1. Lectures in Macroeconomics- Charles W. Upton Breton Woods

2. 2 System planned during World War II –Named after hotel in New Hampshire –Lasted until 1971

3. Breton Woods 3

4. 4 System planned during World War II –Named after hotel in New Hampshire –Lasted until 1971 Fixed rates desirable, but gold standard impractical

5. Breton Woods 5 The Plan All currencies pegged to the dollar. Nations pledged to maintain exchange rate.

6. Breton Woods 6 The Plan All currencies pegged to the dollar. Nations pledged to maintain exchange rate. M Y P Peg This rate keeps supply and demand of (say) £ in balance

7. Breton Woods 7 The Plan All currencies pegged to the dollar. Nations pledged to maintain exchange rate. In these conditions, lower price level to P Peg M Y P Peg

8. Breton Woods 8 The Plan All currencies pegged to the dollar. Nations pledged to maintain exchange rate. In these conditions, lower price level to P Peg M Y P Peg

9. Breton Woods 9 Backup Each nation had a central bank, a bank’s bank. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) would be their bank of last resort. M Y P Peg

10. Breton Woods 10 Backup Each nation had a central bank, a bank’s bank. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) would be their bank of last resort. If the demand for £ temporarily exceeded the supply of £, the IMF would lend $. It would insist on domestic reforms to drive P to P Peg The US would often help out.

11. Breton Woods 11 The Plan Adopt monetary and fiscal policies to shift Y and M curves Alternatively, restrict trade and impose currency controls M Y P Peg

12. Breton Woods 12 The Extreme Backup The foreign government could devalue (say from 1£ = $4.80 to 1£ = $2.80).

13. Breton Woods 13 The Extreme Backup The foreign government could devalue (say from 1£ = $4.80 to 1£ = $2.80). When devaluation looked likely, there was a lot of exchange speculation.

14. Breton Woods 14 The Extreme Backup The foreign government could devalue (say from 1£ = $4.80 to 1£ = $2.80). When devaluation looked likely, there was a lot of exchange speculation. 1£= $3 1£ = $2. Borrow £100,000,000, exchange it for $300,000,000.

15. Breton Woods 15 The Extreme Backup The foreign government could devalue (say from 1£ = $4.80 to 1£ = $2.80). When devaluation looked likely, there was a lot of exchange speculation. 1£= $3 1£ = $2. Borrow £100,000,000, exchange it for $300,000,000. If £ devalued, exchange the $300,000,000 for £150,000,000: Profit = £50,000,000.

16. Breton Woods 16 The Extreme Backup The foreign government could devalue (say from 1£ = $4.80 to 1£ = $2.80). When devaluation looked likely, there was a lot of exchange speculation. 1£= $3 1£ = $2. Borrow £100,000,000, exchange it for $300,000,000. If £ devalued, exchange the $300,000,000 for £150,000,000: Profit = £50,000,000. If £ not devalued exchange the $300,000,000 for £100,000,000. Profit = Loss = 0.

17. Breton Woods 17 The Extreme Backup The foreign government could devalue (say from 1£ = $4.80 to 1£ = $2.80). When devaluation looked likely, there was a lot of exchange speculation. 1£= $3 1£ = $2. Borrow £100,000,000, exchange it for $300,000,000. If £ devalued, exchange the $300,000,000 for £150,000,000: Profit = £50,000,000. If £ not devalued exchange the $300,000,000 for £100,000,000. Profit = Loss = 0. Heads I win, tails you reimburse me for my losses.

18. Breton Woods 18 The Flaw Suppose P f > P peg. M Y P Peg PfPf

19. Breton Woods 19 The Flaw Suppose P f > P peg. More people would want to purchase $ for £ than people wanted to purchase £ for $. M Y P Peg PfPf

20. Breton Woods 20 The Flaw Suppose P f > P peg. More people would want to purchase $ for £ than people wanted to purchase £ for $. The British would have a difficult choice M Y P Peg PfPf

21. Breton Woods 21 The Flaw Suppose P f > P peg. More people would want to purchase $ for £ than people wanted to purchase £ for $. The British would have a difficult choice M Y P Peg PfPf They could tighten their belt, much as a household facing bankruptcy might. –A recession would result.

22. Breton Woods 22 The Flaw Suppose P f > P peg. More people would want to purchase $ for £ than people wanted to purchase £ for $. The British would have a difficult choice M Y P Peg PfPf They could tighten their belt, much as a household facing bankruptcy might. –A recession would result. Ignore their commitments to the IMF and fixed exchange rates

23. Breton Woods 23 The Consequences This was not a difficult choice –When choice was between using monetary policy to fight unemployment or to meet obligations to IMF, the IMF was the loser.

24. Breton Woods 24 The Consequences This was not a difficult choice –When choice was between using monetary policy to fight unemployment or to meet obligations to IMF, the IMF was the loser. –Speculation was rampant. –Devaluations became more and more common.

25. Breton Woods 25 The Consequences This was not a difficult choice In 1971, President Nixon put the fixed exchange rates out of their misery and started floating the dollar.

26. Breton Woods 26 Why did Fixed Exchange Rates Fail? Independent Monetary Systems End of US Dominance –United Kingdom wants to sell more £ than foreigners wanted to buy. For a long time, the US bailed them out. –That is D $ >S $ –But when D $ < S $, we were forced to devalue.

27. Breton Woods 27 Why did Fixed Exchange Rates Fail? Independent Monetary Systems End of US Dominance Ease of Speculation –Heads I win, tails you reimburse me.

28. Breton Woods 28 Fixed Rates Today Many nations follow this system today. –US –Canada –United Kingdom –Japan –Europe

29. Breton Woods 29 Are there Alternatives? Managed Floats or Crawling Pegs Currency Boards Monetary Unions

30. Breton Woods 30 End ©2005 Charles W. Upton. All rights reserved