2. Access Control for CERN Experimental Areas
North Area Consolidation Safety Review
by Rui Nunes /BE-ICS-AC
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3. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
Outline
Access Control Concept and context
SUSI & ZORA
Primary vs Secondary
NA ZORA access control and PPS
Extents
Historical evolution
Way forward for Post LS2
Risk Analysis – Functional safety studies
Consequences
Question
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4. Access Concept – SUSI vs ZORA
Today we are discussing this one
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5. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
Definitions
SUSI
SUrveillance des SItes  Non interlocked
OTS commercial equipment
Main function
Security or safety by control of allowed area population
ZORA
ZOnes de RAdiation  Interlocked
Integration of OTS commercial equipment with in-house development for interlock of the machine elements
Main function :
Safety System for Protection of Personnel from existing hazards. Control of area population, but most importantly interlock of machine elements in case of dangerous situation.
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6. Primary vs Secondary (our perspective)
Primary areas
High risk of personnel exposure to radiation hazards emanating from the beam during operation or from activated materials
Generally lower risk of exposure to other hazards
Secondary areas
Low risk of exposure to radiation hazards emanating from the “secondary” beam during operation or from activated materials
Generally even lower risk of exposure to other hazards
The terms High, Low and Lower are currently not defined quantitatively
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7. Primary vs Secondary (our perspective)
Primary systems deployed up to now according to a Functional Safety methodology
LHC Access
LS1 PS Access
LS2 SPS Access
Secondary systems were designed in a different context, without a functional safety methodology, at a time when the perception of the risk did not warrant an equivalent to the “primary areas” in terms of safety requirements
LS3 Exp Areas Access ???
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8. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
NA PPS Extents
918
ECN3
EHN2
EHN1
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9. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
Historic Evolution
IEFC
10 June 2011
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10. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
Historic Evolution
IEFC
10 June 2011 39
NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS

11. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
Historic Evolution
IEFC
10 June 2011
Mostly unchanged
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12. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
Historic Evolution
v20
IEFC
10 June 2011 v8
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13. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
Evolutions & requests
Executed changes
LOKN upgrade equipment
Ion Mode interlock
GIF++
Turnstile and upstream beam
Sources not dependent on SPS extraction
Neutrino Platform
More zones
ODH risks
Close the galleries with non interlocked access
Increased access control to the buildings EHN1 & EHN2
Laser interlocks systems
[…]
Known future requests
Limit access to trained people
Change access system in every zone
Interlock galleries in EHN1 & EHN2
Increase of interlocked zones
Review of patrol capabilities
Identify holders of safety keys
Change of equipment
Alternative to analog telephone intercoms ?
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14. Way forward for post-LS2
The combination of:
increase of beam energies
new and more complex hazards
increased complexity of zones
uncoordinated modifications
such as presented in the North Area Consolidation Study Report (  v1)
may not provide the adequate safety personnel protection that could be expected in the post LS2 operation scenarios.
For this reason, a risk-based review and functional safety redesign of the post-LS2 ZORA Personnel protection system seems adequate at this time.
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15. Consequences of FS studies
Risk Analysis
Quantification of radiological risks (RP) and other eventual risks
Determination of safety functions
Review architecture to implement to required SIL level
May imply change of access policy in Exp Halls
May imply revision of EIS-f interfaces
May imply revision of EIS-a design (type of door/device/key distributor)
May imply change of PLCs and supervision
May imply cabling and powering changes
Study implementation phases to minimize impact
Post LS2
The cost of these measures cannot be completely estimated, until the scope and functions of the future system are determined.
This is a result of the risk analysis and functional safety studies.
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16. NA-CONS Safety Review EDMS 2165412
Shall we go for it?
Thank you for your attention.
Questions?
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