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FHM TRAINING TOOLS This training presentation is part of FHMs commitment to creating and keeping safe workplaces. Be sure to check out all the training programs that are specific to your industry.
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Bioterrorism: An Overview Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program
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Bioterrorism Bioterrorism Intentional or threatened use of viruses, bacteria, fungi, or toxins from living organisms to produce death or disease in humans, animals, or plants
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History of Biological Warfare 14th Century:Plague at Kaffa
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History of Biological Warfare 18th Century:Smallpox Blankets
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History of Biological Warfare 20th Century: –1943:USA program launched –1953:Defensive program established –1969:Offensive program disbanded
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Biological Warfare Agreements 1925Geneva Protocol 1972Biological Weapons Convention 1975Geneva Conventions Ratified
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Bioterrorism
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Bioterrorism : Who are 1st Responders? Primary Care Personnel Hospital ER Staff EMS Personnel Public Health Professionals Other Emergency Preparedness Personnel Laboratory Personnel Law Enforcement
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Potential Bioterrorism Agents Bacterial Agents –Anthrax –Brucellosis –Cholera –Plague, Pneumonic –Tularemia –Q Fever Viruses –Smallpox –VEE –VHF Biological Toxins –Botulinum –Staph Entero-B –Ricin –T-2 Mycotoxins
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Biological Agents of Highest Concern Variola major (Smallpox) Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax) Yersinia pestis (Plague) Francisella tularensis (Tularemia) Botulinum toxin (Botulism) Filoviruses and Arenaviruses (Viral hemorrhagic fevers) ALL suspected or confirmed cases should be reported to health authorities immediately
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Smallpox
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ParapoxAnthrax
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Advantages of Biologics as Weapons Infectious via aerosol Organisms fairly stable in environment Susceptible civilian populations High morbidity and mortality Person-to-person transmission (smallpox, plague, VHF) Difficult to diagnose and/or treat Previous development for BW
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Advantages of Biologics as Weapons Easy to obtain Inexpensive to produce Potential for dissemination over large geographic area Creates panic Can overwhelm medical services Perpetrators escape easily
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Bioterrorism: How Real is the Threat? Hoax vs. Actual BT Event
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Anthrax Bioterrorism San Francisco Chronicle, 20 December 1998
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Threats reported to FBI
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Chemical & Biological Terrorism Chemical & Biological Terrorism 1984: The Dallas, Oregon, Salmonella (salad bar) 1991: Minnesota, ricin toxin (hoax) 1994: Tokyo, Sarin and biological attacks 1995: Arkansas, ricin toxin (hoax) 1995: Ohio, Yersinia pestis (sent in mail) 1997: Washington DC, Anthrax (hoax) 1998: Nevada, non-lethal strain of B. anthracis 1998: Multiple Anthrax hoaxes
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Salmonellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination 4 The Dalles, Oregon in Fall of 1984 4 751 cases of Salmonella 4 Eating at salad bars in 10 restaurants 4 Criminal investigation identified perpetrators as followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh
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Clinical Status of Patients Exposed to Sarin on March 21, 1995 Dead 8 Critical 17 Severe 37 Moderate 984 Outpatient4,073 Unknown 391 Total5,510
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Shigellosis Caused by Intentional Contamination 4 Dallas, Texas in Fall of 1996 4 12 (27%) of 45 laboratory workers in a large medical center had severe diarrheal illness 4 8 (67%) had positive stool cultures for S. dysenteriae type 2 4 Eating muffins or donuts in staff break room implicated 4 PFGE patterns indistinguishable for stool, muffin, and laboratory stock isolates 4 Criminal investigation in progress
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Federal Agencies Involved in Bioterrorism NSC DOD FEMA DOJ DHHS Treasury EPA FBI PHS CDC Secret Service USDA FDA SBCCOM USAMRIID OEP
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Cost of Bioterrorism
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Agent Transmission
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Routes of Infection Routes of Infection Skin –Cuts –Abrasions –Mucosal membranes
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Routes of Infection Routes of Infection Gastrointestinal –Food Potentially significant route of delivery Secondary to either purposeful or accidental exposure to aerosol –Water Capacity to affect large numbers of people Dilution factor Water treatment may be effective in removal of agents
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Routes of Infection Respiratory –Inhalation of spores, droplets & aerosols –Aerosols most effective delivery method –1-5F droplet most effective
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Medical Response to Bioterrorism
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Medical Response Pre-exposure –active immunization –prophylaxis –identification of threat/use
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Medical Response Incubation period –diagnosis –active and passive immunization –antimicrobial or supportive therapy
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Medical Response Overt disease –diagnosis –treatment may not be available may overwhelm system may be less effective –direct patient care will predominate
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Public Health Response to Bioterrorism
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Priorities for Public Health Preparedness Emergency Preparedness and Response Enhance Surveillance and Epidemiology Enhance Laboratory Capacity Enhance Information Technology Stockpile
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Components of a Public Health Response to Bioterrorism Detection - Health Surveillance Rapid Laboratory Diagnosis Epidemiologic Investigation Implementation of Control Measures
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Laboratory Response Network For Bioterrorism Level-A Lab Use Class II Biosafety Cabinet A - Rule-out and forward organisms Level B Lab BSL-2 facility + BSL-3 Safety Practices B - Limited confirmation and Transport Level C Lab BSL-3 C - Molecular assays, reference capacity D - Highest level characterization (Federal) Level D Lab BSL-4
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CDC Rapid Response and Advanced Technology Lab CDC BT Rapid Response and Advanced Technology Lab BSL -3 Agent Identification and Specimen Triage Refer to and Assist Specialty Lab Confirmation Evaluate Rapid Detection Technology Rapid Response Team
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Bioterrorism : What Can Be Done? Awareness Laboratory Preparedness Plan in place Individual & collective protection Detection & characterization
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Bioterrorism: What Can Be Done? Emergency response Measures to Protect the Publics Health and Safety Treatment Safe practices
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