1. Current AU Peace Support Operations Efforts

2. AMISOM Background; Current Security Situation;
Force Deployment And Strength;
Key observations;
Way Forward.

3. BACKGROUND
PSC COM 69TH OF 19th JAN 2007: Authorizing the deployment of AMISOM.
PSC COM 782 OF 27TH JUNE 2018 mandated AMISOM to:
Expand its political and stabilization role into all sectors;
Ensuring IHL and human rights compliance and accountability;
Progressive training and mentoring of Somali national army;
Somali police forces and Darwish forces required to successfully implement the STP.

4. BACKGROUND UNSCR 2431: Mandated the following:
Degrade Al‑Shabaab and other AOG;
Enable the gradual handing-over of security;
Assist the Somali Security Forces.
PSC/PR/COMM(DCCCXXVII) Adopted at 827th meeting held on 13 February Endorsed the AMISOM CONOPS

5. BACKGROUND ‘’Cont’’ END STATE
A significantly degraded military and related capacities of Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups in Somalia, leading to a stable, federal, sovereign, and united Somalia whose citizens enjoy access to justice and the rule of law, with Somali own institutions assuming full responsibilities.

6. BACKGROUND ‘’Cont’’ STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES FOR AMISOM:
Enable the gradual handing over of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the SSF;
Reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups;
Assist the SSF to provide security for the political process at all levels as well as stabilization.

7. CURRENT SECURITY SITUATION OVERVIEW
Al Shabaab continue to recruit in the AoR: 4,000 to 7,000 combatants;
Al-Shabaab will continue to conduct asymmetric attacks against AMISOM/SSF, Federal Government and Civilian by the use of IEDs and VBIEDs;
Involvement of foreign fighters as well as Islamic State/Daesh in Somalia;
Slow progress between Federal Government of Somalia and Federal Member States on issues related to security and resources.

8. AMISOM TROOPS DEPLOYMENT AND STRENGTH
SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS
POLICE
687
CIVILIAN 66
SUMMARY OF STRENGTHS
FHQ – 117
UPDF - 5,892
BNDF - 3,892
KDF – 3,858
DNDF - 1,774
ENDF - 4,123
Military: 19,656
AMISOM STRENGTH 21,626
UNSCR 2431: 20626
SECTOR 4
BELETWEYNE
SECTOR 3
BAIDOA
SECTOR 5
JOWAHAR
SECTOR 1
MOGADISHU
SECTOR 6
KISMAYO
SECTOR 2
DHOBLEY

9. KEY CIMIC ACTIVITIES Refugee returnee convoy movement coordination
Convoy identification and passes-facilitating freedom of movement for HROs.
Dispute resolution(Land, accidents involving AMISOM troops, compensation claims)
Rapid needs assessment for QIPs
Civil resilience(flooding/drought)& response
Defectors reception
Support to election security
IDPs camps identification and security

10. KEYS OBSERVATIONS
Generation of force Enablers/ Multipliers and Somali Security Forces;
Deployment of Somali security forces on the ground ;
Need of funding the mission by the AU;
Dealing with complex ATKs as well as IED/VBIED ATKs.
-AMISOM troops are over stretched IOT to hold liberated area, defend their own positions, assure the security of the elections and conduct security operations. Thee is therefore a requirement for more troops to be engaged.
The limited ability and capability of SNSF limits AMISOM capability to liberate further ground and reduce AS influence.
- Force Multipliers/Enablers such as Intel Surveillance and Recce capability to enhance intel collection and facilitate availability of real time info on AS activities. Attk Helos to provide Close Air Support. Utility Helos for Rapid Deployment of troops,. Expand the Mission enabling unit IOT open up and maintain the MSRs for civilian use and enable logistic support.
-Enhance Counter IED capability to deal with AS weapon of choice as this continue to impact negatively on force protection.

11. WAY FORWARD Implementation of the Somali Transition Plan (STP)
Short-term:
Reconfigure to secure MSR and Pop centres; hand- hover priority locations;
SNP to secure pop centres and Institutions.
Medium-term
Secure MSR; Shabble River Valley and Juba Valley.
Long-term
SSF lead in all sectors IOT to exit.
-AMISOM troops are over stretched IOT to hold liberated area, defend their own positions, assure the security of the elections and conduct security operations. Thee is therefore a requirement for more troops to be engaged.
The limited ability and capability of SNSF limits AMISOM capability to liberate further ground and reduce AS influence.
- Force Multipliers/Enablers such as Intel Surveillance and Recce capability to enhance intel collection and facilitate availability of real time info on AS activities. Attk Helos to provide Close Air Support. Utility Helos for Rapid Deployment of troops,. Expand the Mission enabling unit IOT open up and maintain the MSRs for civilian use and enable logistic support.
-Enhance Counter IED capability to deal with AS weapon of choice as this continue to impact negatively on force protection.

12. JOINT FORCE G5 SAHEL

13. SCOPE Background; Security situation; Force deployment and strength;
Keys observations;
Way forward.

14. BACKGROUND
Convention for the creation of the G5 Sahel signed on 19 December 2014 ;
Declaration of the extraordinary summit of heads of state and government of the member states of the G5 Sahel, held in Bamako, February 6, 2017;
Communiqué of 679th meeting of the PSC;
UNSCR 2359 and 2391.

15. BACKGROUND ‘’CONT’’
Through 679th PSC communiqué (art 11), the force is mandated to:
Combat terrorism, drug trafficking and human trafficking;
Contributing as necessary to the restoration of state authority and the return of displaced persons and refugees;
Facilitate humanitarian operations;
Contribute to the implementation of development actions.

