples
Output: (i.e discovery of new s new botulinum toxin serotype, improved synthesis techniques)
Underlying systems of tech generation: Models of innovation, diffusion of capacities
Broader trends in bio/chem innovation governance: I.e

9. Thank you Twitter @Biochemsec2030 @Bwiedwards
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