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Source: Journal of Systems and Software, Vol. 140, pp , June 2018

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Presentation on theme: "Source: Journal of Systems and Software, Vol. 140, pp , June 2018"— Presentation transcript:

1 A Truthful Combinatorial Double Auction-based Marketplace Mechanism for Cloud Computing
Source: Journal of Systems and Software, Vol. 140, pp , June 2018 Authors: Dinesh Kumar, Gaurav Baranwal, Zahid Raza, Deo Prakash Vidyarthi Speaker: Chit-Jie Chew Date: 8/23/2018

2 Outline Introduction Proposed scheme Experimental results Conclusions

3 Introduction(1/3) - Double Auction
$30 $40 Provider 1 Profit: $30 Consumer 1 $35 $50 Provider 2 Consumer 2 Auctioneer $20 $30 Provider 3 Consumer 3

4 Introduction(2/3) - Combinatorial Double Auction
Case 1: Provider 1, 2, 3 Profit: $220 Case 1: Provider 1, 2, 3 Profit: $220 Case 3: Provider 1, 3 Profit: $250 Case 2: Provider 1, 2 Profit: $70 Case 4: Provider 2, 3 Profit: $200 $100 $200 Case 4: Provider 2, 3 Case 3: Provider 1, 3 Case 1: Provider 1, 2, 3 Case 2: Provider 1, 2 Auctioneer Auctioneer Auctioneer Auctioneer -$400 -$250 -$250 -$300 2 2 1 1 3 5 4 3 6 5 5 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 Provider 1 1 2 1 2 2 3 3 1 3 Consumer 1 Consumer 2 Consumer 1 Consumer 2 Consumer 2 +$300 +$300 +$200 +$300 $150 $300 -$ 50 -$100 $ 0 $ 50 2 1 1 1 3 1 3 1 2 1 3 2 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 Consumer 1 Consumer 1 Consumer 1 Consumer 3 +$120 +$200 +$200 +$200 Provider 2 Consumer 2 Auctioneer $100 $250 $70 $200 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 $150 $120 1 2 1 4 Consumer 3 +$120 1 2 Consumer 3 Provider 3 $220 2

5 Introduction(3/3) – Model based on combinatorial double auction
Virtual resource Cloud resource provider 1 · · · · · · Providing bid price · · · · · · Cloud resource consumer n Bidding request Auctioneer Cloud resource provider n Providing bid price · · · · · · Computing resources Storage resources

6 Proposed scheme(1/3) - Resource allocation
𝑖∈𝑁 𝑞𝑢 𝑘 𝑖 𝑥 𝑖 = 𝑗∈𝑀 𝑧 𝑗𝑘 𝑖∈𝑁 𝑝𝑢 𝑘 𝑖 𝑥 𝑖 − 𝑗∈𝑀 𝑘∈𝐾 𝑝𝑝 𝑘 𝑗 𝑧 𝑗𝑘 >0 − 𝑁,𝑀 : 1 $60 $75 1 1 1 1 1 1 $10 $20 $30 $15 if 𝑝𝑢 𝑖 >𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑖 𝑢 go to the next screening − 𝑁,𝑀,𝑣 : 𝑖∈𝑁 𝑝𝑢 𝑘 𝑖 𝑥 𝑖 − 𝑗∈𝑀 𝑘∈𝐾 𝑝𝑝 𝑘 𝑗 𝑧 𝑗𝑘 >0 𝑖∈𝑁 𝑞𝑢 𝑘 𝑖 𝑥 𝑖 + 𝑞𝑢 𝑘 𝑣 = 𝑗∈𝑀 𝑧 𝑗𝑘 2 $25 $35 Provider 1 Consumer 1 $153 $95 1 2 3 1 2 1 $12 $21 $33 $14 $23 $35 Provider 2 Consumer 2 $91 $50 3 1 1 − 𝑁 𝑠 ,𝑀 : 𝑖∈𝑁 𝑝𝑢 𝑘 𝑖 𝑥 𝑖 − 𝑗∈𝑀 𝑘∈𝐾 𝑝𝑝 𝑘 𝑗 𝑧 𝑗𝑘 >0 𝑖∈𝑁 𝑞𝑢 𝑘 𝑖 𝑥 𝑖 = 𝑗∈𝑀 𝑧 𝑗𝑘 3 1 1 1 $13 $20 $32 $8 $17 $25 Provider 3 Consumer 3

7 Proposed scheme(2/3) - Resource allocation
Maximum (Provider) (Consumer) $13 $15 $21 $25 $33 $35 2 Consumer 1 $67 $68 $69 $71 $75 Consumer 2 $88 $89 $90 $91 $94 $100 Consumer 3 $67 $68 $69 $71 $75

8 Proposed scheme(3/3) - Resource allocation
2 3 2 Consumer demand: $68 $60 $75 Provider Revenue 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 $65 $10 $20 $30 $15 $25 $35 Provider 1 Consumer 1 1 $89 1 $33 $153 $95 1 1 $53 1 2 3 1 2 1 $12 $21 $33 $14 $23 $35 Provider 2 Consumer 2 $10, $12, $13, $13, $13 $12 $91 $20, $20, $21, $21 $21 Profit = -$65 - $33 - $53 + $68 + $89 3 1 1 = $6 $13 $20 $32 $30, $32, $33, $33, $33 $32 Provider 3 Auctioneer

9 Experimental results(1/3)

10 Experimental results(2/3)

11 Experimental results(3/3)
User = 50 Provider = 20

12 Conclusions Social welfare Budget-balance Individual rational


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