1. Expeditionary Operations
in the 21st Century
Jim Strock
Director, Seabasing Integration Division
Capabilities Development Directorate
Marine Corps Combat Development Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134

2. B.L.U.F. We are in a Long War with an adaptive enemy
We are continuously evolving with changing character of war:
Meeting guidance from QDR—shifting focus to both IW and maintaining conventional competencies
Learning from ongoing operations
Anticipating who, where and how we will fight in the future
Future naval capabilities will provide CoCom’s with flexible capabilities via innovative concepts
Exploiting operational maneuver from global commons
Phase 0: Contributing to maritime security and cooperation
Phases 3 and 4: Decisive Ops and SASO
Industry input vital to bring these capabilities to fruition ASAP and at reasonable costs
I WILL GIVE YOU THE CLIFF NOTE VERSION OR THE BOTTOM LINE UP FRONT
WE RECOGNIZE THAT WE ARE IN A LONG WAR WITH A COMMITTED AND ADAPTIVE ENEMY. WE CAN BEAT THIS OPPONENT AND HIS SPAWN, BUT IT WILL REQUIRE US TO CONTINUOUSLY EVOLVE AND ADAPT OURSELVES.
SO PART OF OUR CURRENT OPS INVOLVES MEETING THE GUIDANCE OF THE QDR TO GET PAST SIMPLY TWO NEARLY SIMULTANEOUS MAJOR COMBAT OPS AND TO SHIFT OUR AIM INTO IRREGULAR WARFARE.
PART OF OUR CURRENT OPS IS LEARNING FROM CURRENT OPS AND CHANGING OUR INVESTMENTS IN R&D TO DEFEAT THE IED THREAT AND TO RAPIDLY ABSORB NEW INSIGHTS FROM THE BATTLEFIELD INTO OUR TRAINING AND EDUCATION SYSTEM.

3. Understanding the Future
How to keep our Naval forces relevant and able to
Threaten an asymmetrical enemy
While maintaining dominance for the conventional fight
Phase 0 requirements
CONPLAN GWOT demands
Naval emphasis in area denial and anti access environments
Temporal nature of the battlespace
World-wide deployment support structure is on the decline
Forward Staging Bases: 38 to 12
Strat Airlift: declining fleet numbers: 160 fewer than 1989; projected down to 250 by 2010
Flexible, adaptable, self-sufficient, DO capable, seabased forces a must

4. Strategic Guidance
Naval forces need to establish steady state capability: Active Partnering and Tailored Shaping
Must contribute to Long War & transnational/ regional deterrence
Build Partner Capacity
Deter or Prevail in Conventional Campaigns

5. CMC Planning Guidance
“Working closely with our Navy and Coast Guard partners, we will advance the amphibious and expeditionary capabilities the Combatant Commanders rely upon to meet their emerging challenges.”
CMC Planning Guidance

6. Traditional Naval Ethos Well Tailored for Non-Traditional Missions
Naval in character
“Packaged” command, ground combat, aviation, CSS capabilities in any size (not just ARG/MEUs)
Commander designation is mission dependent
Joint, Coalition, Interagency friendly in composition
Comfortable and adaptable on non-traditional platforms
Motherships can lighten the maneuver element
Add or subtract “specialists” based on the mission
Aviation and Combat Service Support lily-pad as far forward as required on all ships/crafts afloat
This is the “how” in deploying and employing tomorrow’s “MAGTF Modules”

7. Adjusting Our Aim Irregular Catastrophic Traditional Disruptive
Rebalanced
Capabilities
Irregular & Traditional
Phase 0
Naval emphasis
Temporal nature
Requires self-sufficiency early on
Irregular
Catastrophic
Traditional
Disruptive
Though it is inherently difficult to gauge future security challenges with precision, today’s security landscape suggests that it will be perplexing and dynamically unstable. Recent combat operations suggest a shift towards the more complex Contested Zones. These zones include the dense urban jungles and the congested littorals where the majority of the world’s population and economic activity is centered. They also include other forms of complex terrain including mountain sanctuaries. Marines have faced adversaries in these environments in Mogadishu, the Tora Bora, and in Fallujah. Adversaries realize their relative impotence in conventional force-on-force operations, and are making a corresponding effort to draw U.S. forces into an arena where U.S. conventional capability and technological edge are blunted. A part of this dynamic is the presence of increasingly sophisticated opponents, able to employ sometimes crude but often highly effective unconventional tactics and techniques. As seen in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, these complex adversaries will adopt tactics and modes of operations in an attempt to offset their conventional disadvantages, and engage U.S. forces in the Contested Zones.
“ …our national strategy calls for more widely dispersed forces to provide increased forward presence, security cooperation, and global response to crises…”
The Naval Operations Concept, 2006

