1. Major Justin M. Moeykens jmmoeyke@nps.edu
Cooperation Between Mexican Drug Cartels and AQ or ISIS: Fact, Fiction, or Possible
Major Justin M. Moeykens

2. Argument For…
Osama Bin Laden Expressed Interest in exploiting the Mexican border
USNORTHCOM explicitly has expressed interest in the topic
Hamas has in fact created relationships Los Zetas
IRA and FARC past relationship
Border security issues
Some media says so:
FOX Business News
Project Veritas

3. Argument Against… Zero Confirmed Cases Bad for cartel business
Some media says so:
“They Will Kill Us All!” Critically Assessing ISIS Fear Mongering by US Politicians
NORTHCOM CT experts unofficially says “unlikely”

4. What does this have to do with Political Economy?
Cartel
Terrorist
“Political Economy is the intersection of power, influence, and economics” – GWC Writing Coach Cooperative relationships in the business sector (or between states) is about finding (perceived or real) opportunity between the parties for mutual benefit. Parallels between cartels and terror groups and the private sector do exist
Factors Examined:
Ideology
Identity
Strategy

5. Issues With Ideology CARTEL:
Profit Maximization & Organizational Sustainment
Immediate Gratification and Materialism
Classic Economist
AQ:
Long Term establishment of the Caliphate
Cosmic War
Anti-Western / Globalization
Pious Islamic Behavior
Strategist
ISIS:
Sustainment of the Caliphate
Cosmic War
Strict Sharia Law
Anti-Western / Globalization
Doctrinarians
*AQ being categorized as a strategist, makes them in a position more apt to cooperate with a cartel - IF it supports strategic objectives, but…

6. Issues With Strategy Regarding The United States
CARTEL:
Market ($30 Billion)
Safe Haven
Cog in economic process
AQ:
Target critical to strategic narrative
ISIS:
Non-critical target
AQ’s strategy on the United States does not support cooperating with a Cartel; targeting the United State is a critical component of their strategy. ISIS on the other hand, could compromise their position on the United States, but…. Being doctrinarians in ideology prevents the cooperation.
Regardless of the AQ/ISIS position – ramifications to the cartels would be to costly.

7. Issues With Identity CARTEL:
Fosters In-group dynamics vs. out- group dynamics
High egos
Innovative at all levels
AQ:
ISIS:
Fosters In-group dynamics vs. out- group dynamics
Moral Superiority
Tactical adaption, yet innovation threatens
Fosters In-group dynamics vs. out- group dynamics
Moral Superiority
Tactical adaption, yet innovation threatens
Commonality in group dynamics, but a polarizing external effect.
Greater intra-group trust and identity = lower openness to out-group relationships
Further, moral superiority (especially religious based) is uncompromising
AQ/ISIS reluctance to innovation counter to new relationships

8. What About Principle Agent Problems?
CARTEL:
High ability to prevent defection
AQ:
ISIS:
Defection hard to enforce
Greater ability to prevent defection
Cartels = exploit familial ties to reduce defection behaviors
AQ = globally dispersed low ability to mitigate defection
ISIS = territorial ties and enforcement put the risk of defection high
Decision to cooperate would have to come from the highest levels (historical precedence for all)
Individual defection – can come with a high cost.
Group defection = immediate competitive environment (resource intensive)

9. Conclusion
Significant organizational differences between cartels and AQ or ISIS preclude likelihood of cooperative relationships developing. While they cannot be completely disregarded, divergence in ideology, identity, strategy and decision making processes restrict relationships from forming.
What about the IRA & FARC or Hamas & Los Zetas?
Possible Future Research
IRA & FARC Ideological Alignment as a critical factor
Hamas State Sponsorship? Hamas niche capabilities (tunneling) as cooperative pay off?