1. Loyal Cooperation and Implementation of FTAs
Opinion 1/94 of the Court of 15 November 1994.
Competence of the Community to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property.
107 Any problems which may arise in implementation of the WTO Agreement and its annexes as regards the coordination necessary to ensure unity of action where the Community and the Member States participate jointly cannot modify the answer to the question of competence, that being a prior issue. As the Council has pointed out, resolution of the issue of the allocation of competence cannot depend on problems which may possibly arise in administration of the agreements.

2. Loyal Cooperation and Implementation of FTAs
Article 4 (1) TEU
In accordance with Article 5, competences not conferred upon the Union in the Treaties remain with the Member States.
Article 4(3) TEU
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions of the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's objectives.

3. Loyal Cooperation and Implementation of FTAs
Opinion 1/94
108. Where it is apparent that the subject-matter of an agreement or convention falls in part within the competence of the Community and in part within that of the Member States, it is essential to ensure close cooperation between the Member States and the Community institutions, both in the process of negotiation and conclusion and in the fulfilment of the commitments entered into. That obligation to cooperate flows from the requirement of unity in the international representation of the Community (Ruling 1/78 [1978] ECR 2151, paragraphs 34 to 36, and Opinion 2/91, cited above, paragraph 36).

4. Loyal Cooperation and Implementation of FTAs
I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
II. Externalisation of the division of competences in the implementation of a mixed agreement in the light of the principle of loyal cooperation (loyalty with regard to the EU legal order)

5. - Procedural and reciprocal obligation of unity
I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
- Procedural and reciprocal obligation of unity
Judgment of 4 September 2014, Protection of neighbouring rights of broadcasting organisations — Negotiations for a Convention of the Council of Europe , C-114/12
49      The Council, (…) maintains that the future Convention of the Council of Europe falls within an area of shared competences between the European Union and its Member States, namely that of the internal market, which encompasses protection of intellectual property. Consequently, both the European Union and the Member States should be involved in the forthcoming negotiations by cooperating closely in all stages of the process in order to ensure the unity of the external representation of the European Union.

6. I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
-Obligation to refrain from autonomous action in the field of shared competence, in the framework of a mixed agreement
Judgment of 20 April 2010, Commission v Sweden, PFOS, C-246/07
71      In that regard, the Court has already held that this duty of genuine cooperation is of general application and does not depend either on whether the Community competence concerned is exclusive or on any right of the Member States to enter into obligations towards non-member countries
104    Such a situation is likely to compromise the principle of unity in the international representation of the Union and its Member States and weaken their negotiating power with regard to the other parties to the Convention concerned.

7. -Obligation to implement a mixed agreement, as an EU law obligation
I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
-Obligation to implement a mixed agreement, as an EU law obligation
Hauptzollamt Mainz v. C.A. Kupferberg, 104/81
By implementing an international agreement, Member States fulfil an obligation towards the Union, bearing international responsibility in case of violation of the provisions of the agreement

8. I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
Mixed agreements as source of EU law in their entirety:
-interpretative competence of the Court of Justice for the agreement as a whole
-action for infringement for non-implementation of a mixed agreement, including provisions falling under Member State competence
-but: division of competences in the implementation of the mixed agreement
Case 12/86, Meryem Demirel
Joined Cases C-392/98 & C-300/98, Parfums Christian Dior SA v. Tuk Consultancy BV
Case C-431/05, Merck Genericos-Produtos Farmaceuticos
Case C-13/00, Commission v. Ireland (Berne Convention)
Case C-239/03, Commission v. France (Etang de Berre)
Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie (Brown Bear)

9. I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
Case C-239/03, Commission v. France (Etang de Berre)
24 The Convention and the Protocol were concluded by the Community and its Member States under shared competence.
25 In accordance with case-law, mixed agreements concluded by the Community, its Member States and non-member countries have the same status in the Community legal order as purely Community agreements in so far as the provisions fall within the scope of Community competence (see, to that effect, Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 3719, paragraph 9, and Case C-13/00 Commission v Ireland [2002] ECR I-2943, paragraph 14).
26 From this the Court has inferred that, in ensuring compliance with commitments arising from an agreement concluded by the Community institutions, the Member States fulfil, within the Community system, an obligation in relation to the Community, which has assumed responsibility for the due performance of the agreement (Demirel, cited above, paragraph 11, and Commission v Ireland, cited above, paragraph 15).