8. 76 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years
The Naval Security Environment Across the Entire Range of National Security Strategy
21 Forcible Entry Operations
10 Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
6 Amphibious Assaults
3 Amphibious Raids
2 Peace Operations
Naval Operations (40X)
Naval Operations (21X)
“Arc of
Instability”
“Islamic
Caliphate”
This is the discussion on the Current Security Environment. Except for four HA/DR missions, all of these commitments occurred either in the Caliphate claimed by Islamic extremists or the wider area of economic, social and political instability referred to as the “arc of instability.”
This data not only gives insight with respect to where and what Naval forces may do in the future, it also illustrates the utility of amphibious forces. Amphibious requirements are often discussed strictly in terms of large scale, “high end” forcible entry operations like Inchon.
Most of these are “preventive maintenance,” not corrective.
The United States Navy and Marine Corps conducted at least 76 amphibious operations between 1982 and 2005.
Ongoing forward presence was not included in this data.
These operations covered all five doctrinal types of amphibious operations:
Assaults
Withdrawals
Demonstrations
Raids
Other operations in a permissive, uncertain, or hostile environment
Each of the 76 historical examples was assessed to determine:
The doctrinal amphibious mission it exemplified
The degree of armed opposition anticipated, necessitating forcible entry
Results: 21 of the operations can be classified as forcible entry operations.
6 involved amphibious assaults
3 were amphibious raids
12 were “other” amphibious operations
5 embassy security + NEO
5 NEO
2 peace operations
The remaining 55 applications of amphibious capability involved peace operations, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, show of force, maritime interdiction operations, recovery operations, nation assistance, strike operations, or combating terrorism.
Naval Operations (15X)
76 Amphibious Operations in 23 Years

9. Crises and Conflicts Sunni Insurgency Shia Insurgency
Micro-nationalist
Insurgencies
Stability and Support Operations
Small Wars and Counterinsurgency
Humanitarian Assistance, Disaster Relief and Nation Building
Peace Operations
Combating Terrorism
Counter-Proliferation
Combating Drug Trafficking and Crime
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations #3 #2 #1
Piracy #X
The brown areas are likely crisis regions with the likely missions identified in the MCIA Midrange Threat Estimate through 2015, which are very similar the NDS, QDR, and SPG projections.
The likely insurgency areas and piracy are highlighted on the map and coincide with other projections.
Messages
The CNO’s view of the Future Threat is substantiated.
The missions called out are coincident with those in the NOC – we keep seeing the same consistent picture.

10. Contributors To Crises5 6 8 7 4 3 2 1 9 10
Top Ten Proven Oil Reserves 2004 ?
Known Reserves ?
Nuclear
Armed States
>20% Population
Undernourished
High Earthquake Risk
>35% Population
Undernourished
<50% Population Have
Access to Clean Water
Significant
Drug Regions
Looking at our likely future, these conditions show that the demand for Naval Forces will probably not abate.
Our view of the future has also been informed by a variety of sources and considerations. Independent sources such as the National Geographic Society provide useful data about environmental conditions that may lead to conflict.
With a few exceptions, these overlays tend to reinforce the idea of an arc of instability.
Crises Are Certain

11. Recent Examples . Date Unit Location Mission Dec 01 15th & 26th MEUs
Afghanistan
Operation Enduring Freedom
Fall 04
22nd MEU
COIN ops
Dec 04/Jan 05
15th MEU
Sri Lanka/ Indonesia
Tsunami relief
June 05
24th MEU
New Orleans, LA
Hurricane Katrina relief
July 06
Beirut, Lebanon
NEO .

12. Naval Response Patterns
(By platform type and by decade)
Source: CNA Study, US Naval Response to Situations , Dec. 2000
Number of Responses
Over the past 30 years, we’ve seen a decided shift in the demand signal for expeditionary warfare ships.
We see this trend increasing as we posture our naval expeditionary forces to fight the “long war.”
If anything, this demand signal for versatile, expeditionary
response has been extended even greater since 2001

13. Increasing Forward Presence Well Beyond Today’s ESGs and MEUs
SPMAGTF
ESG
Distributed
Ops
SPMAGTF
ESG
Distributed
Ops
SPMAGTF

14. What Do We Need to Do? GWOT Operational Tasks
Conduct Expeditionary Ops
Conduct NEO
Conduct Information Ops
Conduct ISR
Conduct Maritime Interdiction
Conduct Maritime Security Ops
Conduct Strike/Power Projection
Conduct Special Ops
Conduct Command And Control
Maintain SLOCs
Provide Consequence Management
Provide Force Protection
Provide Log/CSS/Facilities Maint
Provide Operational Air and Missile Defense
Conduct Civil Affairs
Provide Law Enforcement and prisoner handling
Provide staging for joint and combined forces
Conduct coalition, interagency and NGO coordination and support
Provide Humanitarian Aid
Conduct Maritime Domain Awareness
Share intelligence information
Provide support for Homeland Security
Support Proliferation Security Initiative
“21st Century UNITAS”

15. The Anti-Access Challenge… OIF I Turkey: Access Not Granted, Even with $26B Offer
Our nation was ready, willing, and able to offer up $26B for one-time access and passage.
Yet, unanticipated political pressures prevented that access.
Credible seabased force could have mitigated.

