1. David Lewis London School of Economics & Political Science
The non-governmental sector in crisis? What can be learned from organisational ‘failure’?
David Lewis
London School of Economics & Political Science

2. Introduction
Wide recognition of NGO ‘success’ in services, empowerment and advocacy
Organisations such as BRAC, Nijera Kori and Grameen Bank have gained global reputations – range of work
Others have run into trouble – Comilla Proshika, Gonoshahajjo Sangstha (GSS), Samata, Proshika …
What can be learned from cases of ‘organisational failure’ in Bangladesh’s NGO sector?

3. Longstanding issues
‘the rapid growth and diversification of the NGO sector has also given rise to questions and concerns. These include the viability of a regulatory framework developed when the size and scope of NGOs was far more limited, the appropriate political and commercial spaces for NGO activities, trade-offs between NGO sustainability and pro- poor orientation, the impact and quality of NGO services as they have scaled up, NGO corporate governance, and the implications of different government-NGO partnerships’ (World Bank, 2006)

4. Possible explanations
‘Organisation-centred’ – low internal accountability
‘State-centred’ – weak regulatory systems, politicisation
‘Society-centred’ – pervasive clientelism
‘External actor-centred’ – donor resource flows

5. Distinctiveness
Bangladesh’s NGO sector as a distinctive, unique hybrid produced by histories of social and political activism, impulses of international aid, and national state formation
Socially-embedded within wider institutions, politics and economy
No ‘one size fits all’ solution can be applied bulding Bangladesh’s non-governmental sector

6. Comilla Proshika case
1976 formation, hybrid of activism/developmentalism
1981 split into two organisations around founders
1980s consolidation and growth
1989 CP serving 65,000 people in 1300 groups in east
1990 CIDA evaluation identifies disfunctional managament committee, lack of accountability, financial mismanagement and faded ‘empowerment’ agenda – staff revolt in 1992

7. Comilla Proshika case (1)
The Proshika 1981 split – ideology/factional interests
‘One faction believed that the poor should be mobilized solely to struggle against the tyranny of landlords and other vested interests in the rural areas. The [other] faction … believed that savings, credit and other economic programmes were essential to the development process… [and] did not agree that conscientization and credit, for example, were mutually exclusive’ (Smillie and Hailey 2001, p.98)

8. Comilla Proshika case (2)
Donor pressure for sustainability through resource mobilisation
Lack of professional organisational approach
Political adventurism – key leader became Jatiya Party candidate 1988

9. Comilla Proshika case (3)
‘The organisation had no clear vision or mission, no real programmes apart from credit programmes (which had a poor repayment rate), no properly trained staff and no real ethic of professionalism. I didn’t have the skills or the training to manage an effective micro-credit programme …’ (interview, former senior manager)
‘… an outstanding personality can hinder the development of leadership in an organisation. Also, when an organisation moves into uncharted areas not familiar to leaders, concentration of power may lead to irreversible losses’ (CIDA Evaluation Report, 1989)

10. Conclusion (1)
Unhelpful to build a ‘crisis narrative’, but low public credibility of NGOs remains a problem
NGOs as complex, socially-embedded organisations – no single explanation
‘Failure’ is both potentially positive (purs pressure on low performers) and negative (weakens reputation of the sector)

11. Conclusion (2)
Importance for broader governance of NGO sector of NGOs being seen to operate responsibly, and subject to fair rules
But NGO governance cannot be reduced to a merely ‘technical’ matter:
- Informality is essential to NGO functioning and resilience (hybridity argument)
- Important to avoid building an NGO monoculture (diversity argument)