10. I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
Case C-431/05, Merck Genericos-Produtos Farmaceuticos
2      The WTO Agreement was concluded by the Community and all its Member States on the basis of joint competence and, as the Court has earlier remarked in Hermès, paragraph 24, without any allocation between them of their respective obligations towards the other contracting parties.
33      It follows that, the TRIPs Agreement having been concluded by the Community and its Member States by virtue of joint competence, the Court, hearing a case brought before it in accordance with the provisions of the EC Treaty, in particular Article 234 EC, has jurisdiction to define the obligations which the Community has thereby assumed and, for that purpose, to interpret the provisions of the TRIPs Agreement (see, to that effect, Dior and Others, paragraph 33).
34      In addition, as the Court has previously held, when the field is one in which the Community has not yet legislated and which consequently falls within the competence of the Member States, the protection of intellectual property rights and measures taken for that purpose by the judicial authorities do not fall within the scope of Community law, so that the latter neither requires nor forbids the legal order of a Member State to accord to individuals the right to rely directly on a rule laid down in the TRIPs Agreement or to oblige the courts to apply that rule of their own motion (Dior and Others, paragraph 48).
35      On the other hand, if it should be found that there are Community rules in the sphere in question, Community law will apply, which will mean that it is necessary, as far as may be possible, to supply an interpretation in keeping with the TRIPs Agreement (see, to that effect, Dior and Others, paragraph 47), although no direct effect may be given to the provision of that agreement at issue (Dior and Others, paragraph 44).

11. I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie (Brown Bear)
40      However, it cannot be inferred that the dispute in the main proceedings does not fall within the scope of EU law because, as stated in paragraph 36 of this judgment, a specific issue which has not yet been subject to EU legislation may fall within the scope of EU law if it relates to a field covered in large measure by it.
41      In that connection, it is irrelevant that Regulation No 1367/2006, which is intended to implement the provisions of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention, only concerns the institutions of the European Union and cannot be regarded as the adoption by the European Union of provisions implementing the obligations which derive from Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention with respect to national administrative or judicial proceedings.
42      Where a provision can apply both to situations falling within the scope of national law and to situations falling within the scope of EU law, it is clearly in the interest of the latter that, in order to forestall future differences of interpretation, that provision should be interpreted uniformly, whatever the circumstances in which it is to apply (see, in particular, Case C‑130/95 Giloy [1997] ECR I‑4291, paragraph 28, and Case C‑53/96 Hermès [1998] ECR I‑3603, paragraph 32).
43      It follows that the Court has jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention and, in particular, to give a ruling on whether or not they have direct effect.

12. I. Specific obligations stemming from the duty of loyal cooperation: loyalty with regard to EU (external action) objectives
Judgment of 30 May 2006, Commission v. Ireland (Sellafield or Mox Plant), C-459/03
Para 175
“the Member States and the Community institutions have an obligation of close cooperation in fulfilling the commitments undertaken by them under joint competence when they conclude a mixed agreement. That is in particular the position in the case of a dispute which, as in the present case, relates essentially to undertakings resulting from a mixed agreement which relates to an area, namely the protection and preservation of the marine environment, in which the respective areas of competence of the Community and the Member States are liable to be closely interrelated, as is, moreover, evidenced by the Declaration of Community competence and the appendix thereto

13. A. Is the division of competences an EU law question?
II. External dimension of the division of competences in the implementation of a mixed agreement in the light of the principle of loyal cooperation (loyalty with regard to the EU legal order)
A. Is the division of competences an EU law question?
B. What allocation of responsibility?

14. II. External dimension of the division of competences in the implementation of a mixed agreement in the light of the principle of loyal cooperation (loyalty with regard to the EU legal order)
A. Is the division of competences an EU law question?
Obligation to ensure that third parties do not interfere with the division of competences : an expression of the autonomy of the EU legal order
-Declaration of competences
But: joint responsibility
-Disconnection clauses: “in their mutual relations, the Member States are to apply EU rules and are not to apply rules of the convention”
Complementarity and unity

15. 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
Annex IX, Article 6
Responsibility and liability
l. Parties which have competence under article 5 of this Annex shall have responsibility for failure to comply with obligations or for any other violation of this Convention.
2. Any State Party may request an international organization or its member States which are States Parties for information as to who has responsibility in respect of any specific matter. The organization and the member States concerned shall provide this information. Failure to provide this information within a reasonable time or the provision of contradictory information shall result in joint and several liability.

