Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning"— Presentation transcript:

1 Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning
Luca Melis∗ UCL Congzheng Song∗ Cornell University Emiliano De Cristofaro UCL & Alan Turing Institute Vitaly Shmatikov Cornell Tech

2 Collaborative machine learning
Dataset 1 Participant 1 Model 1 Dataset 2 Participant 2 Model 2 Dataset 3 Participant 3 Model 3 Periodically exchange model parameters Training data never leave participants’ machines

3 Collaborative machine learning
synchronized gradient updates

4 Collaborative machine learning
Federated learning with model averaging

5 Key idea Any useful ML model reveals something about the
population from which the training data was drawn inferring “unintended” features that hold for certain subsets of the training data

6 Inferences Membership Inference Passive Property Inference
Active Property Inference

7 Threat Model K participants (1 adversary, 1 target) Algorithm 1 K = 2
observes gradient updates computed on a single batch of the target’s data K > 2 observes an aggregation of gradient updates from all other participants Algorithm 2 the result of two-step aggregation: (1) every participant aggregates the gradients computed on each local batch (2) the server aggregates the updates from all participants.

8 Threat Model

9 Threat Model - Embedding layer Non-numeric Discrete Inputs Sparse
Low-dim vector representation Treat embedding matrix as a parameter Sparse gradient Infer information from non-zero gradient

10 Membership Inference IN? - Interpretation data model - Importance
Disease record - Implementation in

11 Membership Inference - Experiment (a) idea
Test Bag of Words (BoW) : the input to be inferred Batch Bag of Words (BoW): the target’s data in each batch subset (b) dataset Yelp-health : vocabulary containing 5,000 words FourSquare: 30,000 locations (c) result

12 Passive Property Inference
- Interpretation Not necessarily in all class Not necessarily related with training object Detect properties in a single batch Detect properties in a participant’s entire dataset Bob’s photo -- gender classification – whether Alice also appears whether people wear glasses when a property appears - Assumption Data labeled: - idea generate aggregated updates based on the data with the property and updates based on the data without the property. train a binary batch property classifier and feeds it

13 Passive Property Inference
- idea

14 Single batch Property Inference
- Experiment ex1

15 Single batch Property Inference
t-SNE projection of the features from different layers - Experiment ex1

16 Single batch Property Inference
- Experiment ex2 Main task: review-score classification Inference: specialty of doctors ex3 Infer some people

17 Dynamic Property Occurrence Inference
determine if people in the image are of the same gender infer whether and when a certain person appears in the other participant’s photos

18 Inference against well-generalized models
Main task: sentiment Inference: infer authors’ gender dataset: annually expanded student-written essays and reviews Truthful/Deceptive OR Positive/Negative labeled with attributes of the author (gender, age, sexual orientation, region of origin, personality profile) the document (timestamp, genre, topic, veracity, sentiment)

19 Active property inference
Let the main model learn separable representations for the data with and without the property. adversary performs additional local computations and submits the resulting values into the collaborative learning protocol Main task: gender classification Inference: presence of ID 4

20 Multi-party experiments
A. Synchronized SGD

21 Multi-party experiments
B. Model averaging

22 Multi-party experiments
B. Model averaging

23 Defense A. Sharing fewer gradients B. Dimensionality reduction

24 Defense C. Dropout D. Participant-level differential privacy

25 Limitations A. Auxiliary data
More targeted inference attacks require specialized auxiliary data that may not be available B. Number of participants some federated-learning applications involve thousands or millions of users C. Undetectable properties It may not be possible to infer some properties from model updates. D. Attribution of inferred properties may not be able to attribute these inputs to a specific participant in multi-party scenarios

26 Thanks!


Download ppt "Exploiting Unintended Feature Leakage in Collaborative Learning"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google