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CSE 5/7349 – February 15th 2006 IPSec.

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Presentation on theme: "CSE 5/7349 – February 15th 2006 IPSec."— Presentation transcript:

1 CSE 5/7349 – February 15th 2006 IPSec

2 Basics Stack Level V4 vs V6 Provides Authentication Confidentiality

3 Architecture & Concepts
Placement Mode Security association (SA) ESP AH

4 IPSec Placement

5 Transport Mode Security
IP header IP options IPSec header Higher layer protocol ESP Real IP destination AH ESP protects higher layer payload only AH can protect IP headers as well as higher layer payload

6 Tunnel Mode Security ESP applies only to the tunneled packet
Outer IP header IPSec header Inner IP header Higher layer protocol ESP Real IP destination Destination IPSec entity AH ESP applies only to the tunneled packet AH can be applied to portions of the outer header

7 Tunnel Mode A B Encrypted Tunnel Gateway Gateway Encrypted Unencrypted
New IP Header AH or ESP Header TCP Data Orig IP Header

8 Security Association - SA
One way relationship (uni-directional) Determine IPSec processing for senders Determine IPSec decoding for destination SAs are not fixed! Generated and customized per traffic flows (manual as well as dynamic) If manual, no lifetime; dynamic has lifetime

9 Security Parameters Index - SPI
Can be up to 32 bits large The SPI allows the destination to select the correct SA under which the received packet will be processed (according to the agreement with the sender) The SPI is sent with the packet by the sender SPI + Dest IP address + IPSec Protocol (AH or ESP) uniquely identifies a SA

10 SA Bundle More than 1 SA can apply to a packet
Example: ESP does not authenticate new IP header. How to authenticate? Use SA to apply ESP w/out authentication to original packet Use 2nd SA to apply AH

11 Authenticated Header (AH)

12 AH Security Connectionless integrity Authentication
Flow/error control left to transport layer Data integrity Authentication Can “trust” IP address source Use MAC to authenticate Anti-replay feature Integrity check value

13 AH Header Format Auth Data Reserved SPI Sequence Number
Next Header (TCP/UDP) Payload Length Reserved SPI Sequence Number Auth Data

14 Anti-Replay Message authentication code (MAC) calculated over
IP header field that do not change or are predictable IPSec protocol header minus where the ICV value goes Upper-level data Code may be truncated to first 96 bits

15 Integrity Check Value - ICV
Message authentication code (MAC) calculated over IP header field that do not change or are predictable IPSec protocol header minus where the ICV value goes Upper-level data Code may be truncated to first 96 bits

16 AH Modes Tunnel Transport Nested headers
Multiple SAs applied to same message Nested tunnels

17 Processing Outbound Messages
Insert Next Header and SPI field Compute the sequence no. field If transport mode … If tunnel mode … Compute authentication value

18 Outbound Processing (cont’d)
If transport mode If tunnel mode Compute authentication value

19 Outbound Processing (cont’d) Fragment the Message
IPSec processing may result in large message which will be fragmented Transport mode Tunnel mode

20 Input Processing Identify the inbound SA Replay protection check

21 Inbound Processing (cont’d)
Verify authentication data Strip off the AH header and continue IPSec processing for any remaining IPSec headers

22 Sequence number checking
Replay Protection Sequence number checking Anti-replay is used only if authentication is selected Sequence number should be the first check on a packet upon looking up an SA Duplicates are rejected! Check bitmap, verify if new reject verify Sliding Window size >= 32

23 Anti-replay Feature Sequence number counter - 32 bit for outgoing IPSec packets Anti-replay window

24 Internet Key Exchange (IKE)

25 Key Management AH and ESP require encryption and authentication keys
Process to negotiate and establish IPSec SA’s between two entities

26 Manual Key Management Mandatory
Useful when IPSec developers are debugging Keys exchanged offline (phone, , etc.) Set up SPI and negotiate parameters Not scalable D & H p. 71

27 Oakley Key Exchange Designed to Leverage advantages of DH
Counter DH weaknesses

28 Oakley - Major Features

29 Cookies Stallings, p186

30 Example: Main Mode Preshared
Initiator Responder SA, CKY-I Negotiate IKE SA parameters SA, CKY-R NonceI, YI Exchange items to generate secret NonceR, YR Generate SKEYID IDI, HashI D & H p. 116 Send hash digest so peer can authenticate sender IDR, HashR Example: Main Mode Preshared

31 Main Mode Preshared Hashes
To authenticate each other, each entity generates a hash digest that only the peer could know Hash-I=PRF(SKEYID,YI|YR|CKY-I|CKY-R|SA Offer|ID-I) Hash-R =PRF(SKEYID,YR|YI|CKY-R|CKY-I|SA Offer|ID-R)

32 Phase II What traffic does SA cover ?
Initiator specifies which entries (selectors) in SPD are for this IPSec SA, sends off to responder Keys and SA attributes communicated with the Phase I - IKE SA Passes encrypted & authenticated

33 Example: Quick Mode I R Initiator Responder HASH3 HASH1, IPSec SA,
NonceI, [New K] Negotiate IPSec SA Parameters, [PFS] HASH2, SA, NonceR, [New K] D & H p. 124 HASH3 ‘Liveness’ proof for Responder


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