1. WATER CONFLICT, SECURITY AND COOPERATION
Dr. Marwa Daoudy
IUHEI (Geneva), CERI (Paris)

2. « Water is not necessary for life, it is life »
Antoine de St-Exupéry, Terre des Hommes, 1939

3. WATER, AN INTERNATIONAL ISSUE
PARTIAL PERSPECTIVE:
« Crisis » or « war» because of freshwater scarcity – « geopolitics of water »
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT:
Sanitary, environmental, political, institutional and financial issues

4. MAP
Water, an International Issue
The Debate: Water and IR
Benefit-Sharing

5. ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS INDICATORS: Global data
Resource use per person per year
Rate of utilization
Dependency rate on external sources

6. THE WATER CYCLE

7. WATER-RELATED DATA
263 internationally shared basins (A. Wolf, Oregon State, Water Database)
70 in Africa, 55 in Europe, 40 in Asia, 33 in South America, 6 in the Middle East
1400 million cubic kilometers (millions of billions of m3), 70% of the earth, only 2.5% of freshwater
Renewable resources: km3/year, i.e. 0,007% of the total water volume
Not an issue of global availability but geographic distribution: 9 countries – 60% of world water resources.

8. CRISIS - INDICATORS (I)
Availability per person per year:
> 1700 m3/h/an: relative water sufficiency
Between 1700 and 1000 m3/p/year: water stress
Between 1000 and 500 m3/p/y: scarcity line
< 500 m3/p/y: absolute scarcity

9. CRISIS - INDICATORS (II)
Rate of dependence on external sources:
Upstream/downstream (main areas of tension)
E.g: Turkmenistan (98%), Egypt (97%), Syria (80%)

10. INDICATORS (III) Water utilizations: 70% to agriculture (ME: 80-90%)
Global food: need to find a balance between agriculture/industry/domestic use

11. ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (I)
Health-related dilemmas:
Water quality (80% of diseases are water-borne in poor countries - WHO)
Pollution (pesticides and salinity of water and soils)

12. ELEMENTS OF A CRISIS (II)
Demographic growth:
World population: x 3 in 100 years
Pressures on water: x 6 in 100 years
Mainly in developing countries
Increased urbanization: + pressure on water (90% of demographic growth is absorbed by cities)
Green Revolution: food security, intensive irrigation practices (vs. Blue Revolution )
Urbanization: – activités industrielles + habitat.
Green Revolution: – fertilisation régions désertiques (Asie Centrale, Irak)
augmentation surfaces irriguées (irrigation intensive)

13. ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES
Increased water demand (demographic growth)
Decreased water supply and water quality
Main areas of conflict

14. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE
Decision-making process?
Execution of mandates?
Accountability, responsibility?

15. THE DEBATE
Institutional, economic, ethical, strategic and political issues at stake
No common vision or unified strategy

16. INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Efficiency of international agreements
Legitimacy of procedures
Equitable share of responsibilities

17. International Water Governance
Environmental, economic and social issues
Sustainable development:
Promoting Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM)
Global good vs. Economic good
Water ethics: International Water Law

18. MULTILATERALISM Promoting International Water Governance:
Stockholm, Rio, Johannesburg
1972, 1992, 2002

19. INTEGRATED WATER MANAGEMENT (IWRM)
* Sustainable water management and sustainable development
* Integrating sometimes opposed interests (ecosystems/human needs, surface water/underground resources, upstream/downstream interests, different uses…).
* Chapter 18 of Agenda 21 (Rio): water is an economic good

20. WATER AND ECONOMICS
Symbolic dimension: water = gift from God= public good
Water costs?

21. WATER ECONOMICS: THE DEBATE
Regional scarcity: need to calculate total distribution costs
Global economic costs: distribution + opportunity + external
Conclusion: need to enhance economic efficiency and environmental, ecological sustainability. Avoid « tragedy of common goods ».

22. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
Private investments in water sector
Investments to increase water supplies (supply management): desalination
« Virtual water »: food imports = water imports (1500 m3/ton of cereals)
Water markets
Exporting water (Turkey).

23. ISSUES AT STAKE Privatization of water sector: risks
Water access as human right
Water as global public good
Third way: between total privatization and total State control

24. WATER ETHICS Need to enhance cooperation among States
International legal standards
Slow but steady construction of IL on utilization of international watercourses for non-navigational purposes (United Nations Convention, 1997).

25. CONCLUSIONS Multidimensional issue
Water: human survival, economic growth and political stability
« Hydro-politics »: link between hydraulic issues strategic, economic and political levels (cooperation, conflict, security).

