1. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Projekat realizuje Human Dynamics Konzorcijum HAZARD IDENTIFICATION EXAMPLE CASES IN LPG AND OIL STORAGE Antony Thanos Ph.D. Chem. Eng. antony.thanos@gmail.com

2. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP technique, liquid phase LPG line from tank to pump. Examine deviations for : oNO FLOW, LESS FLOW oMORE TEMPERATURE oLOSS OF CONTAINEMENT V-1 P-2 V-2 LI PI LPG Tank

3. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in LPG (cont.), HAZOP form for use NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 1 No flow 2 Less flow 3 More Temperature 4 Loss of Containment

4. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in LPG (cont.), answers example NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 1 No Flow V1 or V2 closed and P2 starts Cavitation in pump, potential pump failure, as seal failure with LPG release, in prolonged or repeated cases No remote pump start capability (local only) and V2 very close to pump Closed suction results in excessive noise, operator will immediately identify incident Develop written procedure to require check of proper line-up before pump start. Installation of limit switches for V1 position with position signal to pump house. 2 Less Flow Level in tank very low (reduced suction to pump) As in No.1Procedures require check for adequate level in tank before pump start. Examine installation of level transmitter with level indication to pump- house, along with visual alarm, forcing pump trip in very low level.

5. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in LPG (cont.), answers example Ομάδα HAZOP NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 3 More Temperature V1 and V2 closed in summer conditions Thermal expansion increases pressure, potential for pipe rupture Piping test pressure according to standards Install Thermal Relief Valve (TRV) between V1 and V2 4 Loss of Containment Piping mechanical failure Collision of vehicle in piping Release of LPG from tank, uncontrolled if V1 cannot close (failure close to V1) or failure upstream of V1 Manual isolation of V1 Install Fail-Safe remote operated isolation valve at valve outlet (internal if possible) Establish protection of piping routing from collisions

6. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident scenarios  Define some worst-case scenarios for LPG installation LI PI LPG Tank 200 m 3 2 in hose 2 in, gas phase LPG Tank 120 m 3 to other tanks, compressor to other tanks Supply pipeline from refinery LPG Road Tanker 20 tn 6 in, liquid phase

7. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Accident scenarios (cont.), answers example  Storage area (tanks) oCatastrophic failure of 200 m 3 tank  Movement facilities oCatastrophic failure of road tanker oCatastrophic failure (FBR) of 6 inch pipeline from refinery

8. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Top event scenarios  Initial event : Catastrophic failure of 200 m 3 LPG tank, complete top events in event tree PHASEIGNITIONCONFINEMENTTOP EVENT DIRECT 2-PHASE DELAYED NO CONFINEMENT CONFINEMENT NO IGNITION DIRECT LIQUID DELAYEDNO CONFINEMENT PHASE CONFINEMENT NO IGNITION

9. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium Top event scenarios (cont.), answer  Initial event : Catastrophic failure of 200 m 3 LPG tank PHASEIGNITIONCONFINEMENTTOP EVENT DIRECT FIREBALL (BLEVE) 2-PHASE DELAYED NO CONFINEMENTFLASH FIRE CONFINEMENTUVCE NO IGNITIONSAFE DISPERSION DIRECTPOOL FIRE LIQUID DELAYEDNO CONFINEMENTFLASH FIRE PHASE CONFINEMENTUVCE NO IGNITIONSAFE DISPERSION

10. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP technique, Diesel tank in Refinery. Examine deviations for tank:  MORE TEMPERATURE  LESS/MORE LEVEL  LESS/MORE PRESSURE TI From harbour M MOV1 EV PVV EV LI LIT LAHH LSHH Mixer Pressure/Vacuum Vent Emergency Relief Vent LAH LAL To pumpstations From refinery unit MOV2 MOtorized Valves

11. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), HAZOP form for use NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 1 More Temperature 2 Less Level 3 More Level 4 Less Pressure 5 More Pressure

12. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 1 More Temperature High temperature in feed from refinery (potential loss of cooling water at production unit exit) High pressure Vapour pressure exceeding flash point (elevated ignition hazard) TI (local Temperature Indicator) Mixer dampens temperature variations from feeds Installation of remoteTemperature Transmitter at production unit exit with Temperature Indication and Alarm High (TIAH) Installation of remote Temperature Transmitter with multiple temperature measurements (TITs) at various levels

13. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 2Less Level Unattended withdrawal from tank via pumpstation Potential loss of suction in pumps, with seal damage Mixer exposed, potential damage in mixer seal and leak/ignition LT, LAL (remote Level Transmitter with low level alarm) Install dedidated Low Low Level Switch (LLLS) with Alarm (LLLA) and automatic stop of mixer

14. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 3 More Level Unattended feed from refiner or port Potential overpessure with overflow via EV or tank failure and leak to bund LT, LAH (remote Level Transmitter with Level Alarm High) Dedicated Level Switch High High (LSHH) with remote Level Alarm High High and automatic closure of feed MOVs Examine the potential of water hammer effects upstream harbour MOV1 during closure of MOV1

15. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 4 Less pressure Excessive withdrawal flowrate from pump station Rapid temperature drop in ambient temperature (cooling of vapour space) Potential failure of tank shell with leak to bund PVVs prevent vacuum conditions Verify that PVV sizing for vacuum is set according to standards for max flow to pumpstations

16. This Project is funded by the European Union Project implemented by Human Dynamics Consortium HAZOP in Diesel Tank (cont.), answers example NoDeviationCausesConsequencesSafeguards Comments, Recommendations 5 More Pressure High feed rate Wrorg component feed to tank (high volatile substance, (e.g. gasoline) Failure of PVVs External fire Potential vapour release via EV and ignition Tank failure and leak to bund in case of EV failure PVVs EV Verify capacity of PVV according to standards for max feed rate (either ship or production unit) Verify capacity of EV according to standards Verify that connections to tank originate only from diesel units and diesel loading arms from harbour