1. Distribution Statement A
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

2. IMAAC Mission
Provide a single point for the coordination and dissemination of Federal dispersion modeling and hazard prediction products that represent the Federal position during actual or potential incidents involving hazardous atmospheric releases.
Homeland Security Council Memorandum 2004
Memorandum of Understanding between all IMAAC member agencies
Creation of IMAAC:
Anecdote: North Carolina governor had two conflicting plume products, pointing in opposite directions. 
He went on the live news: said "what is the US Gov doing here? We have conflicting information."
This incident spurred NSS to solve the problem of conflicting info. IMAAC was the result: single federal position on atmospheric modeling.

3. IMAAC SUPPORT & TRAINING
The IMAAC provides atmospheric modeling support for:
Real-world events
Emergencies
National Special Security Events (NSSEs)
Exercises
Vibrant Response – 10 kt IND scenario
Southern Exposure – NPP
Training
Webinars
On-site
Classroom (HPAC)

4. WHO IS IMAAC? IMAAC is a partnership
DHS – Department of Homeland Security
FEMA National Watch Center (NWC)
The FEMA National Watch Center (NWC) provides 24/7 situational awareness & understanding of any event or incident which may require a coordinated Federal disaster or consequence management response
The NWC Watch Officer may serve as the Acting IMAAC Director during all phases of an IMAAC activation
DOE – Department of Energy
NARAC is the primary provider of radiological/nuclear modeling for the IMAAC
DOE/NNSA provides technical review, and approval, of radiological/nuclear IMAAC products prior to distribution
HHS – Department of Health and Human Services
Consume IMAAC products and then coordinates and disseminates the data to ESF#8 partners
SME for the effects of contaminants on the population of the US
EPA – Environmental Protection Agency
Authorized to provide updated source term information
When possible, IMAAC modelers are interested in calibrating model assumptions using field measurement data from EPA. If time permits, EPA responders may provide these data to IMAAC in whatever form is available, for example, an ed spreadsheet of geocoded and time-stamped observations
NOAA – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NOAA brings plume modeling expertise (HYSPLIT and CAMEO/ALOHA) to IMAAC as well as volcanic ash plume modeling expertise.
NOAA/National Weather Service weather observations/analysis/atmospheric base models should be the source for any plume models run by IMAAC members for non-DOD events.
NOAA/National Weather Service brings operational weather/atmospheric modeling expertise to the IMAAC.

5. IMAAC UMBRELLA CONCEPT
Idea is to show that each agency has different capabilities that they can contribute to the IMAAC
There is no single agency that will always take the lead, depending on the scenario, any IMAAC member can become the lead for modeling (e.g. DTRA would take the lead for explosive incidents, DOE would take the lead for radiological incidents)
User Community

6. IMAAC Technical Operations Hub
Managed by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).
The IMAAC Technical Operations Hub, coordinates the production and dissemination of IMAAC plume modeling products.
Capabilities
Staffed 24/7 by CBRNE subject matter experts
Turn around requests quickly
Numerous decision support tools to assist Interagency customers

7. IMAAC Technical Operations Hub
Federal, military, and contractor/watch-stander personnel specializing in these fields:
Chemistry
Nuclear
Meteorology
Medical/Biology
Engineering/Sciences
Chemical
Combustion
Structural/Mechanical
Computational Fluid Mechanics
Mathematics
Electrical/Computer
Degree levels: MD, PhD, ScD, MS

8. IMAAC: Operational Concept
Emergency Officials
IMAAC Agency reps; Incident Commanders; Designated State/Local/Tribal/Territories officials
RFI Request
RFI Response
Request for Information
IMAAC Technical Operations Hub
Single Point of Contact for the Interagency Community
IMAAC Hub
Requestor
THE IMAAC COMMUNITY
Technical
SMEs
Collaborative Technical
Analysis
HSIN
Collaborative, Net-Centric Information Environment
Response

9. IMAAC MODELING TOOLS DoD/DTRA HPAC EPA CAMEO/ALOHA NOAA HYSPLIT HHS
Population modeling
DoD/DTRA
HPAC
DOE/NNSA
NARAC
DoD/DTRA
HPAC
EPA
NOAA
NRC
RASCAL
DoD/DTRA
HPAC
VAPO
IMAAC Modeling Capabilities Matrix:
Used to illustrate how the modeling capabilities of IMAAC Member Agencies fit with CBRNE hazards

