1. Topics in moral psychology
VARIETIES OF RESPONSIBILITY
Matt Bennett
drmattbennett.weebly.com

2. Varieties of Responsibility
Thus far, I have tended to talk of responsibility by using a few phrases interchangeably:
Being held responsible
Being accountable
Being the (appropriate) object of reactive attitudes
Being blameworthy
Being blamed
Being the object of moral assessment
But it turns out these phrases refer to different phenomena

3. Being and Holding Responsible
Angela Smith ‘On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible’ The Journal of Ethics
I can consistently judge that a person is responsible for and that I should not hold them responsible
Consider: we do not ordinarily
talk of holding someone
responsible for good actions
Also: I can judge a person
culpable for a wrong and
still think I ought not to actively
blame them

4. Being and Holding Responsible
Angela Smith ‘On Being Responsible and Holding Responsible’ The Journal of Ethics
Additional requirements for active blaming:
Is the person already self-blaming (feeling guilty)?
Considerations about me (would it be hypocritical?) and my relationship to the person (friends should be forgiving)
The very possibility of forgiveness indicates the difference between being and holding responsible

5. Scanlon on blame
Example: I discover my friend was joking with others at my expense
Three features of my response:
Interpret the meaning of the action (attitude of my friend, its compatibility with our friendship)
Consider what attitude I should take towards the friend given 1
Act on 1 and 2 e.g. by demanding justification

6. Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability
What kind of blaming action we take is partly determined by the relevant relationship-norm
Some norms specify behaviour conducive to a flourishing relationship (e.g. attentiveness in marriage)
Some norms specify minimal requirements for a functioning relationship (e.g. fidelity in marriage)
Transgression of the latter warrants sanctioning behaviour. A person is accountable for those transgressions only
David Shoemaker ‘Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability’ Ethics (an elaboration of Scanlon’s theory of blame)

7. Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability
Reminder: Smith’s attributability theory maintains that we are responsible for the thoughts and actions entailed by our evaluative judgements
Objection 1: irrationality can be attributed to us, but is not something we can justify
Objection 2: we can attribute non-rational attitudes to people, but it makes no sense to ask for reasons for those attitudes
Conclusion: attributability is not co-extensive with answerability (read: open to demands for rational justification)
David Shoemaker ‘Attributability, Answerability, and Accountability’ Ethics (an elaboration of Scanlon’s theory of blame)

8. Active and Passive Responsibility
In (almost?) all contemporary accounts of responsibility, responsible people are the object of a verb We blame or forgive Sophie We hold Sophie responsible/accountable We demand justification from Sophie We assess Sophie in a certain way We attribute something to Sophie But consider: being a responsible parent/student/teacher/etc. is not (just) about being the appropriate object of a judgement or attitude when things go wrong One must also conduct parenting in a responsible way

9. Varieties of Active Responsibility
Taking Responsibility
Accepting what I have done
Accepting blame for a collective failure
Stepping Up
Taking the lead in meeting a collective obligation – a group of people, at least one of whom must ensure X, but of whom none is individually obligated to ensure X (workplace examples may count)
Acting to correct a structural injustice e.g. volunteering with a charity
Acting Responsibly
An attitude towards what we do that is not required by duty

10. A Theory of Active Responsibility
Active forms of responsibility are:
Actions (or ways of acting)
Supererogatory (not obligated/duty bound)
Voluntarist (these kinds of responsibility need to be willed by me, in some sense, in order for them to hold)
Fallible (i.e. I can get this wrong)

11. Possible Objections
Obj1: Taking responsibility is just a way that we can alter passive responsibilities
Like promise making, it can generate obligations
As a form of contrition, it can absolve blame
Reply1: the phrase “taking responsibility” can, but does not always, refer to actions that alter passive responsibilities
e.g. the acknowledgement of wrong required for forgiveness differs from the acknowledgement of wrong required for therapeutic acceptance
Obj2: Acting responsibly means making sure we have good reason for what we are doing
Reply: yes, but our reasons are not always reasons of justification – they are reasons of what is worthwhile