1. Welcome Remarks
National Nuclear Regulator

2. Presentation Outline Presentation Outline Regulatory Footprint
Regulatory Framework
Centre for Nuclear Safety and Security (CNSS)
Radio Analytical Laboratory (RAL)
Regulatory Emergency Response Centre (RERC)
Reorganisation
International Cooperation

3. Regulatory Footprint

4. 2. Regulatory framework

5. CENTRE FOR NUCLEAR SAFETY & SECURITY (CNSS)
North Carolina State University (NCSU)
International Science and Technology Center (ISTC)
International Partners
CNSS HUB - University of Pretoria (UP)
SPOKES:
North West University (NWU)
Stellenbosch University (SU)
University of Cape Town (UCT)
University of Witwatersrand
Local Partners
IAEA – Practical Agreement
European Nuclear Safety Training & Tutoring Institute (ENSTTI)
Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety (IRSN)
Agreements to be signed

6. Inspector Training
Current inspector training reviewed by international experts (AdSTM) with a view to developing a formal inspector training programme that is aligned with our organizational competency model.
The core curriculum was finalised with inputs from experts during an IAEA expert mission earlier this year.
Our vision is that we will not reinvent any training that exists, e.g. Established courses at Eskom, Necsa and academic institutions but will include such training as part of our defined curriculum 

7. NNR Radio analytical Laboratory
The laboratory was established in 2013
NNR in partnership with the NMISA laboratory, which is based in Cape Town to provide radio-analytical services.
In 2015 the laboratory joined the IAEA Almera group of laboratories, for participation in inter-comparison tests, method development and validation. The Almera group of laboratories are expected to provide reliable and timely analysis of environmental samples in the event of an accidental or intentional release of radioactivity.
The IAEA peer review was also conducted in 2015 to benchmark the management system against international best practice.

8. Capacity
No. of samples analysed at the laboratory as per the Verification plan is now at 80%. Radium analysis has been Validated and will be analysed at the lab in the future.
Currently the LAB has full capacity and capability to analyse samples for the following:
Sample matrix
Radionuclides
Nuclear Techniques
Water,
Soil/sediments
Biological samples (e.g. fish)
Gamma emitting radionuclides e.g. Cs-137, Co-60, Ra-226
Gamma Spectrometry
Alpha emitting radionuclides in water.
Alpha Spectrometry
Tritium
Liquid Scintillation counting
Gross Alphas/Betas
Gross Alpha/Beta Counter

9. Accreditation
The laboratory has started with the process of acquiring SANAS accreditation for its methods/ activities as required by ISO standard. The plan is to have the laboratory fully accredited by 2019/2020.
As part of accreditation process, the laboratory has been taking part in the IAEA World-Wide open proficiency tests since 2015 on the determination of anthropogenic gamma emitters and natural radionuclides in water and biota samples, by gamma spectrometry.
All the submitted results were acceptable for precision and accuracy (based on z-score method) and were comparable to all other participating international counterparts.

10. Lab Staff

11. Regulatory Emergency Response Centre (RERC)
Regulatory Emergency Response Centre (RERC) established 2006
Purpose of response centre is:
Respond to notification of nuclear/ radiological emergencies from nuclear authorisation holders
Investigation of cause, circumstances and effects of emergency
Keep and maintain records and details of nuclear emergencies
Monitor implementation of protective actions
Upgrade of RERC started in 2013 and completion in 2018

12. Current Capabilities Notification and activation of RERC responders
Direct communication with facilities’ Emergency Control Centre and Disaster Management Centre
Preparation of media briefing and communication with external stakeholders
Briefing and advising Minister of Energy
Monitor emergency events, modelling accidental release and verifying recommended protective actions
Radiological instrumentation for environmental monitoring
Online radiation monitoring for onsite and around facilities
Plant data transfer from facilities' ECC to RERC

13. RERC LAYOUT

14. FINAL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
Reorganisation
FINAL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE ANALYSIS
FUNCTION
CURRENT STAFF
TO BE STAFF
INCREASE/DECREASE
CEO’s OFFICE 2
RITS 33 65 32
NPP 36 42 6
NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY AND NORM 44 69 25
CSS AND COMMUNICATIONS 23 30 7
FINANCE 13 17 4
STRATEGY, GOVERNANCE AND ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE 1
CORPORATE LEGAL, RISK AND COMPLIANCE
INTERNAL AUDIT 3 5
TOTAL
163
242 79
FUNCTION
TECHNICAL
SUPPORT
NUMBER
176 66 %
73%
27%

15. Reorganisation CEO Executive Executive NPP Executive RITS NTWP &NORM
Programme Manager NORM
Programme Manager RITS
Programme Manager NPP
Programme Manager NTWP
Director CNSS

16. International Cooperation
IRRS Mission to NNR: From 5-15 December 2016.
NNR determined to be an Effective Regulator; several findings, suggestions, and good practices
Expert Missions in 2017: Ageing Management, Safety Culture, Public Participation.
Active participation in the IAEA Safety Standards Committees
Member and participates in MDEP
Regional Cooperation through Forum for Nuclear Regulatory Bodies in Africa FNRBA.
South Africa is a member of the African Regional Co-operative Agreement (AFRA)

17. International Cooperation
International conventions relating to nuclear safety and security that the country has either ratified or acceded to:
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident;
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency;
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material;
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
Convention on Nuclear Safety;
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management;

18. Bilateral Cooperation

19. Emerging Issues
Fragmentation in the national regulatory framework (DoH & NNR)
Degradation in safety culture & security culture at nuclear installations
Uncertainty on way forward on the NISL from Eskom
Environmental contamination from legacy mining

20. Thank You