16. SECURITY SITUATION IN THE G5 SAHEL AoR
North of Mali remains of Concerns;
Lipta-Gourma most dangerous area;
Inter-communal conflicts;
About 800 schools closed due to insecurity;
125,000 IDPs recorded (50% from Mopti Region).

17. FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND STRENGTH
5,000 troops to be deployed in the mission Area;
Force HQs at Bamako.

18. KEY OBSERVATIONS Very large and difficult AoR;
UNSCR 2391 support limited to Malian territory;
Strengthening the G5 Sahel Joint Force;
Coordinate the G5 Sahel efforts with the entire region of the Sahel;
Focus on development activities to deal with conflict sources;
Over employment of some MS Defense Forces;
Implementation of the Mali APR.

19. WAY FORWARD
AU Support and International community mobilization for funding the Force;
FHQs to be operationalized on as well as sector HQs;
Coordinating Cell.

20. PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS DIVISION Brief on MNJTF against Boko Haram

21. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
RESTRICTED
MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
8/16/2019
Background– Boko Haram
Actual name of Boko Haram is ‘Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati Wal-Jihad’ meaning "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". In the local dialect, Boko Haram means ‘Western education is forbidden’
It was created by Mohamed Yusuf, an extremist preacher, in 2002 in Maiduguri, North Eastern Nigeria
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

22. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
RESTRICTED
MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
8/16/2019
Background– Boko Haram
Since the demise of its founder in 2009, the group’s leadership is split between Abubakar Shekau and Abu Musab al-Barnawi
Boko Haram was designated by the US as a terrorist group in November 2013
In March 2015, BH swore allegiance to ISIS
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

23. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
RESTRICTED
MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
8/16/2019
Background– Boko Haram
A regional threat
Evolved from conducting sporadic raids and bombings to taking and holding territories
Expanded its AOO to Niger, Cameroon and Chad
Now conducts attacks against military and civilian targets including using, IEDs and suicide attacks
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

24. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
RESTRICTED
MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
8/16/2019
Regional and AU Response to Boko Haram
Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram formed on 20 January 2015 by LCBC Member States and Benin
MNJTF authorized by the 484th meeting of the AU PSC, held on 29 January 2015.
The AU PSC called on the AU and the International Community to support LCBC MS and Benin, with financial, logistical assistance, equipment, and timely intelligence
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

25. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
RESTRICTED
MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
8/16/2019
Strength and Operations
The 489th meeting of the PSC held in March 2015 endorsed the MNJTF Strategic CONOPs. MNJTF strength increased up to 10,000 uniformed personnel
The current strength of the MNJTF stands at 10,772 and supported by AU Mission Support Team of 27 personnel
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

26. MNJTF AREA OF OPERATION
MAIDUGURI
BAGA
DIFFA
MORA
N’DJAMENA
BAGASOLA
GAMBARU
BOSSO
MAROUA
SECTOR 4
SECTOR 2
SECTOR 3
STRATEGIC AND OP HQ : MNJTF N’DJAMENA, CHAD
HQ SECTOR 1: MORA (CAMEROON)
HQ SECTOR 2: BAGASOLA (CHAD)
HQ SECTOR 3: BAGA (NIGERIA)
HQ SECTOR 4: DIFFA (NIGER)
MNJTF GARRISON: N’DJAMENA (BENIN REPUBLIC)
STRENGTH : A DIVISION PLUS
SECTOR 1

27. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
RESTRICTED
MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
8/16/2019
Support to MNJTF
Following this, the AU established a SSC at the AU Hqs and MST at MNJTF Hqs to coordinate and manage the AU additional support to the MNJTF
AU signed a MoU and SIA with the LCBC and the MNJTF TCCs on 29 January 2016 to streamline the extension and accountability of the additional support to the MNJTF
The 816th meeting of the PSC renewed the mandate of the MNJTF until January 2020
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

28. MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
RESTRICTED
MULTINATIONAL JOINT TASK FORCE
8/16/2019
Regional and AU Response-Support to MNJTF
The AU has provided additional support (Human Resource, equipment, services and works) to MNJTF from its own resources and from funds contributed by the AU Partners
Partners include: UK, EU and Turkey
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

29. AU ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TO MNJTF
RESTRICTED
AU ADDITIONAL SUPPORT TO MNJTF
8/16/2019
Stabilisation and Protection of Civilian Strategies
The AU, coordinating with LCBC, local and international partners, drafted a Regional Strategy for the Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience of the Lake Chad Basin
The strategy will support an effective transition from stabilization to early recovery
The strategy was adopted by LCBC on 30 August 2018 and endorsed by the AU PSC on 5 December 2018
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

30. CHALLENGES The major challenges faced by the MNJTF include:
RESTRICTED
CHALLENGES
8/16/2019
The major challenges faced by the MNJTF include:
Appropriate handling of BH surrendering combatants across IBs
Interoperability of equipment in joint ops
Lack of Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) equipment.
Lack of Funds for Quick Impact and Peace Strengthening Projects
Need for Robust maritime capabilities to enhance MNJTF operations in and around the Lake Chad
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

31. RESTRICTED
CONCLUSION
8/16/2019
Although degraded, Boko Haram continues to pose a threat to Peace and Stability in the Lake Chad Basin region
The AU continues to support the LCBC/MNJTF through: Political support; Diplomatic advocacy; administration, logistic and services support; financial and logistic resources mobilization; and provision of expertise
With pledged allegiance to ISIS, BH continued existence now poses a global security threat that needs global response
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED

32. RESTRICTED
8/16/2019
END
16 August 2019
AU-RESTRICTED
RESTRICTED