1. Summary of RCM TIG formation
Month Year
doc.: IEEE yy/xxxxr0
May 2019
Summary of RCM TIG formation
Date:
Authors:
Name
Affiliation
Contact
Amelia Andersdotter
Article19
Slide 1
Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

2. Month Year
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Abstract
This document summarizes the discussions on MAC randomization in IEEE P between , and presents a collection of academic research, as well as previous IEEE standardisation work relating to randomized and changing MAC addresses.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

3. More information These slides are based on 11-19/588r2.
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doc.: IEEE yy/xxxxr0
May 2019
More information
These slides are based on 11-19/588r2.
For references, articles, links, and more information, please consult 11-19/588r2.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

4. It has previously been introduced in:
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May 2019
Background to randomized and changing MAC: History in IEEE, mobile networks and aim
It has previously been introduced in:
IEEE WAVE (in relation to vehicular privacy)
Mobile OS (e.g. Android, iOS)
Broadly, the aim of randomized and changing MAC is
The protection of geolocational privacy to some extent (i.e. reducing the privacy threat posed by profiling someone’s patterns, behaviour, whereabout or habits).
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

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Background to randomized and changing MAC: Regulatory and research overview
Geolocational tracking in WiFi networks has been subject to regulatory attention in, for instance, Sweden, Netherlands, the US and France.
Geolocational tracking in WiFi networks using the MAC address has also been subject to academic research (Cunche (2013), Sapiezynski (2015))
It is broadly agreed that merely randomizing a MAC address might not be sufficient for privacy protection (Matte et al (2016), Vanhoef et al (2016), Martin et al (2017))
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

6. Background to randomized and changing MAC: Previously in IEEE 802 LMSC
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May 2019
Background to randomized and changing MAC: Previously in IEEE 802 LMSC
In addition to work already undertaken in IEEE 1609, the following work has been done in IEEE 802 LMSC:
The privacy threat mitigation potential of MAC randomization was studied by IEEE 802 Privacy ECSG with outcome documents privescg , privecsg , privescg
IEEE SEC TG document P802E: Recommended Practice for Privacy Considerations for IEEE 802 Technologies (draft 1.4) in clauses 7.2 and 8.1 (requires member’s log-in)
.11aq Pre-Association Service Discovery amendment to the , with MAC Privacy Enhancements.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

7. Month Year
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May 2019
Current status: Effects of .11aq amendment and future mission of RCM TIG #1
Randomized and changing MAC addresses are not in themselves new. There have existed standard tools for changing a device’s MAC identifier for a long time. Nevertheless, standardising systematically changing MAC identifiers have raised some concerns:
In September 2018, three months after the publication of the official aq amendment, the IEEE WG received a liaison statement from the Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA) detailing network operator concerns with the disappearance of clear-text sufficiently-permanent unique device identifiers ( ).
The ARC SC made efforts to address the concerns raised by the WBA in a response approved by the Working Group in November 2018 ( arc). In this response, the Working Group noted that some issues raised by WBA merit further consideration.
RCM TIG is set up to enact this consideration.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

8. Month Year
doc.: IEEE yy/xxxxr0
May 2019
Current status: Effects of .11aq amendment and future mission of RCM TIG #2
The network analytics and device identification issue was discussed in the IEEE OmniRAN Task Group in its F2F meeting on 15 January (omniran TG). The assertion was made that device manufacturer identification and network analytics and troubleshooting would be an issue in the absence of MAC identifiers (omniran CQ00).
It is not within currently within RCM TIGs to consider the aspects raised in IEEE OnmiRAN TG, however
OmniRAN has agreed to produce a "draft protocol proposal for secure signaling of a static device identifier to the access network" and "functional requirements describing the need to provide the possibility of fixed device identifiers" (omniran TG).
This calls, at least, for collaboration and coordination?
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

9. Proposed problem: Band steering
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May 2019
Proposed problem: Band steering
A single device may end up using different MAC addresses in different bands and/or different SSIDs.
IEEE has agreed that this should be considered further, and may require recommendations about SSID assignment.
IEEE has also suggested this could require coordination with WiFi Alliance.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

