1. Jaap-Henk Hoepman TNO ICT, Groningen, the Netherlands  jaap-henk.hoepman@tno.nl Digital Security (DS) Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands  jhh@cs.ru.nl /  www.cs.ru.nl/~jhh Privacy & The Internet of Things How to keep the good and make the bad less ugly

2. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

3. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Paradigm shift 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

4. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // RFID = a lot of things..... 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things NFC

5. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // The Internet Of Things 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things The virtual world and the real world are no longer seperated

6. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Where do I come from.... 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

7. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // The good 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things Timo Arnall : http://www.elasticspace.com/ http://www.nabaztag.com//

8. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen //... and where may this all go to? 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

9. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // The bad 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

10. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Privacy concerns xx-xx-xxxxPrivacy orwell / big brother chandler / little sister kafka / the trial

11. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Security concerns as well Confidentiality ● Corporate espionage Integrity ● Data out of sync Authenticity ● Cloning ● Detach/swap Availability ● Jamming ●... 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

12. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // EC Recommendation 12-5-2009 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things Don’t kill the Internet of Things !

13. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // How to avoid the kill and make the bad less ugly Give people agency ● RFID Guardian ● Privacy Coach Use privacy enhancing technologies ● Mutual authentication ● Conditional access ●... 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

14. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Agency 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things “Tags should not be used on people but used by people” former Commisioner Viviane Reding

15. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // The RFID Privacy Coach 04-12- 2009 The RFID Privacy Coach privacy preference privacy policy NFC enabled phone Goal – give consumers control over RFID http://www.privacy-coach.org

16. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Policies? Preferences? Example of a policy ● ACME Ltd registeres the type of pasta you buy when buy a can of peeled tomatoes ● ACME Ltd will offer discounts to people that wear a FOOBAR watch Example of a preference ● I do not want offers based on the tags I carry  (note that FOOBAR watches should give permission to ACME Ltd for reading their tags) ● I allow anonymous profiling 04-12- 2009 The RFID Privacy Coach

17. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // How does it work? 04-12- 2009 The RFID Privacy Coach network independent privacy policy provider tag number tag policy RFID tag database tag policies consumer preference

18. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Privacy enhancing technologies Limitations ● limited resources ● no central authority ● practicality  no key search Requirement ● acknowledge lifecycle! 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

19. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Object-oriented model Object owner ● grants permission to object tag owner ● grants access to tag 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things caller

20. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Practical authentication protocol Symmetric key authentication ● using diversified access key Re-encryption of tag identifier t ● ● new id becomes ● tag only accepts when properly authenticated Protection against stolen readers ● Domain gets new re-encryption key for each epoch ● Tag stores last seen epoch ● Keep old keys for old 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

21. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things Reader Tag

22. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Properties No trusted hardware for tags ● Each tag has different symmetric key Reader does not have to search all keys ● Diversification Tags untraceable before/after succesful authentication ● Re-encryption Any reader can update all identifiers ● Universal re-encryption ● But reader needs to know at least one access key 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

23. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // References IFIP WG 11.2 “Pervasive systems security” ● http://www.cs.ru.nl/ifip-wg11.2/ Council – a thinktank on the IoT ● http://www.theinternetofthings.eu 5-2-2010Privacy and the Internet of Things

24. Jaap-Henk Hoepman // TNO ICT / Radboud University Nijmegen // Discussion 04-12- 2009 The RFID Privacy Coach [Monty Python’s Argument Clinic sketch]