16. Enhancing Phase 0-1 Capabilities Via Expanded Naval Missions
Global Fleet Station
Distributed
Globally Networked
Adaptive force packaging
Aggregate, disaggregate & re-aggregate
Culturally aware
Task focused
Build partner capacity
Cross Fleet Standardization
Sized, shaped, and globally
postured for:
Forward Naval Presence
Security Cooperation
Counterinsurgency (COIN)
Counterterrorism
Civil-Military Operations
Counter-proliferation
Maritime Security Operations
Crisis Response
Deterrence
Sea Control
Air and Missile Defense
Expeditionary Power Projection

17. Enhancing Phase 0-2 Capabilities Via Distributed Ops Capable SPMAGTFs
Employed from platforms like LCS, riverine craft, destroyers…
Counter-
proliferation
Forward Presence
Deterrence
Counter-
terrorism
ESG/MEU(SOC)
Air & Missile Defense
COIN
Security Cooperation at Sea
MARSOC units forward-deployed with the ESG/MEU closely link our integrated support with SOCOM and capabilities ISO GWOT/7500
Addresses three of four quadrants: catastrophic, irregular, traditional
DO at the operational level
Potential enabler for Global Fleet Station concept of employment
Enables a wide variety of SPMAGTFs to conduct missions across the full range of military operations
Security
Cooperation
Maritime
Security
Civil – Military
Operations
Crisis Response
U.S. Navy
…While supported by Amphib motherships

18. Enhancing Phase 2-3 Capabilities By Re-aggregating Naval Forces
Power
Projection
Sea
Control
“1000 Ship Navy” will be important enabler
Forward Postured
CONUS Based

19. Marine Corps Amphib & MPF(F) Shipbuilding Requirements
Capabilities
Amphibious Warfare Ships
Inherent survivability, self-defense, and Navy crewing
Maritime forcible entry operations
Forward presence, deterrence
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) (MPF(F))
Capable of at-sea arrival and assembly of forces
Selective offload of equipment sets to meet Seabasing mission requirements
Supports forward engagement and forcible entry
MPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping; therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capable
Shipbuilding Requirements
Amphibious Warfare Ships
2.0 MEB AE per Strategic Planning Guidance; 15 Ao Ships per MEB AE
Total 30 operationally available ships
10 LHD/LHA(R)
10 LPD-17
10 LSD-41/49 (or equivalent replacement)
Average availability is 85% (for planning purposes)
Minimum 11/11/11 ships to meet 30 Ao requirement
Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)
One squadron (per May 2005 Acting SecNav/CNO/CMC decision)
Legacy Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons
Retain two squadrons to maintain afloat prepositioned war reserve capacity
MPF(F) Squadron Composition
Notional 15-Ship ATF
Five LHD-1 (Wasp Class)
Five LPD-17 (San Antonio Class)
Five LSD-41 (Whidbey Island Class)
2 LHA(R)
Thus far, I’ve discussed what we see as the emerging GWOT/TSCP/Shaping requirement for future naval expediionary forces.
This slide gives you a snapshot of our amphibious and maritime prepositioning force (future) shipbuilding requirements.
Our amphib shipbuilding requirements are based on the Strategic Planning Guidance direction to consider options for a single 2-MEB forcible entry capability.
That translates into 15 operationally available ships per MEB, meaning 5 big decks, 5 LPD-17’s, and 5 LSD-41/49’s.
Our MPF(F) squadron composition is based on a formal decision made between the Acting Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps in May of 2005.
It’s key to point out that MPF(F) by design is not assault echelon shipping; therefore, MPF(F) forces are not forcible entry capable.
3 MLP
1 LHD
3 T-AKE
3 T-AKR
2 Legacy
T-AK

