1. Extended Cognition
March 28th, 2019

2. Andy Clark and David Chalmers

3. Plan for Today Introducing the Extended Cognition Debate
Two Putative Examples of Extended Cognition
Extended Belief and the Inga/Otto Thought Experiment
Adams and Aizawa’s Response

4. The Central Question
Where is the "boundary” between the mind and the outside world?
The Standard View (Intracranialism): cognition takes place exclusively in the head.
The Extended Cognition Hypothesis (Extracranailsim): cognition can, and sometimes does, extend beyond the boundaries of the skull.

5. The Central Question
Where is the "boundary” between the mind and the outside world?
The Standard View (Intracranialism): cognition takes place only in the head.
The Extended Cognition Hypothesis (Extracranailsim): cognition can, and sometimes does, extend beyond the boundaries of the skull.

6. The Central Question
Where is the "boundary” between the mind and the outside world?
The Standard View (Intracranialism): cognition takes place only in the head.
The Extended Cognition Hypothesis (Extracranailsim): cognition can, and sometimes does, extend beyond the the skull.

7. Could Your Phone be Part of Your “Cognitive Apparatus”?

8. What Do We Mean by “Cognition”?
Cognition is a general term that refers to the many different types of psychological processes that we undergo.
Paradigm cases of cognitive processes include learning, remembering, perceiving and thinking.

9. Plan for Today Introducing the Extended Cognition Debate
Two Putative Examples of Extended Cognition
Extended Belief and the Inga/Otto Thought Experiment
Adams and Aizawa’s Response

10. The “Tetris” Thought Experiment
Clark and Chalmers outline three possible ways in which a person might solve this problem:
The person assesses fit by mentally rotating the shapes in their head.
The person physically rotates the shape on the screen by pressing a ‘rotate’ button on the keyboard.
The person is given a neural implant which can perform the rotation for them.
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 7)

11. The “Tetris” Thought Experiment
Clark and Chalmers outline three possible ways in which a person might solve this problem:
The person assesses fit by mentally rotating the shapes in their head.
The person physically rotates the shape on the screen by pressing a ‘rotate’ button on the keyboard.
The person is given a neural implant which can perform the rotation for them.
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 7)

12. The “Tetris” Thought Experiment
Clark and Chalmers outline three possible ways in which a person might solve this problem:
The person assesses fit by mentally rotating the shapes in their head.
The person physically rotates the shape on the screen by pressing a ‘rotate’ button on the keyboard.
The person is given a neural implant which can perform the rotation for them.
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 7)

13. Is the Rotation of the Shape (In the Head or Otherwise) a Cognitive Process?
Case 1 (mental rotation): Yes, definitely.
Case 3 (neural implant): It looks like it.
Case 2 (rotation button): ? ? ?

14. Is the Rotation of the Shape (In the Head or Otherwise) a Cognitive Process?
Case 1 (mental rotation): Yes, definitely.
Case 3 (neural implant): It looks like it.
Case 2 (rotation button): ? ? ?

15. Clark and Chalmers’ View
The only relevant difference between cases 1 & 3 and case 2 is that in 1 & 3 the rotation is performed in the head, whereas in 2 it is performed outside the head (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 8).
But why should this matter?
In Case 2, the cognitive process is spread across the coupled system of the person plus the computer.

16. *The Parity Principle*
“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) part of the cognitive process.” (Clark & Chalmers, p. 8)
This is the cornerstone of Clark and Chalmers argument for extended cognition.

17. Another Example: Scrabble

18. Another Example: Scrabble
According to Clark and Chalmers, we should view the scrabble example as a genuine case of extended cognition because (a) it satisfies the parity principle, and (b) it is explanatorily simpler to treat the person and tile tray as a single cognitive system.
“Of course, one could always try to explain my action in term of internal processes and a long series of ‘inputs’ and ‘actions’, but this explanation would be needlessly complex. If an isomorphic process were going on in the head, we would feel no urge to characterize it in this cumbersome way. In a very real sense, the re-arrangement of the tiles on the tray is not a part of action; it is a part of thought” (Clark & Chalmers 1998, 10)

19. Plan for Today Introducing the Extended Cognition Debate
Two Putative Examples of Extended Cognition
Extended Belief and the Inga/Otto Thought Experiment
Adams and Aizawa’s Response

20. Extended Belief?
So far, we’ve been discussing the general question of whether there are extended cognitive processes.
In the second half of their paper, Clark and Chalmers turn to the more specific question of whether beliefs can extend into the world.
They argue that one’s beliefs need not always be located exclusively in the head.

