1. Non-Myopic Strategic Bluffing
Papers Presented by Nick Wells

2. Myopic
Short-sighted
Always truthful
Never an incentive to deviate

3. Why do we care about non-myopic?
Repeated games
Intelligent players
Focus on present round or later rounds?

4. Games “Non-Myopic Strategies in Prediction Markets”
Can’t see other person’s signal
But can infer their signal based on action
Trading security F based on event E
P{E|00}, P{E|01}, P{E|10}, P{E|11}
Independent Signals (implies CD)

5. Games “Bluffing and Strategic Reticence in Prediction Markets”
Alice-Bob-Alice
We can analyze both papers with this game
Alice always reveals in first round (PBE)
Knowing Bob’s information won’t help her anyway
Because of Conditional Independence (i.e. Nature choosing a coin)
Therefore, Alice goes first to take biggest slice she can by going first

6. Relative Entropy
Each Player Expects to Gain the Relative Entropy of his Distribution to the Old Distribution
Thus always being truthful makes a profit
But can we make more profit by being deceitful?

7. Truth or Lie
Yes, we can make more profit by being deceitful if we have independence.
No, we cannot if we have conditional independence
Intuitively, with conditional independence we don’t really change our actions anyway.
With independence, one player can deceive the other and turn the tables on them at the end.

8. Discounted Market Scoring Rule
Aims to prevent forward-looking bluffing strategies by discounting future payoffs, thus making you focus on the present
In other words, you act myopically
Problems:
Arbitrage system by taking advantage of the present
System shrinks to a point where there is no incentive to participate
How can we fix it? Still not sure…