10. IMAAC MODELING TOOLS, cont.
Chem/Bio
Rad/Nuc
Explosion
Cascading Effects
Waterborne Hazards

11. How to activate the imaac
The IMAAC is activated for current or potential real-world emergencies involving significant hazardous atmospheric releases.
ANY Federal, State, Tribal Territorial, and Local official can request the activation of IMAAC.
To activate IMAAC or request assistance, please call
(703)

12. Imaac MODELING REQUIREMENTS
The IMAAC Emergency Request form describes the type of information required for modeling
When (incident time)
Where (address, intersection, coordinates, etc.)
What (hazard, amount, dispersal method; any details you know)
Contact information
Phone call is best to ensure rapid response
Form can be filled out and sent later to confirm details

13. imaac activation SEQUENCE
IMAAC Activated
Initial IMAAC Products Distributed
IMAAC Coordination Teleconference
IMAAC Deactivated
IMAAC Activated - 0 min
IMAAC activated by the National Watch Center
IMAAC Technical Operations Hub distributes notifications to all IMAAC member agencies’ operations centers
Initial IMAAC Products Distributed ~ 30 min
IMAAC distributes initial model to the requestor and posts products on the Homeland Security Information (HSIN) IMAAC page.
IMAAC Coordination Teleconference ~ 45 min.
Discussion on modeling assumptions, source term data, and weather used for modeling
Updated IMAAC models distributed as needed
IMAAC Deactivated
IMAAC deactivated by NWC and/or IMAAC Director when additional support no longer needed

14. Real world IMAAC activation
Incident: Aug 29 – Sep 3, 2017; Arkema Chemical Plant, Crosby, TX
Activated by: EPA Region 6
Interagency participation: FEMA (IMAAC Dir., National Watch, Region 6), EPA (Region 6 and HQ), NOAA (SDM, Emer. Response Div.), DHS-CSAC, NORTHCOM, JTF-CS, U.S. Dept H&HS, TRANSCOM
Due to Hurricane Harvey, plant was inundated w/ several feet of water.
Organic peroxides at the site required cooling to prevent spontaneous “instability”. Inundation caused cooling systems to fail.
For this particular Interagency Modeling & Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) activation, DTRA provided much more than just the atmospheric prediction of a hazard.
Due to the long duration and the dynamic nature of the incident, DTRA was able to provide assistance based on operational experience and depth of knowledge of CBRN scenarios.
DTRA provided direct technical support and recommendations to Federal, State, and Local entities as actions were taken to manage the incident.
Specifically, DTRA provided:
-Products corroborating evacuation zones and locations of evacuation points
-Updated products based on changing threats (different chemicals; burning vs. pools; and dynamic weather systems)
-Activation of the 45th CST
-Awareness of chemical transition hazards (hydrogen cyanide)
Recommendations on remediation plan and timing of lifting evacuation order
- 87 people were treated at the hospital, 36 admitted: Respiratory issues, skin irritation, and nausea

15. ARKEMA PLANT MODELING Updates
Over the next 6 days, three trailers containing organic peroxides exploded/burned; the rest were intentionally destroyed
Evacuations were conducted in a 1.5 mile radius
IMAAC provided nine updates over the course of 6 days
Products included:
Explosion of a trailer of organic peroxides
Possible chlorine release
Possible leak of sulfur dioxide stored nearby
Possible isobutylene BLEVE
Vertical cross-section
For this particular Interagency Modeling & Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) activation, DTRA provided much more than just the atmospheric prediction of a hazard.
Due to the long duration and the dynamic nature of the incident, DTRA was able to provide assistance based on operational experience and depth of knowledge of CBRN scenarios.
DTRA provided direct technical support and recommendations to Federal, State, and Local entities as actions were taken to manage the incident.
Specifically, DTRA provided:
-Products corroborating evacuation zones and locations of evacuation points
-Updated products based on changing threats (different chemicals; burning vs. pools; and dynamic weather systems)
-Activation of the 45th CST
-Awareness of chemical transition hazards (hydrogen cyanide)
Recommendations on remediation plan and timing of lifting evacuation order
- 87 people were treated at the hospital, 36 admitted: Respiratory issues, skin irritation, and nausea