26. WATER AND IR

27. The Theoretical Debate
I. Water Conflict & Cooperation: some IR theories
II. Debating water issues in the 1990s: environmental security vs. virtual water
III. Debating water issues today: benefit sharing vs. water rights.

28. Water Specificity – Some Theoretical implications
Global Common Good = need for collective action
Avoid « tragedy of the commons » (Hardin, 1968) or unilateral abuse by developing common and organized management of resources.
Common and organized management of resources: (Ostrom, 1991).
Recent studies suggest that average cost of desalinated water is 65 c/m3.
Water property rights: Moore, 1992 & 1994; Luterbacher, Schellnhuber & Wiegandt, 2000.
Political economy: Harvard Water Project, Fisher & al.

29. Water, Conflict and Security

30. Conflict over Water Classification criteria (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006):
Development disputes
Control of water resources
Water as political tool
Water as military target
Water as military tool
Inter-State
Intra-State

31. Water Conflict and Cooperation
Regime Theory: regional institutions to manage cooperative regimes for natural resources.
International Governance: agent-based resolution of collective problems at local, national and international level.
Regime theory: (Young, 1989; Haas, Keohane & Levy, 1993; Kibaroglu, 1998)
Hegemonic stability theory: (Lowi, 1994)
No conflict over water in ME: Waterbury, 1994).
International governance: (Medzini & Wolf, 2001).

32. Water Conflict & Cooperation
Power Matrix: additional factors (other than asymmetry) to explain link between water and conflict (interests, riparian position, projected power).
Inherent asymmetry as specific nature of conflicts over water (Haftendorn, 2000).
Conflict resolution should address asymmetric structure of conflict
Power matrix: (Naff & Frey, 1985
Inherent asymmetry: (Haftendorn, 2000).
Debate in 90s: (Th. Homer-Dixon, 1994):
Virtual water: (Allan, 2000).

33. Water Conflict vs. Water Cooperation
Environmental security vs. virtual water (Pessimists vs. Optimists)
Debate in 1990s: very high risks of violent conflict because of increasing water scarcity (e.g., Middle East)
Vs. no conflict despite water scarcity and tensions: additional supply through water embedded in food imports

34. GEOPOLITICAL STUDIES Conventional Geopolitics:
Natural resource endowments and geography are defining features of a State’s status
Geographical and environmental determinism

35. WATER - GEOPOLITICS Neo-Malthusianism: « WATER WARS»
Demographic growth, resource scarcity and violent conflict
Cornucopian perspectives: cooperation vs. conflict
Available but mismanaged resources
Need to evaluate resources economically (price)
(Homer-Dixon)

36. WATER WARS?

37. The Debate
The inevitability of water conflicts is supported by quantitative and qualitative analysis. The link between water and violent conflict is thus confirmed.
As a strategic security concern, water can become a source of conflict but interdependent riparian states are more likely to cooperate over water.

38. Water & Security
A new debate on national security: critical security studies (CSS)
Enlargement of threats: from traditional (military, economic) to non-traditional (environment, resources, health)
Link between environmental problems and emergence of conflicts
« Environmental security »
Critical security studies: (Krause & Williams, 1997).
Securitization: (Buzan,Waever & de Wilde, 1998)

39. Research Questions
What linkages are established between the environment and security? How can they explain the successful securitization of the environment as a referent object since the 1990s.
Some would argue that resource scarcities have been over-securitized in the last decades. How? Why? What about current trends towards the securitization of the environment in relation to development?

40. Environmental Security (1)
Transnational environmental problems
Resource-based conflicts

41. Environmental Security (2)
Toronto School (Homer-Dixon, 1993, 1994)
Oslo School (Gledditsch, 1998, 2000)
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars (ECSP), Washington.

42. THE SECURITIZATION OF WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
Link between environmental problems (water) and national security issues
Threat perception
Securitization of environmental problems: maintain local biosphere as an essential support on which will depend all other human activities (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 74)

43. UNDERLYING CONCEPTS
Negotiation
Power (asymmetry)
Conflict (resolution)

44. Water, Conflict and Negotiation

45. NEGOTIATION ELEMENTS
Actors
Structure
Process
Strategies
Results

46. ACTORS
Defining the Hegemon: State that temporarily gains a preponderance of power in the international and/or regional system
It can unilaterally dominate the rules
and procedures that guide political and economic relations – and water dynamics

47. STRUCTURE
Asymmetry of power (upstream/downstream, military, economic resources)
History of relations (politics, culture, etc..)
Structural power (1st dimension of power)

48. Cooperative, integrative Conflict-oriented, distributive
PROCESS
Cooperative, integrative
(win-win)
Conflict-oriented, distributive
(win-lose)
Mixed (but predominantly…)