21. The Inga-Otto Thought Experiment

22. Clark and Chalmers’ View
According to Clark and Chalmers, “the notebook plays for Otto the same role that [biological] memory plays for Inga” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 13). Just as Inga’s biological memory retains her stored beliefs, so Otto’s notebook retains his stored beliefs.
Clark and Chalmers conclude that Otto’s beliefs literally extend and into the world:
“The moral is that when it comes to belief, there is nothing sacred about skull and skin. What makes some information count as a belief is the role it plays, and there is no reason why the relevant role can be played only from inside the body.” (Clark & Chalmers, p. 14)

23. Clark and Chalmers’ View
According to Clark and Chalmers, “the notebook plays for Otto the same role that [biological] memory plays for Inga” (Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 13). Just as Inga’s biological memory retains her stored beliefs, so Otto’s notebook retains his stored beliefs.
Clark and Chalmers conclude that Otto’s beliefs literally extend and into the world:
“The moral is that when it comes to belief, there is nothing sacred about skull and skin. What makes some information count as a belief is the role it plays, and there is no reason why the relevant role can be played only from inside the body.” (Clark & Chalmers, p. 14)

24. Formalizing the Argument
What makes something a belief is the functional role it plays in one’s cognitive economy (Functionalism).
The information stored in Otto’s notebook functions just like the information stored in Inga’s biological memory system.
The information stored in Inga’s biological memory constitutes a belief that the MoMA is on 53rd street.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Therefore, the words written in Otto’s notebook also constitute an (extended) belief that the MoMA is on 53rd street.

25. Four Further Conditions
Clark and Chalmers add a couple of qualifications to their view. They claim that Otto’s notebook only counts as a part of his mind if the following four conditions are also met:
The notebook must be a constant in Otto’s life—he must rarely be without it.
The information in the notebook must be directly available without difficulty.
Otto must automatically endorse information retrieved from the notebook.
The information in the notebook must have been consciously endorsed in the past.
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 17)

26. Four Further Conditions
Clark and Chalmers add a couple of qualifications to their view. They claim that Otto’s notebook only counts as a part of his mind if the following four conditions are also met:
The notebook must be a constant in Otto’s life—he must rarely be without it.
The information in the notebook must be directly available without difficulty.
Otto must automatically endorse information retrieved from the notebook.
The information in the notebook must have been consciously endorsed in the past.
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 17)

27. Four Further Conditions
Clark and Chalmers add a couple of qualifications to their view. They claim that Otto’s notebook only counts as a part of his mind if the following four conditions are also met:
The notebook must be a constant in Otto’s life—he must rarely be without it.
The information in the notebook must be directly available without difficulty.
Otto must automatically endorse information retrieved from the notebook.
The information in the notebook must have been consciously endorsed in the past.
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 17)

28. Four Further Conditions
Clark and Chalmers add a couple of qualifications to their view. They claim that Otto’s notebook only counts as a part of his mind if the following four conditions are also met:
The notebook must be a constant in Otto’s life—he must rarely be without it.
The information in the notebook must be directly available without difficulty.
Otto must automatically endorse information retrieved from the notebook.
The information in the notebook must have been consciously endorsed in the past.
(Clark & Chalmers, 1998, p. 17)

29. Plan for Today Introducing the Extended Cognition Debate
Two Putative Examples of Extended Cognition
Extended Belief and the Inga/Otto Thought Experiment
Adams and Aizawa’s Response

30. Adams and Aizawa’s Response
Adams and Aizawa disagree with Clark and Chalmers. They claim that – at least at present – cognition doesn’t extend beyond the brain.
“Our view is that, as a matter of contingent empirical fact, in all actual cases of human tool use brain-bound cognitive processes interact with non-cognitive processes in the extracranial world.” (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, p. 46)
Adams and Aizawa provide several reasons for resisting Clark and Chalmers argument for extended cognition (to be outlined in the following slides).

