1. Measuring community perceptions of tenure security: Evidence from four African countries
The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of the other principle investigators involved in the design of each study (Ethiopia: Peter Little and John McPeak; Guinea: Mike McGovern; Liberia: Alexandra Hartman; Chipata, Zambia: Lauren Persha), as well as data analysis by Aleta Haflett Starosta, Kate Marple-Cantrell, Darin Christensen, Stephanie Fenner, Nicole Walter, and Aidan Schneider.
This work was supported by the United States Agency for International Development [award number AID-OAA-TO ]. The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily the views and opinions of the United States Agency for International Development or the World Bank.
M. Mercedes Stickler, Heather Huntington, and Ben Ewing
March 20, 2018
The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily the views and opinions of the United States Agency for International Development or the World Bank.
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2. Motivation Indicators Findings Implications

3. Photo Credit: Jeremy Green
MOTIVATION

4. Does land registration increase land investment?
Strong theoretical link (Besley 1995; Besley and Ghatak 2010)
Clear evidence from Asia & Latin America (Deininger & Chamorro 2004; Feder et al. 1988)
Evidence from Africa is mixed outside Ethiopia and Rwanda (Arnot et al. 2011; Fenske 2011; Lawry, et al. 2014)

5. Does land registration increase tenure security (in Africa)?
Difficult to answer due to varied definitions (Arnot et al. 2011)
Content of rights
Assurance against loss
Participation in land registration
Until recently, limited evidence to compare levels of assurance across contexts
Content of rights (sell, bequeath, use as collateral)
Assurance against loss (expropriation, eviction)
Participation in formal land registration program

6. 6 studies collected similar data across rural areas of 4 countries
Country
Dataset
Survey Date
Sample Size
Focal Regions
Ethiopia
Afar
2016
2 656 households
Amibara and Chifra woredas
Oromia
2014
2 541 households
Borana and Guiji zones
Guinea
2 165 households
Forécariah and Kindia prefectures
Liberia
2013
2 100 households
Lofa, River Gee, and Maryland counties
Zambia
Chipata
3 512 households
Chipata district
Luangwa Valley
4 274 respondents1
Nyimba, Mambwe, and Lundazi districts
Deliberately over sampled households headed by females (all studies) and other potentially vulnerable sub-groups relevant to each study site, such as youth and members of minority ethnic groups.
Though FHH are not representative of the entire population of women (or other group) in the sampled communities, we were only able to sample more than one household member in one study (Luangwa Valley, Zambia).
Nonetheless, by collecting similar data on various proxies for tenure security (assurance) and its potential drivers at the household level and by oversampling potentially vulnerable groups, we have attempted to standardize the way perceived tenure security is measured to promote long-term analysis, increase external validity, and begin to understand differences within communities.
1 To enable intra-household analysis of tenure security, adult respondents were randomly selected within selected households.

7. INDICATORS
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8. Perceived tenure security
Assurance that existing rights-holders will continue to possess their land (e.g., Arnot et al. 2011; Fenske 2011; Sjaastad and Bromley 2000)
Index measuring likelihood of:
Internal Land Appropriation
External Land Appropriation
Tenure Security Index:
Data averaged across all questions from series of questions about likelihood of appropriation from different sources
Lickert scale (1-5)
Internal actors e.g.:
Immediate or extended family
Neighbors within the community
Neighboring communities
Local customary authorities
External actors, e.g.:
Urban elites
Government actors
Outside investors
Standardized each indicator across all datasets, so that we could compare across study sites. For example, variables measured with a scale were converted to 5-point Likert scale with 1 as negative outcome and 5 positive.

