1. Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Military in the Westminster Tradition: Why is Canada so Weak?
Philippe Lagassé
Associate Professor and Barton Chair
Norman Paterson School of International Affairs
Carleton University

2. Outline Legislatures and scrutiny of defence affairs American Bias
Westminster Structures
Variables among Westminster states
The United Kingdom
Australia
New Zealand
Canada
Conclusions

3. Legislatures and Defence Affairs
Research question:
How and why do democratic legislatures vary in their oversight of the military and defence policy?
Fifteen country study
Hundreds of interviews with parliamentarians, ministers, advisors, officials and GOFOs.
Intra and inter-regime comparison
Presidential systems
European/Continental Parliaments
Westminster Parliaments

4. American Bias
The American Constitution and United States Congress as the democratic standards
Separation of powers between the President and Congress in military affairs
Budgets
Promotions
Military service and loyalty
War powers
Congressional Oversight
Classified information
Large staffs and budgets
Budgetary leverage and promotion influence
Visible and powerful committees

5. Westminster Structures
Separation of powers mingled with the confidence convention:
Executive with confidence is solely responsible for defence affairs and controlling the military
Parliament holds the executive to account for its performance
Parliament passes the budget, but it is set by the government
Parliament and the military:
Review rather than oversight
Accountability rather than control
Limited committees, little direct leverage, reliance on unclassified information

6. Variables and Measures
Measures/Indicators
Institutional Design
Unicameral or bicameral
Electoral system
Number of committees
Committee membership rules
Committee roles
Officers of Parliament
Party and Individual Incentives
Vote-seeking or influence-seeking parties
Office-seeking or influence-seeking individuals
Subject matter interest/expertise
Bureaucratic incentives
Military incentives
Access to Information
Secret briefings
Executive transparency and responsiveness
Audits and intra-executive oversight
Public and Media Attention
Civil society attention to defence issues
Media devoted to defence coverage
Domestic defence industrial considerations

7. The British Parliament
Institutional Design
Bicameral with many former military leaders in the House of Lords.
Single-member plurality for MPs with a low turn-over rate at election, enabling longevity.
Two committees with a strong interest in military affairs: the Defence Committee and the Public Accounts Committee.
Committee chairs chosen by the House of Commons.
Committees focused on legislation, spending, procurement, operations, military personnel; ministers appear regularly.
National Audit Office regularly reports on defence issues.
Party and Individual Incentives
Parties are vote-seeking in the Commons.
High degree of backbench independence and rebelliousness.
Many MPs and Lords are influence-seeking, not seeking ministerial office.
Many MPs and Lords with an interest and expertise in defence issues.
Defence bureaucrats take committees seriously, particularly Public Accounts.
Military leaders can use the Defence Committee to highlight their concerns with government policy.

8. The British Parliament
Access to Information
Select parliamentarians can be given secret briefings related to defence.
The executive is fairly responsive to parliamentary requests for information and fairly transparent.
Audits provide the Public Accounts Committee with strong leads for defence oversight.
Public and Media Attention
Defence carries weight with civil society.
Media devote significant resources to defence issues.
Defence industries are a significant employer in the United Kingdom.

9. The Australian Parliament
Institutional Design
Bicameral with strong elected upper house, independent of the government.
Electoral system that empowers the Senate against a government majority in the House of Representatives.
Two committees with a strong interest in military affairs: the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade and the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade; Public Accounts Committee.
Committee chairs and members chosen by parties.
Senate committee focused on legislation and estimates; Joint committee focused on studies; Public Accounts on spending and audits.
National Audit Office regularly reports on defence issues.
Party and Individual Incentives
Parties are vote-seeking in the House.
Parties are influence-seeking in the Senate.
Strong party discipline in the House; independence of many Senators from the government.
Many MPs seek ministerial office.
Many Senators are influence-seeking.
Many Senators with an interest and expertise in defence issues.
Defence bureaucrats take committees seriously, particularly the Senate estimates.
Military leaders take Senate estimates more or less seriously.

10. The Australian Parliament
Access to Information
Select parliamentarians can be given secret briefings related to defence.
The executive is responsive to parliamentary requests for information and fairly transparent, especially during Senate estimates.
Audits provide the Public Accounts Committee and the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade with strong leads for defence oversight.
Public and Media Attention
Defence carries weight with civil society, but it is not the subject of significant debate.
Media devote significant resources to defence issues.
Defence industries are a significant employer in key regions represented by Senators.

11. The New Zealand Parliament
Institutional Design
Unicameral with a small elected house.
Mixed-member proportional representation.
One committee with defence focus: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade.
Committee chairs chosen by parties.
Committee focused mostly on foreign affairs, some interest in defence procurement and administration.
Office of the Auditor General regularly reports on defence issues.
Party and Individual Incentives
Major parties are vote-seeking; small parties are office-seeking.
Strong party discipline.
MPs use committees to advance their careers.
Some former ministers sit on committees.
Defence bureaucrats take the committee seriously.
Military leaders did not see the committee as significant.

12. The New Zealand Parliament
Access to Information
FADT can hear sensitive information in camera.
The executive is very responsive to parliamentary requests for information and fairly transparent.
Audits provide the FADT with strong leads for defence oversight.
Public and Media Attention
Defence carries little weight within civil society.
Media few resources to defence issues.
Defence industries are insignificant in New Zealand.

13. The Canadian Parliament
Institutional Design
Bicameral with appointed upper house.
Single member plurality for the lower house; very high turn over rate for MPs.
Three to four committees interested in defence: Commons defence committee; Public Accounts Committee; Senate national security and defence committee; Senate finance committee.
Commons committee chairs chosen by parties.
Commons defence committee and Senate national security and defence focused on all aspect of defence; Public Accounts and Senate finance focus on management and procurement.
Office of the Auditor General and Parliamentary Budget Officer regularly report on defence issues.

14. The Canadian Parliament
Party and Individual Incentives
Major parties are vote-seeking.
Strong party discipline.
MPs are office-seeking, hoping for cabinet positions.
Former ministers leave at a high rate.
Few Senators from CAF leadership, but some Senators with a keen interest in defence.
Defence bureaucrats take Public Accounts, Senate finance, and estimates seriously.
Military leaders are more divided about the utility of committees; some effort to use committees to advance CAF concerns.

15. The Canadian Parliament
Access to Information
Committees tend not to hear sensitive or classified information, but in camera is possible.
Opposition parliamentarians are rarely briefed by the government.
The executive tends to be guarded with information. Transparency is a challenge.
Audits from the OAG and reports from PBO are used by committees, but easily politicized when dealing with procurement.
No Major Projects Report in Canada.
Public and Media Attention
Defence carries some weight within civil society.
A few defence-focused reporters.
Defence industries are significant and have sway, but mostly within the executive.

16. Sources of Strength, Causes of Weakness Strength:
Independently-minded parliamentarians
Low turn over
Parliamentary careers
Subject matter interest/expertise
Influence-seeking
Robust estimates processes, Public Accounts Committees, Auditors General
Estimates about more than money
PACs and AGs are key accountability actors for defence management and procurement
Classified information? Not as important as we might think
Transparency: Baseline minimum is required

17. Sources of Strength, Causes of Weakness Weakness:
Party discipline in confidence chambers
High turn over rates for elected members
Members incentivized to seek ministerial offices
Classified information: can be a source of weakness, too
Transparency: an obstructionist executive does not help

18. Conclusion Why is Canada so weak?
Blame our electoral system and the incentives it structures for parties and MPs
Our lack of transparency does not help either
We are overly dependent on the OAG and interested Senators
Could it be worse?
At least we’re not New Zealand!