31. Reason 1: No (Exact) Functional Parity
Adams and Aizawa deny that Otto’s notebook (and the information inside it) plays the same functional role as Inga’s biological memory.
In particular, the point out that the process of recollection is very different in the two cases:
“Otto’s ‘memory recall’ involves picking up the notebook and turning to the appropriate page in the notebook. This involves processes that have no analogue in Inga’s memory recall In addition, Otto’s ‘memory recall’ involves visual processing for turning to the appropriate page of the notebook and reading the address. Inga’s memory recall does not.” (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, p. 55-6)

32. Reason 1: No (Exact) Functional Parity
If Otto’s notebook (and the information inside it) don’t play the same functional role as Inga’s biological memory, then Clark and Chalmers’ argument is unsound.
What makes something a belief is the functional role it plays in one’s cognitive economy (Functionalism).
The information stored in Otto’s notebook functions just like the information stored in Inga’s biological memory system.
The information stored in Inga’s biological memory constitutes a belief that the MoMA is on 53rd street.
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Therefore, the words written in Otto’s notebook also constitute an (extended) belief that the MoMA is on 53rd street.

33. An Extracranialist Rejoinder
Clark and Chalmers would likely respond to this objection by insisting that the functional roles of Otto’s notebook and the functional role of Inga’s biological memory are similar enough.
Even if recollection doesn’t work exactly the same way in the two cases, both Inga and Otto are retrieving stored information for the purposes of goal-directed action.

34. Reason 2: No Original Intentionality
According to Adams and Aizawa, cognition necessarily involves original intentionally (or ‘non-derived content’).
Genuine cognitive processes include representations that are about things in the world, independent of anyone else’s interpretation of them (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, p. 48).
But Otto’s notebook lacks original intentionality. The words by themselves are just scratches on a page – they only have meaning be we humans interpret them in a certain way.
Thus, if cognition requires original intentionality (as Adams & Aizawa suggest), then Otto’s notebook would appear to be ruled out.

35. An Extracranialist Rejoinder
Perhaps (as Adams and Aizawa admit) not every element of a cognitive process needs to possess original intentionality:
“It must be admitted that it is unclear to what extent each cognitive state of each cognitive process must involve non-derived content. That is, it is epistemically possible that cognitive processes involve representations that include a closed set of non- representational functional elements . . .If this happens, then cognitive states will to some extent be less than maximally dependent on non-derived content.” (Adams & Aizawa, 2001, p. 50)
Otto’s notebook could hypothetically serve as part of a cognitive process, so long as some part of the process (say, the part going on in the head) possessed original intentionality.

36. Who’s Right?
As with many philosophical debates, there’s no clear consensus regarding the existence of extended cognition.
Opponents of extended cognition try to show that alleged extended cognitive systems are importantly different from the human brain – and thus shouldn’t really be classified as cognitive.
Proponents of extended cognition reply that the systems are similar enough to what goes on in the brain to warrant the label of ‘cognition’.
One thing that emerges from this debate is that we need a satisfactory definition of cognition. Until we know what cognition is, its going to hard for us to decide what kinds of systems have it.

37. Who’s Right?
As with many philosophical debates, there’s no clear consensus regarding the existence of extended cognition.
Opponents of extended cognition try to show that alleged extended cognitive systems are importantly different from the human brain – and thus shouldn’t really be classified as cognitive.
Proponents of extended cognition reply that the systems are similar enough to what goes on in the brain to warrant the label of ‘cognition’.
One thing that emerges from this debate is that we need a satisfactory definition of cognition. Until we know what cognition is, its going to hard for us to decide what kinds of systems have it.

38. Who’s Right?
As with many philosophical debates, there’s no clear consensus regarding the existence of extended cognition.
Opponents of extended cognition try to show that alleged extended cognitive systems are importantly different from the human brain – and thus shouldn’t really be classified as cognitive.
Proponents of extended cognition reply that the systems are similar enough to what goes on in the brain to warrant the label of ‘cognition’.
One thing that emerges from this debate is that we need a satisfactory definition of cognition. Until we know what cognition is, its going to hard for us to decide what kinds of systems have it.

39. Who’s Right?
As with many philosophical debates, there’s no clear consensus regarding the existence of extended cognition.
Opponents of extended cognition try to show that alleged extended cognitive systems are importantly different from the human brain – and thus shouldn’t really be classified as cognitive.
Proponents of extended cognition reply that the systems are similar enough to what goes on in the brain to warrant the label of ‘cognition’.
One thing that emerges from this debate is that we need a satisfactory definition of cognition. Until we know what cognition is, its going to hard for us to decide what kinds of systems have it.