1. IEEE 802.21 MEDIA INDEPENDENT HANDOVER DCN: 21-10-00xx-00-sec
Title: Specifications for Security TLVs
Date Submitted: March 8, 2011
Present at IEEE March meeting
Authors: Lily Chen (NIST)
Abstract: This document proposes a resolution on comment #193 and #194 in letter ballot 5a to add specifications on security TLVs for ciphersuites AES-CBC & HMAC-SHA1-96, Null & HMAC-SHA1-96, and Null & CMAC-AES.
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3. What is the issue?
In D02, security TLV is only specified for the default cipher suite AES_CCM.
The security TLV shall be specified also for other ciphersuites, especially AES-CBC plus HMAC-SHA1-96.
This is important because we need to specify the order of encryption and authentication, the IV length, and the MIC length.

4. MIH PDU Protection by AES-CBC Plus HMAC-SHA1-96
Suggested text
Select a 128 bits (16 bytes) initiate vector (IV0, IV1, IV2, …, IV15).
Pad the plaintext P to a length of a multiple of 128 bits (16 octets) so that it can be presented in n blocks P0, P1, …, Pn, each of which is 128 bits.
Apply AES CBC on P0, P1, …, Pn to obtain ciphertext C0, C1, …, Cn*.
Input M=IV**||C0 ||C1||…||Cn to HMAC-SHA1, padding may be needed to make the length to be a multiple of 512 bits.
Obtain output H (160 bits). The most significant 96 bits of H is the MIC.
* It can use a cipher stealing method. In that case, the ciphertext may include a partial block.
**Suggest to add IV to the data to get integrity protection.

5. Security TLVs for AES-CBC plus HMAC-SHA1-96IV
(16 octets)
Ciphertext + MIC
(16n + 12 octets)

6. MIH PDU Protection by HMAC-SHA1-96
Suggested text
Pad the plaintext P to a length of a multiple of 512 bits (64 octets).
Input the padded plaintext to HMAC-SHA1-96.
Obtain output H (160 bits = 20 octets). The most significant 96 bits (12 octets) of H is the MIC.

7. Security TLVs for HMAC-SHA1-96
Plaintext + MIC
( |P|* + 12 octets)
* The length of plaintext in octets

8. MIH PDU Protection by CMAC-AES
Suggested text
Input M to CMAC-AES. CMAC-AES handles M in any length (the padding is specified as a part of the algorithm.
Obtain output H (128 bits). The most significant 96 bits (12 octets) of H is the MIC.

9. Security TLVs for CMAC-AES
Plaintext + MIC
( |M|* + 12 octets)
* The length of plaintext in octets