Download presentation
Presentation is loading. Please wait.
Published byNathaniel Higgins Modified over 5 years ago
1
11th Annual CLTA Conference 11th to 13th Feb 2001 Victoria University of Technology Melbourne
A Comparative Analysis of Insider Trading Regulation – Who is liable and what are the sanctions? Victor CS Yeo Nanyang Business School Nanyang Technological University Singapore 6/25/2019
2
11th Annual CLTA Conference
Introduction Towards a ‘global securities market’ Scope of paper Theories for insider trading regulation Survey of approaches Targets Sanctions Conclusion 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
3
Why regulate insider trading?
Should we regulate insider trading? Misappropriation theory fiduciary aspect proprietary aspect Unfair advantage theory Market stability theory Interaction between the theories 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
4
Comparative survey - ‘Targets’
Two main approaches ‘fiduciary’ or ‘confidentiality’ approach (Singapore, Hong Kong, New Zealand and Companies legislation - Malaysia) focus is on relationship between insider and company fiduciary aspect of the misappropriation theory ‘proprietary approach’ (Australia, Malaysia; NB Singapore) 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
5
‘Fiduciary’ or ‘Confidentiality’ approach
‘Direct trading’ Trading in securities of other corporations Tippee trading 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
6
11th Annual CLTA Conference
Direct trading Definition of insiders: ‘connected persons’ (SG;HK; NZ) persons who have ‘relationship of confidence’ (NZ) Information obtained by virtue of the relationship (SG NZ) cf s132A Companies Act (MY) 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
7
Dealing in securities of other companies
Connected person having information relating to ‘transaction’ (SG; MY (CA)) Connected person having information - takeover related (HK; MY(CA)) Insider obtaining information in confidence from other corporation or from specified persons ‘connected’ to the corporation (NZ) 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
8
11th Annual CLTA Conference
Tippee trading Knowledge that insider is prohibited from dealing + association for the purposes of the trading (SG) cf tippee as ‘constructive trustee’ of information Knowledge without association (HK) Tracing relationship of confidence (NZ) 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
9
11th Annual CLTA Conference
Proprietary approach Definition of ‘insider’: ‘Any person’….(AU;MY) Windfall situations Proprietary aspect of misappropriation theory (AU;MY) Inconsistent with unfair advantage and market stability theories? 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
10
Comparative Survey - sanctions
Penal sanctions criminal provisions civil penalty orders observations: custodial vs non-custodial fixed vs variable fine criminal vs ‘non-criminal’ and double jeopardy Civil liability 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
11
11th Annual CLTA Conference
Criminal provisions 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
12
11th Annual CLTA Conference
Civil Penalty Orders ‘Fine’ on the civil burden of proof (All except AU) Malaysia: Action by regulator - irrespective of criminal proceedings; $500, X profits Regulator distributes to : costs; market participants; compensation fund; Commission New Zealand: Action by corporation or member(NB no criminal sanctions) 3x ‘profits Distributed on Court order to: others who obtained or could obtain judgment; members; the company 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
13
Civil Penalty Orders (2)
Hong Kong Regulator (insider dealing tribunal) initiates action 3X ‘profit’ More in the nature of a ‘fine’ Singapore (*New!) Regulator - alternative to criminal prosecution 3x ‘profit’ (no specific definition); min sum prescribed In nature of a ‘fine’ 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
14
11th Annual CLTA Conference
Civil liability Problems with using civil liability as a regulatory device evidence costs Australia Initiated by: other party; corporation; regulator (in public interest ‘First to claim’ system Hong Kong Initiated by Insider dealing tribunal only 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
15
Civil liability provisions (2)
Malaysia: Claim initiated by counterpart (SIA); Company (for specified insiders (CA) May be liable to both parties NB may be liable to other market participants in a civil penalty action New Zealand: Claim initiated by counterpart or corporation Limit on liability but in addition to ‘pecuniary penalty’ Court may order company to distribute claim to ‘affected parties’; members - priority to the former 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
16
Civil liability provisions (3)
Singapore Initiated by ‘contemporaneous traders’ Entitled to claim ‘loss’ - (problem with definition) Limited to ‘maximum recoverable amount’ Contemporaneous traders can file for a claim (similar to proof of debt) if insider had been convicted or had a civil penalty order made against him - statutorily preferred mode if there has been such a conviction or order (ie claim ‘dependent on regulatory action) Pro-rated distribution 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
17
Civil liability provisions - observations
Malaysia: all three theories? Australia and New Zealand: misappropriation and unfair advantage theories? Singapore and Hong Kong: market stability? 6/25/2019 11th Annual CLTA Conference Victor CS Yeo
Similar presentations
© 2025 SlidePlayer.com. Inc.
All rights reserved.