9. Potential drivers of security
Documentation
Conflict
Land loss
Once indicators were selected, we standardized each one across all datasets, so that we could compare across study sites. For example, variables measured with a scale were converted to a five-point Likert scale with 1 as the negative outcome and 5 positive. In some cases, response categories were collapsed to enable comparison, resulting in the loss of some nuanced contextual information.
Different land-related conflict e.g. over boundaries, access, reallocation

10. FINDINGS
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11. Most respondents (> 74%) rely primarily on informal community rules and institutions
99% in Ethiopia and Zambia and 82% in Liberia report that customary leaders are the primary land-related decision-maker
77% in Guinea report customary inst.’s dominate dispute resolution
Minorities report that government authorities are the primary land-related decision-maker
9% in Liberia and 26% in Guinea
Governments also support dispute resolution
20% in Guinea rely on government to sanction, address encroachment
71% in Ethiopia w/regional boundary conflict relied on govt to resolve

12. Low risk of internal appropriation
There is a fairly high degree of perceived tenure security among survey respondents.
This figure displays respondents’ estimation of the likelihood that internal actors, including their immediate or extended family, neighbors within the community, neighboring communities, or local customary authorities will appropriate their land against their will in the near future.
For surveys that ask about these risks across short versus longer time horizons (Luangwa Valley, Chipata, Afar), we have averaged responses across the two time points to generate one overall average.

13. Lower risk of external appropriation
Similarly, this figure displays respondents’ perceived estimation of the likelihood that external actors, including urban elites, government actors, or outside investors, will appropriate their land against their will in the near future.
The results indicate that a clear majority of community members in the study sites do not perceive either internal or external appropriation as a significant threat. Across all studies, internal actors are perceived to pose the greatest threat to respondents’ land use and access rights.

14. Greatest threat differs by context
Internal
9% of at-risk plots in Guinea
Family
28% of respondents in Liberia
Neighbors
23% of fields in Chipata
Local Authorities
6% of respondents in Afar
Investors
In Guinea:
Almost all respondents (98%, N=2,118) are confident their land is protected from appropriation and report that the boundaries of their farmland are clear and respected by people in their village.
Of plots that are reported to be at risk of appropriation, the greatest perceived risk is losing land to members of the extended family (9%, N=354, in the next 5 years).
Only 5% of respondents (N=115) say there is a risk of local government authorities taking land without the household’s permission.
External

15. Tenure Security Index:
Data averaged across all questions from series of questions about likelihood of appropriation from different sources
Lickert scale (1-5)
Internal actors e.g.:
Immediate or extended family, Neighbors within the community, Neighboring communities, Local customary authorities
External actors, e.g.:
Urban elites, Government actors, Outside investors
Although across all studies, FHH were somewhat more concerned about internal appropriation vs. MHH, no statistically significant difference in the likelihood of external appropriation.
However, the few within-study differences that were significant go in the opposite direction:
Afar internal appropriation: 4.87 for FHH vs for MHH, p < 0.05; and external appropriation: 4.85 for FHH vs for MHH, p < 0.05).
Chipata internal appropriation (4.25 for FHH vs for MHH, p < 0.05) and external appropriation (4.38 for FHH vs for MHH, p < 0.01).

16. The vast majority of respondents in all study areas lack any written documentation of their property rights. With the exception of the Ethiopia Oromia sample, where fully 28% of respondents reported having land documents, less than 10% of respondents across the other samples reported having some form of paper documentation for any of their fields.
In Guinea, most common form of document is from the colonial-era (titre foncier) and, in Zambia most people with documentation report having a customary land certificate, which remains an informal record of rights.
Among the 3% (N=61) of respondents that reported formal land documentation for at least one farming plot in the Guinea sample, the most common type of documentation is a titre foncier, a colonial-era document. Finally, in Zambia, only a handful of respondents reported any kind of land documentation in Chipata (1%) or the Luangwa Valley (2%), and customary land certificates (an informal document) represent 66% and 83% of field documentation in Chipata and Luangwa, respectively, with some 15% of respondents in Luangwa reporting a formal lease.
Across all studies, female-headed households were significantly less likely to report any form of documentation than their male counterparts (5.5% for FHH vs. 7.6% for MHH, p < 0.01). Female-headed households were significantly less likely to report a document compared to male-headed households in Afar (3.5% for FHH vs. 5.4% for MHH, p < 0.05), Oromia (21.9% for FHH vs. 29.7% for MHH, p < 0.01), and Chipata (0.5% for FHH vs. 1.5% for MHH, p < 0.01).

