1. Topics in moral psychology
EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE
Matt Bennett
drmattbennett.weebly.com

2. Epistemic Injustice
Epistemic injustice: moral wrongs committed against people in their capacity as knowers
Epistemic injustices are sui generis
They come in two forms:
Testimonial injustice
Hermeneutical injustice

3. Testimonial Injustice
Testimonial injustice: the wrong committed against a person when their claims are dismissed as a result of prejudice against the kind of person they are
Consider e.g. #metoo A woman suffers TI if her claims are disbelieved despite evidence that would be convincing were she not a woman

4. Appropriate Credibility Judgements
Someone suffering testimonial injustice is not afforded the appropriate level of credibility
But how do we make an appropriate judgement of credibility?
It is not always wrong to judge this based on features of the speaker, for instance:
Relevant expertise
Previous reliability in truth-telling
Whether a person has reason to lie

5. Credibility Deficit and Excess
Someone suffering testimonial injustice is not afforded the appropriate level of credibility However we determine “appropriate”, sometimes we attribute more credibility than appropriate credibility excess And sometimes less credibility deficit

6. Not all credibility errors are unjust
Sometimes we make honest mistakes about credibility Fricker’s example: mistaking a conference delegate for a non-philosopher So what distinguishes culpable mistakes?

7. Credibility and Prejudice
Credibility deficit is unjust when the judgement of credibility is based on an identity prejudice Identity Prejudice: an assumption made about a person based on the beliefs held about people within that person’s social group i.e. about “people like that” e.g. deflating credibility judgement of a woman’s medical claim because “women are hypochondriacs” Injustice, because judgements based on prejudice are ethically culpable Epistemic injustice, because this is an unjust treatment of their credibility

8. Unjust credibility excess?
Fricker focuses primarily on unjust credibility deficit
But sometimes credibility excess is unjust
e.g. undue credibility assigned to a defendant who does not fit the stereotype of a criminal
Certainly an injustice
Epistemic injustice?
See Audrey Yap, ‘Credibility Excess and the Social Imaginary in Cases of Sexual Assault’ Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3.4 (2017)

9. Hermeneutical Injustice
Hermeneutical injustice: when a person is unjustly unable to understand or express a harmful experience
e.g. post-natal depression
Historically, only recently recognised
Not knowing about it can exacerbate the depression
Others not knowing about it can hinder explanation of it, which will also exacerbate symptoms
Mothers can be harmed by an “epistemic gap”

10. Not all epistemic gaps are unjust
e.g. sexual harassment in the workplace
Both victim and perpetrator can have the relevant epistemic gap
But the perpetrator is not wronged in virtue of this gap
Maybe: only epistemic gaps that are harmful/disadvantageous are hermeneutical injustices
But consider the disadvantage of suffering a medical condition that has no diagnosis

11. Hermeneutic marginalisation
Fricker: epistemic gaps are unjust when caused by “hermeneutic marginalisation” Hermeneutic marginalisation: a social group has an unequal opportunity to contribute to public discourse e.g. HM applies to post-natal depression if the relevant epistemic gap is explained by the lack of opportunity for women in medical science

12. Hermeneutical Injustice can harm self-realisation
An additional, serious harm can follow from hermeneutical injustice: inability to be oneself e.g. social and cultural obstacles to sexual identity

13. Speaking Out
The theory of hermeneutical injustice gives us a good way of understanding the value of raising awareness and speaking out

14. A (slight) problem for Fricker – remedies for epistemic injustice
Fricker’s remedy for epistemic injustice is epistemic virtue
A capacity to perceive when to:
Adjust for likely prejudice when assigning credibility
Exercise patience and charity to mitigate the disadvantages of hermeneutical injustice
Rae Langton: is virtue enough? We cant expect virtue to remedy the social factors of hermeneutical injustice Even testimonial injustice is influenced by social factors (See Rae’s review in Hypatia, vol 25.2)