1. GOVERNOR-GENERAL: ROLES, POWERS, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
PLEAWA WACE Revision Seminar

2. GOVERNOR-GENERAL DILEMMA!
Get into teams of 3:
Former PM Malcolm Turnbull
Attorney General Christian Porter
Former GG Peter Cosgrove

3. GOVERNOR-GENERAL DILEMMA!
August 2018: Peter Dutton is preparing to challenge Turnbull for Liberal Party leadership.
Turnbull asserted that he would advise GG not to appoint Dutton as PM, as there were s44 doubts about his eligibility to hold office.
Is Turnbull correct?
What would be your advice as Attorney General?
What would be your response as GG, if Turnbull had given you this advice?
As GG, what would you have done is Dutton had won the leadership? What would you have said to Dutton?

4. CURRENT GOVERNOR-GENERAL
General David Hurley
Appointed 1 July 2019
Former Chief of Defence Force
Former Governor of NSW
Enjoys boxing

5. WHY HAVE A GOVERNOR-GENERAL?
Carries out monarch’s functions as Head of State on their behalf.

6. APPOINTMENT Convention: on advice of PM
Oath of Allegiance and Oath of Office
No term length specified
Salary set by Parliament and cannot be changed during term.

7. REMOVAL ‘During the Queen’s pleasure’ Convention: on advice of PM
Can resign
No GG has been dismissed!

8. Constitutional
Ceremonial
Community
ROLES

9. CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES
WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!

10. CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!
Dissolving parliament and issuing writes for new elections (ss57, 5)

11. CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!
Dissolving parliament and issuing writes for new elections (ss57, 5)
Royal Assent (s58)

12. CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!
Dissolving parliament and issuing writes for new elections (ss57, 5)
Royal Assent (s58)
Appointment of ministers (s64)

13. CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!
Dissolving parliament and issuing writes for new elections (ss57, 5)
Royal Assent (s58)
Appointment of ministers (s64)
Commander in Chief (s68)

14. CONSTITUTIONAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!
Dissolving parliament and issuing writes for new elections (ss57, 5)
Royal Assent (s58)
Appointment of ministers (s64)
Commander in Chief (s68)
Appointment of judges (s72)

15. CEREMONIAL ROLES
WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!

16. CEREMONIAL ROLES
WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!
Opening parliament

17. CEREMONIAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN! Opening parliament
Swearing in ministers

18. CEREMONIAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN! Opening parliament
Swearing in ministers
Receiving credentials of foreign diplomats

19. CEREMONIAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN! Opening parliament
Swearing in ministers
Receiving credentials of foreign diplomats
Reviewing military parades

20. CEREMONIAL ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN! Opening parliament
Swearing in ministers
Receiving credentials of foreign diplomats
Reviewing military parades
Receiving and entertaining foreign heads of state and heads of government

21. COMMUNITY ROLES
WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!

22. COMMUNITY ROLES
WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN!
Presenting awards

23. COMMUNITY ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN! Presenting awards
Attending functions

24. COMMUNITY ROLES WRITE DOWN AS MANY AS YOU CAN! Presenting awards
Attending functions
Citizenship ceremonies

25. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
Executive powers
Legislative powers
Other powers
S61: Executive power
S28: dissolving House of Reps (R)
S68: Commander in Chief (E)
S62: appoints ExCo
S57: double dissolution (R)
S72: appoints judges (E)
S63: act on advice of ExCo
S58: Royal Assent (E)
S64: appoints Ministers (R)

26. EXPRESS POWERS Powers ‘expressed’ on behalf of parliament
GG doesn’t have discretion to exercise these powers
Convention that GG exercises them in accordance with ministerial advice
= RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT!
S68: command of defence forces
S72: appointment of judges

27. RESERVE POWERS USUALLY exercised on ministerial advice, but:
In certain situations, can be exercised without, or CONTRARY to ministerial advice.
Scope of powers is uncertain. WHY?
Not written down – governed by convention!

28. RESERVE POWERS
Power to appoint a PM if an election results in a hung parliament.
Power to dismiss a PM when House has passed No Confidence motion.
Power to appoint a new PM if they have confidence of House.
Power to refuse to dissolve House contrary to ministerial or PM advice.
EXAMPLES

29. RESERVE POWERS
Refusing PM’s request for double dissolution (never been exercised)
Refusing Royal Assent
Dismissing PM and appointing new PM if govt unable to obtain supply.
Why controversial?
DISPUTED/CONTROVERSIAL EXAMPLES

30. PM can advise dismissal of GG
ACCOUNTABILITY OF Gg
GG can dismiss PM
PM can advise dismissal of GG

31. ACCOUNTABILITY OF gg Through appointment Through tenure and removal
Through the people

32. ACCOUNTABILITY OF gg - APPOINTMENT
Appointed by Queen.
On advice of PM.
Perhaps choosing the right person is a good accountability mechanism?

33. ACCOUNTABILITY OF gg – TENURE AND REMOVAL
‘During the Queen’s pleasure’.
Convention: 5 years.
Removal: Queen.
BUT: Queen ruled this out in
Leaves removal up to PM; has never happened (purely a convention).

34. ACCOUNTABILITY OF gg – court of public opinion
Has perhaps been most effective.
Media and public scrutiny following Kerr’s dismissal of Whitlam.
Media and public scrutiny following revelations of Hollingworth’s cover-ups.

35. ANOTHER WAY OF THINKING ABOUT ACCOUNTABILITY…
Formal mechanisms
Informal mechanisms
Technical mechanisms
Appointment
Choosing good candidate
Annual report
Oath of office
Resignation (requested or otherwise)
Budget
Removal (convention)
Public opinion

36. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS – no easy answers!
Independence = accountability difficulties (think of judges)
Is internal accountability the best?
Relying on character and judgement of incumbent to exercise powers in a manner that is consistent with a liberal democracy.
Wouldn’t be good enough for anyone else! (e.g. parliament and executive).
BUT: is this the trade-off for having a truly independent office that isn’t subject to political influence?

37. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS – no easy answers!
‘The absence of a power to discipline or remove for incompetence is an inevitable price that a society pays for ensuring the independence of an office.’
If a GG could be disciplined on the grounds of incompetence, it would be a very difficult and subjective standard to apply.
Could be used as a pretext for removing a GG that the government doesn’t like.

38. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS – no easy answers!
ALSO: disagreement about appropriate use of GG’s reserve powers!
Some (Whitlam) argue that GG must only act on advice of PM, and not use reserve powers against that advice.
Others argue that GG must use reserve powers to reinforce democratic conventions that govt must retain confidence of the parliament, and therefore the people.

39. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS – no easy answers!
It’s difficult to hold someone accountable for their use of powers, when those powers are not written down!