17. Variable: Land conflict reported in past 1-3 years depending on sample.
Note that a conflict series was not asked at the household level in Liberia due to concerns about the sensitivity of questions. However, a similar question asked of community leaders (data not reported here) indicated a very low level of conflict (roughly 2% of all households).
Across all studies, there is no significant difference between the rates of conflict reported by male- and female-headed households. The only significant within-study difference is in Afar, where male-headed households were slightly more likely to report a previous conflict compared to female-headed households (7% for MHH vs. 4.2% for FHH, p < 0.01).
The most common type of land-related conflict reported is over boundaries between administrative regions (28%, N=75). In contrast to the other study sites, over half (52%, N=39) of the boundary conflicts take place with members of different (non-Afar) ethnic groups. Fully 70% (N=52) of such disputes have resulted in violence, and 64% (N=48) have led to destruction of property or the loss of livestock.
Luangwa Valley only includes field conflicts, not forest conflicts.

18. Not all types of conflict were asked for each study – only those deemed most relevant.
Values do not sum to 100 because multiple types of conflict can be reported for a single HH/field
Natural resource-related conflicts were specific to country context
Ethiopia: Water
Guinea: Diamonds
Zambia: Trees

19. Local actors:
Immediate family
Extended family
Neighbors
Community members
External actors:
Neighboring villages
Local government
Outside investors
National government
Disputing parties differ across sites:
Family/community members in Oromia, Chipata
Neighboring administrative zones in Afar (and to some extent in Oromia)

20. Definition of land loss differs across sites, but data reported here refer to lost access to most important productive asset
Chipata – Agricultural field reallocated (mostly to another HH in the village)
Luangwa Valley – Reallocation of farmland; further 15% reported new restrictions on ability to access/collect forest resources
Liberia – No data
Guinea – Lost access to farmland
Oromia – No data
Afar – Lost access to either wet or dry season grazing area; further 5% reported that grazing/water access areas were converted to farmland
No significant differences between FHH and MHH

21. IMPLICATIONS
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22. Most respondents report relatively high levels of tenure security
Levels and sources of insecurity vary
Some differences between households headed by males and females
Samples are representative of treatment areas but not the entire country

23. Room for improvement? Good pre-intervention baselines are critical
Tenure security highest in sites with lowest rates of documentation
Disputes fairly uncommon, most over boundaries
Land reallocation is extremely rare
Afar: 5% Guinea: 3% documentation
Site-specific variation in types of disputes
Only Afar showed MHH > FHH
< 2% in each study reported loss of farm plot
Measuring tenure security
Good pre-intervention baselines are critical
Complement reported/verified formal land documentation with landholder perceptions
Important to measure pre-intervention tenure security and target areas where tenure is most threatened

24. Things to keep in mind This is only one measure of tenure security
Land registration has multiple benefits
Registration can be tailored to local context
People may be unaware of actual risks to their tenure security
Registration is also important for land administration, land use planning, and local revenue generation
Registration critical in areas with active informal land markets and where land conflicts are common
Tailor interventions to specific contexts
Address threats (outside vs. within community)
Weigh costs and benefits of registering group rights vs. individual (or household) land rights
Integrate formal and informal institutions
In areas where land rights derive primarily from community membership, extant customary tenure systems continue to function, and outsiders pose the primary risk of land appropriation, land registration at the community level accompanied by formal recognition of customary tenure institutions may be sufficient to reduce insecurity (Jhaveri, et al. 2016).
By contrast, where land rights are held primarily by individuals or families and actors within the community pose the greatest risk to tenure security, and particularly where informal land transactions involving outsiders are common, the more costly and time-consuming investment in registering land rights held by families or individuals may be merited.

25. THANK YOU FOR
YOUR ATTENTION
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