16. SO2 (Release Starting @ 02 SEP 9:00 PM CDT) – Update #8
Note: AEGL values for SO2 may overestimate effects.
Arkema Chemical Facility
1.5 mile Radius *
FACTS
Crosby, Texas
Location: ° N/ ° W
Event Time: 9:00 PM CDT, 02SEP2017
Type: Sulfur Dioxide
Amount: 32,000 lb (16,000 lbs/hr)
Dissemination: Release over 2 hours
Weather: 3 km NAM
Model: HPAC 6.4
Static Population Estimates: LandScan 2015

17. Human Injury & Structural Damage Contours
Overpressure & Frag
Human Injury/Structural Damage (details on following slides)
55 psi
100% fatalities
Complete structure blowout
30 psi
Near 100% fatalities
Destruction of primary structural components
10 psi
High fatality rate
Severe damage to primary structural components
7 psi
Widespread fatalities, 50% eardrum rupture
Damage to primary structural components
5 psi
Universal injuries
Severe damage to light structures
3 psi
Serious injuries common
Light damage to primary structural components, light structures damaged
1 psi
Light injuries occur
Non-structural component severe damage.
0.5 psi
Temporary eardrum damage
Glass breaks, non-structural components damage
Hazardous Frag
Probability of being struck in the open by primary/hazardous fragmentation is less than 1%.
Initial product focused on chlorine stored at site and a large explosion
Shielding from buildings can reduce the hazard-to-effect contour distances shown in the slides. The contours produced are representative of open terrain effects.
FACTS
Crosby, Texas
Location:
29.949° N / ° W
Amount: 200,000 lb TNT-equivalent
Model: BOOM (JIEDDO)

18. Soot – Burning Trailer – (Starting @ 03 SEP 3:00 AM CDT) – Update #8
1.85 km = 6,070 ft W E
Note: Hazard is from estimated incidental material burning (e.g. tires, trailer, insulation). The combustion products from organic peroxide constitute minimal atmospheric hazards.
FACTS
Crosby, Texas
Location: ° N/ ° W
Event Time: 3:00 AM CDT, 03SEP2017
Type: Organic Peroxide
Amount: 6 containers (38,000 lb each)
Dissemination: Release over 1 hour
Weather: 3 km NAM
Model: HPAC 6.4
Static Population Estimates: LandScan 2015

19. IMAAC Products Types Access
Descriptive plume products (PowerPoint/PDF)
GIS shapefiles
Access
The primary method of product distribution is the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) IMAAC page at:
Products may be distributed through upon request
If you require an IMAAC account, please send an to

20. EXERCISE SUPPORT & TRAINING
To request IMAAC support for an exercise or training session, please send your request to
Optional, in-classroom technical training to use the HPAC model is available to all federal employees at no cost. For information, please contact the DTRA Training Manager at (703) or

21. Public website: https://www.dhs.gov/imaac
Contact Information
For Emergencies
IMAAC Operations: (703)
For general inquiries and exercise support requests, please send an to
Public website:

22. Backup Slides

23. Chem/Bio: HAZARD PREDICTION & ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY (HPAC)
Forward deployable, probabilistic CBRN hazard prediction model that assists the responders in analyzing WMD employment.
Hazard Sources
Weather & Transport
Effects
Chem/Bio Facilities
Chem/Bio Weapons
Nuclear Weapons
Nuclear Facilities
Radiological Weapons
Industrial Facilities
Missile Intercept
Historical Weather
Forecast Weather
Current Observations
Forensic Weather
Particle Transport
Urban Transport
Human Medical Effects
Toxicity Levels
Contaminated Areas
Population Effects
Hazard Areas
HPAC provides for the transport and diffusion of hazards. It has a large variety of input sources (nuclear weapons, nuclear facilities, chemical/biological weapons and facilities, industrial sources, and radiological weapons) Affords great tool for various “what if” scenarios and cases.
The predictions are extremely dependent on weather data, and as you see on the slide a great many sources of weather data is available to the analyst.
HPAC model will present information on the impacts to the human body, the toxicity levels and contamination levels. The model will give an answer to the question, “How good is the prediction?” The hazard area feature estimates the weather uncertainty and turbulence effects on possible plume trajectories and areas of hazard impact. It is designed to assess the validity of the prediction and the degree of confidence in your answer.