49. Bargaining Power (« 2nd face of power »)
STRATEGIES
Bargaining Power (« 2nd face of power »)
Time
Costs of no agreement

50. Bilateral vs. basin-wide, temporary vs. lasting, stable, unstable
AGREEMENTS
Bilateral vs. basin-wide, temporary vs. lasting, stable, unstable
Structure of agreements =
power structure (Schelling, 1960)
BATNA: Best Alternative to No Agreement

51. How to reach agreements in situations of Hydro-Hegemony?
Security dilemma
Unilateral upstream development = dependence and insecurity for downstream riparians
 Bargaining power: reverse of asymmetrical dynamics

52. Some Counter-Hegemony Strategies
Issue-Linkage: linkage, securitization process
Change the other riparian’s utilities & alternatives
Impact on strategic, economic, security interests
Immediate interests: food and water security
General interests: regional, border security
International Law: source of bargaining and structural power for dependent and/or downstream riparians

53. Power Asymmetry: The Debate
Power asymmetry between strong and weaker riparians constitutes a major source of water conflict. The will of the stronger states prevails and determines the course of action.
Power asymmetry between strong and weaker riparians constitutes a major source of water cooperation A difference in power symmetries presents an opportunity for weaker riparians to find solutions and strategies to impact the process and final outcome, thus enhancing the “power of the weak”.

54. Water Conflict Resolution
Asymmetry of power: specific to water conflicts vs. political or some other environmental conflicts
Resolve the conflict by addressing the structure of conflict, not causes
“Desecuritization” process: focus on interests, power and rights

55. POWER ASYMMETRY AND HYDRO-HEGEMONY
Research findings: more efficient outcomes if asymmetry of power (power strategies)
– limits to Hydro-Hegemony
Only bilateral agreements – limits to issue linkage and downstream power

56. Water Cooperation & Economics

57. «Cornucopian » perspectives
Political Economy
Cooperative solutions through water markets and pricing of water:
Virtual water
Demand management
Benefit-sharing

58. The Debate
Cooperation through joint water management, information-sharing, monitoring, etc. can provide the incentive for broader cooperation between co-riparians that is needed for effective de-securitization, thus allowing for conflict prevention/transformation, mutual benefit-sharing and development of all the concerned riparian states.

59. Policy & Research Findings
“Transboundary Water Cooperation as a Tool for Conflict Prevention and Broader Benefit-Sharing”, Expert Group on Development Issues of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
Co-authored with Phillips, Mc Caffrey, Öjendal, & Turton, 2006.

60. The framework for the approach
Specific research and policy-oriented questions:
What role does the sharing of benefits play in the conflict/cooperation debate?
Can cooperation on the sharing of international watercourses be utilized as a broader conflict prevention tool?
What are the key areas for development partners in integrating trans-boundary water management more closely into their overall development agendas?

61. From ‘Water Wars’ to the Sharing of Benefits
Options for cooperation and the amicable sharing of benefits resulting from professionally managed watersheds.
The ‘desecuritization of water resource management’

62. Benefit-Sharing Sadoff and Grey (2002)
Simplest and most useful general framework to date
Benefits from cooperation over a shared river basin may be divided into four different categories: ‘environmental’, ‘economic’, ‘political’, and ‘catalytic’.

63. The Inter-SEDE Model
Phillips et al., 2006: assumption that a well-managed watershed will provide enhanced benefits in terms of Security, Economic Development, and the Environment
Comparative analysis for the Jordan, the Kagera and the Mekong basins
Establishment of relevant categories of indicators for 21 riparians of the three basins

64. Categories of Benefits
Security: promotion of peaceful relations, reduction of military expenditure, prevention of human and societal insecurity.
Economic development: enhancement of trade, food production, local household consumption, livelihoods.
Both of the above elements are nested in the environment: contribution to biodiversity, promotion of sustainable management of trans-boundary resources, access to sufficient w. resources.

65. Identify Key Drivers Use indicators to identify key drivers
All riparians have been ranked for all the indicators and resulting ranks placed in five bands: 1-5
Conclusions: relative importance of different categories of drivers

66. CONCLUSIONS
Clear need for further development of the concept as a whole: “one size does not fit all”
Over-riding importance of security-related dynamics: securitization/de-securitization dynamics
Any successful benefit-sharing scheme will require the generation of a ‘broad basket’ of possible benefits to act as an inducement to each co-riparian to be involved.
Benefit-sharing will need to be established based on concrete inducements which can be quantified
Equitable allocation vs. benefits: two sides of same coin

67. From Theory to Reality?
Testing the frameworks in the Jordan and Mekong Basins.