10. Proposed problem: Client steering
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May 2019
Proposed problem: Client steering
Clients may use the broadcast SSID in probe requests, causing instability in MAC address.
IEEE has acknowledged that this could be considered further.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

11. Proposed problem: Network analytics and troubleshooting
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Proposed problem: Network analytics and troubleshooting
Network analytics and troubleshooting may require at least semi- permanent identifiers (cf OmniRAN discussion referenced above).
IEEE has agreed to look into this.
Suggestion: coordination with OmniRAN seems appropriate.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

12. Month Year
doc.: IEEE yy/xxxxr0
May 2019
Concrete tasks:
• Current and planned implementations of random and changing MAC addresses in devices, and • Current and planned /802 Standards treatment of randomized MAC addresses • Impact on features from randomized MAC addresses and/or changing addresses during: ◦ Pre-association (stateless) ◦ Preparing for (creating shared state) and during associations • Potential mechanisms to address the above impacts, through: ◦ Implementation options, or possible guidelines document ◦ Modifications to the Standard, if any, and recommend continuing work (Study Group/PAR)
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

13. Month Year
doc.: IEEE yy/xxxxr0
May 2019
Presentations
P802.1CQ MAC Address Assignment Requirements, Max Riegel (Nokia), 11-19/851r0
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

14. Starting up #1 May 2019 In relation to the following two goals:
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May 2019
Starting up #1
In relation to the following two goals:
• Current and planned implementations of random and changing MAC addresses in devices, and • Current and planned /802 Standards treatment of randomized MAC addresses
Examples from practical experience, research, or customers can be brought to the group on a continuous basis.
Slide 14
Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

15. Month Year
doc.: IEEE yy/xxxxr0
May 2019
Starting up #2
Impact on features from randomized MAC addresses and/or changing addresses during: ◦ Pre-association (stateless) ◦ Preparing for (creating shared state) and during associations
Suggest we collect a number of use-cases that relate to pre-association, preparing for association and what happens during association. Use-cases should preferably be connected to already identified issues on slides 9-11.
Challenge: there is evidence to suggest MAC randomization is not very wide- spread (Matte, Cunche, 2018), so “real-life” scenarios may be scarce.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

16. Month Year
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May 2019
Starting up #3
Potential mechanisms to address the above impacts, through: ◦ Implementation options, or possible guidelines document ◦ Modifications to the Standard, if any, and recommend continuing work (Study Group/PAR)
This will be easier if we have an understanding for the situations in which we believe we may have problems.
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

17. Month Year
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May 2019
References
IEEE SEC TG, P802E: Recommended Practice for Privacy Considerations for IEEE 802 Technologies, March Available:
OmniRAN, F2F meeting minutes (omniran TG), Hao Wang. January OmniRAN, Random MAC impact (omniran CQ00), Max Riegel, January
Privacy ECSG, Secure Moderated Random MAC Addresses (privecsg ), Robert Moskowitz, January
Privacy ECSG, WiFi Privacy network experiment_x000b_at IETF91 (privecsg ), C. J. Bernardos, F. Giust, A. de la Oliva, J.C. Zuniga, January
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company

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May 2019
Privacy ECSG, WiFi Privacy network experiment_x000b_ at IEEE 802 May plenary and IETF91 meetings (privecsg ), C. J. Bernardos, A. de la Oliva, J.C. Zuniga, July
Privacy ECSG, Tracking stations without relying on the link layer identifier (privecsg ), Mathieu Cunche, April IEEE WG, Liaison from WBA re: MAC randomization impacts ( ), September IEEE ARC SC, Proposed response to liaison from WBA on MAC Address randomization impcats [sic!] ( arc), November
C. Matte, M. Cunche, Spread of MAC address randomization studied using locally administered MAC addresses use historic. [Research Report] RR-9142, Inria Grenoble Rhône-Alpes <hal >
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Amelia Andersdotter (ARTICLE19)
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John Doe, Some Company