24. HPAC – First Responder Modeling Sulfur Trioxide without Thermal Lofting
This model does not account for any burning of products from the house fire.
FACTS
Escondido, CA
Location: º N / º W
Strike Time: 1900Z 09Dec2010
Type: Sulfur Trioxide
Amount: 2.31 kg
Release: 20 minutes duration
Weather: 12 km NAM
Model: HPAC 5.0 SP1
Static Population Estimates: LandScan 2009

25. HPAC - Escondido CA “Bomb Factory House” News Coverage 09 Dec 2010

26. HPAC Batch - Potential Release Planning Casualties vs
HPAC Batch - Potential Release Planning Casualties vs. Time – 5 day – Summary
(1) Low – 10APR2013
(2) High – 11APR2013
50% Mortality
50% Casualty
10% Casualty
Case
Date
Casualties
High
11APR2013
0000Z
~100,000
Low
10APR2013
1200Z
~200

27. Bio: Comprehensive National Incident Management System (CNIMS)
Developed for DTRA by Virginia Tech (VT) – Virginia Bioinformatics Institute (VBI)
CNIMS models the spread of infectious disease by simulating movement, proximity, and interactions between individuals within a geographic region using high- performance computing (HPC)
CNIMS has been used for real world events (2009 H1N1), exercises (SLE '13), and planning requests (Alabama National Guard, NORTHCOM)
Utilizes a web-based GUI that allows for user-specification of scenario parameters
Variations on Intervention Parameters or Multiple Interventions Combined
Infections by Demographics
(Age, Gender, County, etc.)
Infectious Disease Spread on the City, State, and National Level
- Future capability
R E T U R N

28. HPAC - Japan Nuclear Accident Modeling Isotope Air Concentration - Fukushima
1800Z 08APR2011 – NEAR
00000Z 09APR2011 – NEAR
Total Activity Isotope Air Concentration represents standard detectable levels of radioactivity from all possible radioactive isotopes released by the reactor at that exact time.
1200Z 10APR2011 – NEAR
1200Z 09APR2011 – NEAR
Note: Percent release decreased based on data on 0300Z 08APR2011
These are simulated data and are NOT to be used for dose calculations
Models are for air dispersion only and do not account for water dispersion.
- TST on the ground assisting the 2-star educated him enough to redesign the slides
25 NM
50 NM
125 NM
Range Rings
(nautical miles)
Note: these concentrations are very low and not exceptionally dangerous to human health, but monitoring devices may see hits.

29. Rad/Nuc: DOE/NARAC Products
Technical Consequence Reports
The DOE National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center (NARAC) develops IMAAC rad/nuc products
Inform decisions on public and worker protection
Standardized information
Mapped plume hazard areas
Affected population and casualty numbers
Expected health effects
Protective actions to consider: Evacuation, Sheltering, Relocation, Worker Protection,
Geographical information
Distributed on HSIN
One-page technical summary
Briefing Products
DOE/NARAC radiological/nuclear plume model predictions are available for IMAAC support in a variety of formats.
RDD, IND, nuclear power plants, chemicals, and biological agents
Types of Products
Standard technical one-page summary and multi-page consequence report with expanded descriptions, input data, assumptions, tabular output data
Briefing products focus on actions and decisions that need to be consider, and were developed with interagency consensus
Products can be pulled into Google Earth and GIS platforms

30. Rad/Nuc: DOE/NARAC Products
Official Use Only
Rad/Nuc: DOE/NARAC Products
Initial Model Predictions Guide Measurement Surveys
Measurement surveys and sensor data, e.g., DOE AMS, and FRMAC
FRMAC measurements transferred electronically to LLNL/NARAC
Updated predictions using measurement data
Software used to help select, filter and statistically compare measurements and predictions
DOE/NARAC Predictions Guide Measurement Survey and Measurement are Used to Update Predictions
NARAC initial predictions are used in the preparation of field monitoring plans, and help guide monitoring teams to areas of potential contamination
Measurement data is gathered and stored in the DOE/FRMAC RAMS monitoring database or AMS aerial monitoring data files, where it is accessed electronically by the NARAC home team
NARAC uses the measurement data to refine and update model predictions. NARAC compares each measurement values by type, location and time to NARAC model predicted values of the same type, location and time using statistical software and graphical displays. NARAC staff refine the source assumptions and/or the meteorological/dispersion model parameters to best fit the pattern and values indicated by the measurements. A refined product is then available to responders to be used for further monitoring plannning or public protection action guidance.
NARAC’s computational methods are coordinated with those of DOE/FRMAC dose assessment methods and dose conversion factors, so that the two are compatible.
R E T U R N 30