16. II. External dimension of the division of competences in the implementation of a mixed agreement in the light of the principle of loyal cooperation (loyalty with regard to the EU legal order)
B. Allocation of international responsibility
Article 8.21 CETA
1. If the dispute cannot be settled within 90 days of the submission of the request for consultations, the request concerns an alleged breach of the Agreement by the European Union or a Member State of the European Union and the investor intends to submit a claim pursuant to Article 8.23, the investor shall deliver to the European Union a notice requesting a determination of the respondent.   2. The notice under paragraph 1 shall identify the measures in respect of which the investor intends to submit a claim. 
3. The European Union shall, after having made a determination, inform the investor as to whether the European Union or a Member State of the European Union shall be the respondent.  

17. II. External dimension of the division of competences in the implementation of a mixed agreement in the light of the principle of loyal cooperation (loyalty with regard to the EU legal order)
B. Allocation of international responsibility
Article 8.21 CETA
4. In the event that the investor has not been informed of the determination within 50 days of delivering its notice requesting such determination:  (a) if the measures identified in the notice are exclusively measures of a Member State of the European Union, the Member State shall be the respondent. (b) if the measures identified in the notice include measures of the European Union, the European Union shall be the respondent.

18. II. External dimension of the division of competences in the implementation of a mixed agreement in the light of the principle of loyal cooperation (loyalty with regard to the EU legal order)
B. Allocation of international responsibility
Article 8.21 CETA
5. The investor may submit a claim pursuant to Article 8.23 on the basis of the determination made pursuant to paragraph 3, and, if no such determination has been communicated to the investor, on the basis of the application of paragraph 4.  6. If the European Union or a Member State of the European Union is the respondent, pursuant to paragraph 3 or 4, neither the European Union, nor the Member State of the European Union may assert the inadmissibility of the claim, lack of jurisdiction of the Tribunal or otherwise object to the claim or award on the ground that the respondent was not properly determined pursuant to paragraph 3 or identified on the basis of the application of paragraph 4.   7. The Tribunal shall be bound by the determination made pursuant to paragraph 3 and, if no such determination has been communicated to the investor, the application of paragraph 4.

19. II. B. Allocation of international responsibility
Financial responsibility is not necessarily competence- based:
Regulation 912/2014
Recital 3
International responsibility for treatment subject to dispute settlement follows the division of competences between the Union and the Member States. As a consequence, the Union will in principle be responsible for defending any claims alleging a violation of rules included in an agreement which fall within the Union’s exclusive competence, irrespective of whether the treatment at issue is afforded by the Union itself or by a Member State

20. II. B. Allocation of international responsibility
Regulation 912/2014, Art 3
1.   Financial responsibility arising from a dispute under an agreement shall be apportioned in accordance with the following criteria:
(a)the Union shall bear the financial responsibility arising from treatment afforded by the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union;
(b)the Member State concerned shall bear the financial responsibility arising from treatment afforded by that Member State;
(c) by way of exception to point (b), the Union shall bear the financial responsibility arising from treatment afforded by a Member State where such treatment was required by Union law.

21. II. B. Allocation of international responsibility
Regulation 912/2014, Art 3
Notwithstanding point (c) of the first subparagraph, where the Member State concerned is required to act pursuant to Union law in order to remedy the inconsistency with Union law of a prior act, that Member State shall be financially responsible unless such prior act was required by Union law.
2.   Where provided for in this Regulation, the Commission shall adopt a decision determining the financial responsibility of the Member State concerned in accordance with the criteria laid down in paragraph 1. The European Parliament and the Council shall be informed of such a decision.

22. II. B. Allocation of international responsibility
Regulation 912/2014, Art 3
3.   Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, the Member State concerned shall bear the financial responsibility where:
(a) it has accepted potential financial responsibility pursuant to Article 12; or
(b)it enters into a settlement, pursuant to Article    Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, the Union shall bear the financial responsibility where the Union acts as the respondent pursuant to Article 4.
Article 6
Cooperation and consultations between the Commission and the Member State concerned
1.   In accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation referred to in Article 4(3) TEU, the Commission and the Member State concerned shall take all necessary steps to defend and protect the interests of the Union and of the Member State concerned.