20. Marine Corps JHSV Shipbuilding Requirements
JHSV Capabilities & Characteristics
Shallow draft (< 15’), high speed (> 35 kts loaded)
Ability to enter small, austere/degraded ports unassisted
Self-deploying between theaters
ST payload, 1200 NM range, 35 kts, Sea State 3
Smaller payloads = greater range, larger payloads = less range
Seating for 312 Marines (Co (rein)); berthing for 104 Marines
20-22,000 sqft mission deck/cargo bay (M1A2, MTVR compatible)
Slewing ramp (astern to 40 degrees forward)
Level I, Class 2 flight deck for H-60s, H-46s, UH-/AH-1 helicopters
Fuel only, no services
20 ST crane for TEU movement, small boat launch & recovery
Net Ready C4 system (plug and play)
JHSV is not a combatant, operates in a permissive environment
MSC standard for ATFP capabilities
JHSV Quantity and Basing
8 JHSVs funded (5 Army, 3 Navy)
Quantity funded does not equal quantity required
Acquisition objective TBD by MS B (Mar ’08)
PACOM, AoA, MCCDC studies suggest 16 JHSVs needed across DOD
7 JHSV equivalents meet USMC requirements
Based on MARFOR TSCP, GWOT, intra-theater lift requirements
Requirement quantified in “vessel days per year” v. specific # of JHSVs
Assumes 180 days operational availability (Ao) per year per JHSV
Does not explore overlap between USN, USMC requirements
Notional basing scheme (JHSVs swing between theaters as needed)
PACOM = 3 (Hawaii, Guam, Okinawa)
CENTCOM = 2 (Bahrain)
EUCOM = 1 (Rota)
CONUS = 1 (Norfolk)
Possible JHSV Candidates
USMC JHSV CONOPS (The “Intra-Theater Connector”)
TSCP
COBRA GOLD
BALIKITAN
This slide shows you how we see Joint High-Speed Vessel capabilities, characteristics, quantities, and basing. While the Navy’s current 30-year shipbuilding plan has only three of these vessels in the program, COCOM demand signal is growing and will surely influence PR09 and beyond shipbuilding budgets.
Seabasing Support
FIE
Austal 126
INCAT 112
Sea Base
TSL - 140
Adv Base
Self-deploy
Austal 105
NSE
MDV-300
MPF
ESG
HA/DR

21. Seabasing Research and Development
High Capacity UNREP
Selective Offload
Skin-to-Skin Transfer
Stabilized Cranes
Here’s an overview of the various seabasing-related research and development efforts currently ongoing.
Our industry partners have been key players in these efforts, to include stabilized crane technologies, shipboard automated cargo handling and warehousing, air-skid technologies that permit moving heavy loads into heretofore non-accessible stowage locations, and at-sea equipment and personnel transfers between large vessels.
In August and September of last year, the MPF(F) program office, supported by the Marine Corps operating forces, conducted a series of successful at sea skin-to-skin marriages between a mobile landing platform surrogate and an LMSR and performed equipment and personnel transfer between the two vessels, below-decks equipment movement and stowage operations on the LMSR, and LCAC and assault amphibian vehicle recovery operations on the mobile landing platform – all in a sea state 3 operating environment.
We’re very pleased with the progress thus far as we mitigate anticipated risks associated with deploying and operating our new seabasing platforms.
Joint Modular
Intermodal Container (JMIC)
Mobile Landing Platform
Interface
Automated Cargo Handling
At-Sea Arrival, Assembly, Employment, Sustainment

22. Other Research and Development Opportunities
Cultural Awareness and Tactical Language Training
Responsive Naval and Joint Fires suitable for Restricted ROE
C4ISR Interoperability and Intel Fusion Support Technology
Key Equipment Characteristics
Weight
Mobility
Armor
Power
We have much more R&D work to do, and that’s where we’ll need industry’s help.
CMC has expanded our new Center for Advance Operational Cultural Learning to include other Irregular Warfare functions. There have been some limited successes in the S&T world in training technology brought to bear on language acquisition and cultural awareness.
OAD and the Joint Fires AoA have both concluded that Naval Forces are lacking in firepower suitable for use when collateral damage must be minimized, as well as for moving targets and area targets. S&T Plan highlights RESPONSIVE fires., loitering munitions, selectable yield.
C4ISR interoperability is prominent in the S&T Strategic Plan. Plan also hits automated intel fusion. Interoperability also very important, as is intelligent agent technology, multi-level security solutions, systems tolerant of intermittent connectivity.
The Naval Research Advisory Council (NRAC) is conducting a “Lightening the Load” summer study. Advanced power solutions, advanced materials, robotic supports.
One key area that is causing significant concern is weight. With all the armor we’re adding to our ground equiopment, we’re beginning to “weight out” our amphibs ships before they “square and cube out.”
In other words, we’re leaving gear on the pier and sailing with partially loaded ships because ships alterations and MAGTF equipment loads are exceeding allowable ship loading characteristics.
We need your help in finding light-weight, yet fully effective personnel, vehicle and equipment armoring solutions.

23. Conclusions Evolving security environment expands challenges we face
Blurring character of war generates premium for agile forces with adaptive ethos
Security context calls for greater maritime cooperation and interoperability
International and interagency

24. Questions?