31. Vulnerability Analysis and Protection Option (VAPO)
VAPO allows users to assess a multi-facility site for an array of high-explosive threats (i.e., IEDs, VBIEDs)
VAPO predicts damage to internal and external structural components and windows as well as predictions of personal injury, equipment damage

32. VAPO Force Protection Modeling VBIED Access Control Point w/ Barriers
R E T U R N

33. Cascading Effects: HAZUS-MH
Hazards US – Multi-hazard (HAZUS-MH) is a multi-hazard risk assessment and loss estimation software program developed by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
The tool can identify hazard related risks, calculate potential losses to life and property, and help define effective ways to reduce losses
It is a planning tool, NOT an engineering tool
Engineering-level data (i.e. Hydrology & Hydraulic studies for Flood modeling) can be input to increase accuracy, but results still produce planning-level estimations
It estimates physical damage & economic losses
It assesses population needs related to emergency management
It allows users to compare results from different study case scenarios, including those that result from specific mitigation actions (useful for benefits analysis)
-Working with FEMA
R E T U R N

34. Waterborne Fate and Transport Modeling
Waterborne Hazards: The System for Hazard Assessment of Released Chemicals (SHARC)
Waterborne Fate and Transport Modeling
What does it do:
Provides an operational capability to predict the trajectory and fate of weaponized chemical agents, toxic industrial chemicals and materials, radiological materials, and oil transport in an aquatic environment.
How has it been used:
Operation Tomodachi
US STATCOM Planning
Hypothetical Oil Spills
How does it do it:
SHARC integrates 4 separate models:
Transport Model
Aqueous Fates Model
Particulate Fates Model
Sediment Fates Model
Transport Model
Is a 3D particle based Transport Model, used to transport material by tides, currents, and wind. 
Aqueous Fates Model
Designed to simulate the near-real time changes in near release water chemistry as a result of the degradation of the initial released material and impact to local water chemistry and subsequent chemical breakdown rates. 
Particulate Fates Model
Models the impacts of sorption, a physical and chemical process by which one substance becomes attached to another, and desorption, the opposite of sorption, of materials to suspended material in the water column.
Sediment Fates Model
Models the primary and secondary reactions within the sediment as well as diffusion out of the sediment to predict the fate of chemicals which become incorporated into the sediment.

35. Waterborne Hazard for Nuclear Accident USF-Japan Limits: 0000Z 25Apr2011
Conc of
Cs-137
(Bq/L) ←
Significance
Reference
I-131 (Bq/L) →
>2000*
Min. acceptable ground water protection standards for water safety (All Others)
IAEA General Safety Guide – (17 MR 2011)
>300 *
Min. acceptable ground water protection standards for water safety (All Others)
Japan NSC Guidance (General Population)
37-200
Ingestion of effluent water discharged to the environment (Reference Man)
10CFR20 Appendix B, Table II
37-100
7.4-37
Max. contaminant level limits in drinking water. Derived Concentrations of Beta and Photon Emitters in Drinking Water
Radionuclides in Drinking Water, A Small Entity Compliance Guide: EPA std, NBS Handbook 69
SHARC model – 20m depth based on US/Japan afluence and water standards
Passed on to NOAA for open water
This model does not estimate effects on marine life
Dispersion and activity modeled by a continuous release of a distributed source (constant magnitude) at 0-20m in depth.
Source magnitude based on MEXT and TEPCO monitoring data.
Actual total activity may be greater than predicted due to presence of other radionuclides not shown.
Other constituents will disperse similarly and preliminary simulations suggest that total contamination will not exceed the overall footprint presented above.
R E T U R N