1. Rational Choice Models Directional Models & Symbolic Politics
KAP
Political Science 200: Liberal Democracy in America
Henry B. Stobbs, MFA
Associate of Instruction

2. Copyright Notice
Certain materials in this presentation are included under the fair use exemption of the U.S. Copyright Law and have been prepared with the multimedia fair use guidelines and are restricted from further use.

3. The Median Voter Model
The Median Voter Model provides a method of aggregating individual voter's demands to obtain community demand for publicly provided goods and services [Turnbull & Mitias, 1999].
Geoffrey K. Turnbull and Peter M. Mitias (1999). “The Median Voter Model Across Levels of Government.” Public Choice 99:

4. Voter 972’s Ideal Point on Policy Issue Set A
Median Voter Model
1. Each voter can be represented by a point in space such that the point reflects the person’s ideal set of policies (IDEAL POINT). The voter has SINGLE-PEAKED PREFERENCES.
Voter 972’s Ideal Point on Policy Issue Set A

5. Median Voter Model
2. The policy of each candidate likewise can be represented by a point in the same space.
Candidate Smith’s Policy on Issue set A
Candidate Jones’ Policy on Issue Set A

6. Median Voter Model
3. A voter chooses the candidate whose policy position is closest to his or her own.

7. Median Voter Model
The candidate who wins the MEDIAN VOTER wins the election in a two-candidate or two-party election.
The median voter represents 50% +1 of the voters.
The candidate who is closest to the median wins!

8. Median Voter Model Over time, BOTH PARTIES WILL TRY TO WIN THE MEDIAN.
Both will pick close to the same policies
Political conflict will be over small differences (Think of the difference between Kellog’s Raisin Bran and Post Raisin Bran)

9. Median Voter Model
Ideologies are an individual’s concept of a good society.
Ideologies serve as an information shortcut, allowing voters to assume a candidate’s position on given issues
Voters select ideologies

10. Median Voter Model
The degree to which a voter prefers a given candidate is a function of their ideological proximity (closeness) to the candidate (Proximity Spatial Model).

11. So…
In a representative democracy, a vote-maximizing politician should mirror the position or preferences of the median voter [Downs, 1957].

12. Limitations Public choice theory: MVM applies only to unimodal issues.
Bimodal issues are those that:
Engender salient, conscientious, intense public opinion
Derive from passionate ethical, moral, or religious beliefs

13. Limitations
Are dichotomous (you are either for it or against it – little room in the middle).
There is little room for compromise, so policy options tend to be mutually exclusive and sometimes extreme

14. Limitations
Whatever position a representative takes on the issue, either proponents or opponents will be alienated.
The more intense opinion is on a bimodal issue, the less likely a representative will vote in accordance with the preferences of the median voter.

15. Symbolic Politics & the Directional Model
In reality, voters may view issues DIFFUSELY, or as SYMBOLS

16. Key Argument
For issues to have impact, they must evoke EMOTIONS rather than an objective appraisal of information.

17. Symbol-Value of Issues
Issues may convey a symbol that may trigger a set of associations based on prior experiences.
The associations tend to generate emotional responses
These are known as EASY ISSUES

18. Symbol-Value of Issues
It is difficult to reconcile SYMBOLIC POLITICS with traditional PROXIMITY SPATIAL MODEL politics.
Sharp, Fixed Position
emotional, symbolic

19. Advantages of the Directional Model
Can handle emotional issues
It allows us to calculate the impact on an individual voter as a JOINT FUNCTION of both DIRECTIONAL COMPATIBILITY between the voter and the candidate as well as the INTENSITY of both the candidate and the voter.

20. Dos Preguntas de Modello Direccionál
1. Are the individual and candidate in agreement about the direction a policy should take?

21. 2. How INTENSE are the individual and the candidate with regard to the issue?
Neutral

22. (CL– NP) X (VL – NP)
The MAGNITUDE OF THE IMPACT of an issue, its DIRECTIONAL EFFECT, is the INTERACTION of the two INTENSITY LEVELS (candidate and voter).
That is determined by HOW FAR ONE IS from the NEUTRAL POINT of the scale.

23. If NP = 0, Then (CL) X (VL)
If both the voter and the candidate are on the same side of the neutral point, the sign of the product and therefore the impact of the issue will be POSITIVE.

24. If they are on different sides, the sign and the impact will be NEGATIVE.

25. If EITHER the candidate or the voter is NEUTRAL, the effect on the issue will be NEUTRAL.

26. As the voter and candidate become more INTENSE, the directional effect INCREASES. It is possible for a candidate to become so intense that he or she will be unacceptable (an EXTREMIST). The model therefore assumes a ZONE OF ACCEPTANCE in which campaigns and political activity occur.

27. Electoral Impact
The MORE INTENSE a candidate is on an issue, the more the candidate generates INTENSE SUPPORT or OPPOSITION over a given issue. By taking clear, strong stands, candidates can make an issue central to judgments about themselves.

28. A candidate who can successfully EVADE an issue is able to make the issue far less relevant for judgment.
Less Emotional ISSUE B
More Emotional ISSUE A

29. In a multi-issue campaign, candidates are likely to be INTENSE on issues that BENEFIT them and SILENT on issues that are potentially DAMAGING.

30. Electoral Competition: Remember the Median Position
MEDIAN VOTER THEORY: A candidate located at the MEDIAN (or MEAN under certain specific assumptions), will DOMINATE any candidate located at other positions in the space.

31. Electoral Competition: The Directional Model
Any candidate within the Zone of Acceptability is COMPETITIVE with ANY OTHER CANDIDATE within the zone. The MEDIAN (or mean) DOES NOT DOMINATE. ALL strategies are EQUALLY DESIRABLE, so issues will play a more dominant role.

32. When the electorate has a CLEAR DIRECTIONAL PREFERENCE, a DOMINANT POSITION exists and is the MOST EXTREME POSITION in the direction of that preference STILL LYING WITHIN the Zone of Acceptability.

33. Symbolic Politics: The Electoral Goal
To be the candidate who makes the most effective use of the SYMBOL. BUT, the candidate may not stray outside of the Zone of Acceptability.

34. Implication: When the electorate has a clear policy preference, a CANDIDATE who RESPONDS TO THAT PREFERENCE will be REWARDED.

35. Caveat!
Directional theory also suggests that candidates receive LITTLE REWARD for taking a CENTRIST position on an issue – UNLESS the ELECTORATE is EXACTLY DIVIDED.

36. Bibliography
Congleton, Roger D. "The Median Voter Model." (2002): Encyclopedia of Public Choice. [Database online.] 22 FEB 2002.
Elliott, John. “Mayhew: Summary Points & Supporting Material.” 22 SEP 2007.
Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Conection, 2nd Ed.. New Haven: Yale University, 2004.
Turnbull, Geoffrey K. and Peter M. Mitias (1999): “The Median Voter Model Across Levels of Government.” Public Choice 99: