1. Where are the Drivers of Governance Reform?
40 Years of Bangladesh:
Retrospective and Prospective
Where are the Drivers of Governance Reform?
Pierre Landell-Mills

2. Purposes of Presentation
1.To place Bangladesh’s progress towards better governance in the context of the North paradigm for state building
2. In light of this discussion to explore who might become the drivers of governance reform
3. To examine how donors might contribute constructively to supporting these drivers

3. North-Wallis-Weingast
Paradigm for State Building
Fragile  basic mature natural state
limited access -> open access
Essence of a ‘natural state’:
Competition among factions of the elite for power: outcome depends on access to the means of violence
Rulers need resources -> negotiate with owners and creators of wealth
Resources ->power-> accumulation of
resources

4. Limited access state
Institutions are personalized
Means of violence is dispersed
 security forces are not fully
controlled by the state
Elite enjoy privileges not accessible
to ordinary citizens
qualified rule of law
 corporations not treated equally
(monopolies, rigged procurement, etc.)

5. Open access state
Impersonal elite relationships
 Perpetually lived institutions
Security forces under full state/civilian control
Impartial rule of law
Privileges converted into rights under the law available to all citizens
Open and fair competition among political parties, corporations, and CSOs
All citizens equal under the law

6. Limited access  open access:
Transition
Limited access  open access:
Privileged relationships  open competition
Arbitrary justice  rule of law for all
Dispersed means of violence
 state monopoly under civilian control
Increasing transparency and accountability

7. “Doorstep Conditions”
Rule of law for elites
Perpetually lived institutions both public and non-state
Consolidated control of the means of violence (military and police)

8. Good governance
Impartial rule of law
Open and fair competition among political parties, corporations,and CSOs
Impersonal (i.e.meritocratic)
bureaucracy
Transparency and accountability of all state institutions
-> free press, separation of powers, etc.

9. How does Bangladesh fit the paradigm?
Personalized relations -> competing elite factions
Deficient and partial rule of law
Security forces capable of acting independently + other forms of violence
Weak institutions of accountability
Lack of transparency
Limited access state

10. Why bother? Who would gain?
Steady growth: true that poverty remains severe but improvement in social indicators has been impressive
Progress falls far short of potential: growth/incomes, public services, human rights
Paradox: economic dynamism, but poor governance
->better governance could raise GDP growth
2-3% p.a. (World Bank)

11. near-universal agreement
State of governance
near-universal agreement
Highly politicised institutions, both state and non-state, divided along party lines
Formally, ‘modern’ laws and institutions are in place, but informal realities are what matter: weak accountability, lack of restraints, disregard for rule of law; little access to justice; inefficiency and corruption in judiciary and police; use of violence/criminality in politics
Most citizens are ‘prisoners’ in a neo-patrimonial system based on unaccountable informal power

12. Governance issues: Most public transactions involve corruption
-> e.g. procurement, contracting,
appointments, services, etc.
Systems of accountability are ineffective
-> parliament, audit, ACC, etc.
Dysfunctional bureaucracy: not merit-based; highly centralised
Trends: generally considered as mixed, some positive trends (digital Bangladesh); some worsening (judiciary); some uncertain RTI? Media?

13. Why poor governance?
Patronage-based systems for securing and exercising power
Socio-cultural and historical: deep structures (prisoners and escapees)
Constitutional: first-past-the-post, winner takes all; elections promote short-termism; institutions of accountability are ineffective
Economic: hamstrung businesses -- politics seen as way to make money
Slow political renewal: low turnover among senior politicians

14. Drivers of governance reform?
Business groups
Independent media
Professional associations
Policy research and advocacy centres
NGOs

15. Business groups Strong incentives to promote reform Ample resources
Politically divided and captured
Short term horizons
Global links
Prefer not to rock the boat

16. Independent media Resource dependent -> risk capture
No strong traditions
Weak investigative skills
Need a lot of support for building capacity

17. Professional associations
Very varied group
Politically divided
Have yet to play a strong role
Potentially highly influential
Need to assistance to build up capacity

18. Policy research and advocacy centres
Less politically aligned than other groups
Important role in promoting awareness and debate
Heavily dependent on external funding
Vulnerable
Potentially key players

19. Development NGOs Numerous with wide geographical coverage
Well resourced but heavily donor dependent
NGO have conflicting goals
Internal governance issues
Support role

20. Special cases CSOs that are dedicated to governance reform
TIB
BRAC-IGS
Manusher Jonno
Key players

21. Is there a role of the donors in governance reform?
Can donors help?
Is there a role of the donors in governance reform?
Official donors work with and through governments  they accept the rhetoric and pretend to ignore the reality
Governance reform is very politically sensitive  work through 3rd parties

22. Can Donors Help? Major constraints: An ‘open access state’ mindset
Mixed motives (idealism v. self interest)
Inappropriate timeframe
Opportunities:
catalyst  new ideas from outside
money  support non state actors
Switch from supply to demand side from supporting state agencies to NSA

23. Donors Incentives
Incentives : HQ driven priorities , risk avoidance, technical versus political considerations, and quick wins, leading to:
A short term perspective
Blue-print v. learning approach
Preference for technical ,supply side, capacity building interventions, with milestones and measurable value for money
Too little time to learn about local conditions, understand local politics and build personal relationships

24. Conditions for greater donor effectiveness:
Donors need to:
Obtain a better understanding of the political economy context
Map and seek ways to support the potential drivers of governance reform
Accept that governance reform is a slow iterative process – needs a 20+ year time frame, a learning approach, dogged persistence,
And hence, staff willing to stay at least 5-7 years in post

25. Thank you.